

The Month in Review



IN YEARS PAST Spring usually brought political respite to the harried peasants of Eastern Europe. The great strides in collectivization, the expropriation of land and the confiscation of goods, the "anti-kulak" campaigns, as well as the governmental ukases and reorganizations, normally took place in winter, in a pause between autumn harvest and Spring sowing. Then, as snow melted in the fields, Party agitators would descend on the villages exhorting farmers to ready themselves for the tasks ahead. They would call meetings at which they brandished the latest decrees on Spring preparedness dealing with machinery, fertilizers and all the complexities of agricultural production. Thereafter long weeks of hard work would follow, when the Party generally thought it wiser to concentrate on output while tempering its theoretical dicta and for a time halting its "reforms." This year, however, the breathing spell either did not materialize or came late, granted with obvious reluctance. In all the countries in the area, demands for more strenuous efforts and much higher production were coupled to a simultaneous increase in the Party's interference in rural life. The basic intention, apparently even in Poland, is to press for more direct control over the agricultural sector to bring it into line not only with each separate "Socialist" State Plan but also with the Soviet bloc's current drive for overall economic integration. In the final analysis this amounts to an endeavor by the regimes to extract a greater share of the peasant's product for State use. As reflected in official policies it spells collectivization or, in countries where this process is already completed or well under way, further refinements in the system.

This essentially doctrinaire approach has brought a return to the threat of force, which in some cases has actually been applied on a wide scale. It has also brought in its wake renewed peasant resistance, disorganization and financial loss. Nowhere is this bitter harvest more depressingly evident than in Hungary, where in the first three months of the year over 350,000 peasants were herded into collectives, adding more than a million hectares to the "Socialist sector" and increasing the collectivized area from 13.5 to 37 percent of the land. The use of coercion was openly admitted. As one Communist writer put it, "I am convinced that not a single peasant would have joined a collective farm [in the author's place of birth] of his own free will." They joined, the account reveals, because they felt threatened with imprisonment, because sons and daughters were dispatched from factories with orders not to return until their parents had complied with the regime's wishes, and also because "in one village it was simply announced by beat of drum that from that day onward the village was a collectivized village. . . ." It seems that the regime itself was taken by surprise; Kadar admitted that the drive had gone faster and further than anticipated. The result was chaos. The larger tracts of land require more machinery, but no provision had been made to increase deliveries. In fact until recently the regime had prided itself on its exports of farm machinery and made a special point of helping China by beating delivery deadlines. Now Hungary is hurriedly importing tractors from neighboring countries in an attempt to save a bad situation made worse (the Yugoslavs report) by the peasants' sale of their horses.

In Romania, a recent decree set out to "liquidate, in all forms, the survival of exploitation of man by man in the field of agriculture." By this measure of expropriation, all land the individual peasant cannot farm on his own will automatically be transferred to the "Socialist sector." Compensation has been promised, but only as a general prin-

ciple to be carried out at the discretion of the State authorities. The measure is thus essentially confiscatory and aimed at the decimation of private farming to the immediate and direct advantage of the collective farms. Not content with this, the regime, by a decision of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, appreciably tightened its control over State farms. From now on each such farm will have a council whose strongest member will be the Party organizer—"a comrade who has given evidence of energy, passion and determination in carrying out Party and State tasks . . . having political training equivalent to that of a District Secretary." What is remarkable is that these two decrees were issued at the very time it was disclosed that last year's grain output was abnormally low, amounting to only 7.3 million tons as against 11 million the year before. The Five Year Plan calls for a target of 15 million tons next year. Repression and rigid control are unlikely to produce this scheduled amount.

To the south, in Bulgaria, the discrepancy between the probable effects of specific measures taken and the fanciful planning of overall targets is even wider. This year alone agricultural production is supposed to increase by more than 73 percent. This is to be accomplished by more investment, greater human effort, large-scale irrigation and land reclamation. In the first quarter of the year, however, the press has been filled with complaints that the grandiose "leap forward" had limped to an awkward start. But instead of catering to the farmers, the regime increased its pressure. By a decree of mid-April the enlarged collective farms were ordered to stop "spending collective funds earmarked for capital investments on payments to members."

The same problem, with a similar recommendation for its solution, has arisen in Czechoslovakia. Collectivization has advanced steadily and will probably be completed next year without too much difficulty. The State, however, is not profiting as it thinks it should. "I believe," said First Secretary Novotny, "that we have bred more pigs on our farms; not, of course, on the collective or State farms, but on private plots . . . the consumption of meat of the farming population itself has gone up . . . our agriculture is not up to the level required by our national economy." To "improve matters," the Minister of Agriculture was recently fired, taxes for remaining smallholders were raised, collectives were ordered to invest more and consume less and, above all, Party organizations were ordered to step up their activities.

Poland remains the exception, but only in comparison with the other countries. In terms of internal evolution, the spirit, if not the measures, are the same. The will to collectivize was again repeated at the recent Third Congress. The words this time seem to presage some action, for now a concrete line of action has been laid down. It was broached as follows in a *Trybuna Ludu* article entitled "After the Third Congress": "At this moment, the decisive issue is the transformation of agricultural circles into a mass, universal peasant organization. . . ." A few days later the major economic review called the circles "management embryos of future Socialist agricultural enterprise" and recommended that they should "become the center of all forms of group activity in a given community." Both these statements drew attention to a passage in a speech by Gomulka at the Congress in which he stated that all available resources should be used to increase agricultural production. And he added: "This purpose may well be served by agricultural circles. It will be no sin if we aid their development and their activities by means of administrative methods, too."

Gomulka went on to say that such methods should only be "auxiliary," but the fact that he used the expression—now accepted in Eastern Europe as a euphemism for Stalinist pressures—and used it in connection with the most sensitive subject in Poland's national life, bodes ill for the future. There are at present some 16,500 agricultural circles with 450,000 members. This is a small number compared with the 40,000 farm communities and the more than 10 million peasants. But the circles are important to the regime insofar as they are freely-constituted groupings for mutual assistance which had already existed before the war, almost completely disappeared in Stalinist days and were reborn after October 1956. Thus, like the workers' councils in their brief period of freedom, they represent popular opinion. And like the councils they could be undermined and controlled to do the regime's bidding—in the service of collectivization.



The Congress in session; facing the podium surmounted by Marx and Lenin.

Swiat (Warsaw), March 22, 1959

The Third Party Congress

IF A STUDENT of Machiavelli had wandered into the gathering in Warsaw's Palace of Culture last March he might have concluded, after making the necessary allowances for language and ceremony, that the techniques of power had not changed a great deal since fifteenth-century Florence. The principals of the occasion were, to a surprising extent, the same men who had delivered Poland over to Stalin in 1948 and had later, in 1956, denounced Stalin as a tyrant. They were now extolling the work of Stalin's successor. These men, the Ochabs, Zambrowskis, Jedrychowskis and Zawadskis, had come to applaud a leader whom they had condemned only a few years earlier as a "right-wing nationalist deviationist" and to hail him for saving them from the fury of the Polish people. Much of the oratory at the Congress might have been composed for the previous Congress five years before, with slight amendments to allow for the passage of time. While there was no withdrawal from the principles of the famous "Polish October," that phrase itself was never mentioned, and the heady independence of those days was replaced with the new cant of "proletarian internationalism."

Savior of the Party

THE MONOTONY of the proceedings and the sameness of the faces did not mean that nothing had changed since the Second Congress in March 1954—when Gomulka was in prison and the name of Stalin was still being honored. That Congress occurred at the beginning of a turbulent period of transition during which the Soviet empire struggled to divest itself of the more outrageous aspects of

Stalin's system and to achieve a new equilibrium under Khrushchev. In Poland the period began with a revision of economic planning designed to offset the decline in living standards that had taken place since 1949, was followed by the political and cultural "thaw" of 1955 and 1956, and reached a dramatic peak in October 1956 when Wladyslaw Gomulka was reinstated as a member of the Central Committee and elected First Secretary of the Party despite the personal intervention of Khrushchev himself. (A similar chain of developments in Hungary led to open revolt and the temporary destruction of Hungary's Communist Party, which had been unable to change its leadership without losing its grasp on the country.)

Neutralization and Compromise

Much of Gomulka's political effort in the succeeding two years was devoted to neutralizing some of the very elements that had supported his return to power. While discarding some of the Stalinists who had fought him, he made it clear that he had no intention of amending the received doctrines of Marxism-Leninism as they were currently interpreted in Moscow. Those of his supporters in the Party who had grander ideas were labelled "revisionists" and forced to choose either silence or expulsion from the Party. For the bulk of his support he looked to the central element of old-time Party men who had been the mainstay of Polish Communism even during the Stalinist years, but who had not been hopelessly compromised by the excesses of that time.

To save the Party, Gomulka had to come to terms with powerful forces in Poland which were hostile to Communism. He made an agreement with the Roman Catholic

Church permitting religious instruction in schools and changing the method of appointing ecclesiastical personnel. He called off the Party's efforts to force the peasants into collective farms against their wish. He allowed a measure of freedom to speak and write which, despite a later tightening of controls, still exceeds that to be found elsewhere in the Communist world.

These were concessions to the Polish nation by a political party which has no roots in the country and would prefer to rule by sufferance rather than by force. Gomulka made no concessions in doctrine. In his speeches he still maintained that collective farming was the only way ahead for the Polish peasant, and that the Church was to be tolerated only because it had the strong support of the Polish people. Notwithstanding his assertion that the essence of Socialism was the abolition of man's exploitation of man, he never allowed his followers to believe that it could be achieved outside of the dogmas of Marxism-Leninism.

The Third Congress was originally scheduled for December 1957, and preparations for it had been made by the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee in May 1957. But disunity in the Party forced the leadership, evidently unsure of its control, to postpone the Congress while it conducted a purge of the ranks. The purge was launched at the Tenth Plenum in October 1957 and was directed chiefly at "revisionists," although the Stalinist "dogmatists" and a motley group of corrupt and careerist elements also came under fire. Another reason for the delay may have been the economic crisis through which the country was passing.

October Downgraded

The 1,411 delegates who assembled in the Warsaw skyscraper on March 10—twenty were absent—heard Gomulka report that the Party had successfully passed through the trials that began in 1956 and was now ready to lead the country forward in the general direction mapped out by Soviet Premier Khrushchev at the Twenty-First Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in January. Gomulka's speech, nominally a report by the Central Committee on its work since the last Congress, was even longer than the one Khrushchev had delivered. It combined the apocalyptic drone of standard Communist rhetoric with the note of reasoned argument that is typically Polish, and was intended to assure Moscow of the Polish Party's orthodoxy while at the same time assuring the Polish people that the crude "mistakes" of past years would never be repeated. He alluded to the famous "Polish October"—when the country seemed about to rise against Soviet imperialism and against the Party which had faithfully implemented Moscow's orders—only as "the time of the eighth plenum of the Central Committee." His account of those hectic days, buried deep in the six-hour speech, was a masterpiece of political exorcism:

"The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union condemned and eliminated from the practice of Soviet life the errors and perversions associated with the cult of the individual [Stalin's tyranny—Ed.]. . . . Our Party associates with the 20th Congress of the CPSU changes in its activity which were extremely important and



On the way to the podium: right to left, Party leader Gomulka, Politburo-member Roman Zambrowski, Premier Cyrankiewicz and Politburo-member Jerzy Morawski.

Swiat (Warsaw), March 22, 1959

positive in their effects. These found their expression in the resolutions of the eighth plenum of the PZPR [Polish Party] CC, resolutions which, while emerging from the social needs of our country and determined by the concrete situation in Poland, nonetheless would not have been possible without the 20th Congress of the CPSU. . . . The eighth plenum of the PZPR Central Committee introduced changes in the Party's political line, aiming at the knitting of tighter bonds with the masses and facilitating a favorable solution of the basic tasks facing People's Poland in the given stage. . . . At the same time the eighth plenum finally and firmly overcame the errors of the earlier activities of the Party which restricted Socialist democracy and internal Party democracy and tolerated infringements of the Socialist rule of law. The eighth plenum put an end to the temporary but serious political crisis in the Party and society. That crisis manifested itself in the dissatisfaction of part of the workers' class as well as in the incapacity of the Party's leading organs, which lasted for several months, to take concerted and consistent action."

International Affairs

HE BEGAN his speech with a survey of the relative economic strength of the Soviet Union and the United States. He repeated Khrushchev's boast that "we will bury you" by remarking that capitalism, for all its wealth, is "a dying system condemned by historical development to leave the arena of human history" while Socialism, for all its poverty, will soon "catch up with the most economically developed countries." As if realizing that this statement sounded hollow to a Polish audience more concerned with the housing problem than with the death of capitalism, he added that the United States had a housing problem too.

"A housing shortage exists not only in our country, but also in highly developed capitalist countries, but in the

latter the shortage results from causes different from ours. . . . So the United States cannot solve its housing problem. . . . The capitalists cannot liquidate the slums because the people inhabiting them earn too little to be able to pay the rents for bigger apartments."

The German Problem

On foreign policy he repeated the standard Communist line with respect to Western military bases, Western imperialism and the nature of the cold war. He dwelt at length on the German question, underlining the fact—of particular significance to a Polish audience—that the Western signatories of the Potsdam Agreement had not yet recognized Polish sovereignty in the German Oder-Neisse territories, which the Agreement had assigned to Polish administration pending a final settlement. He said that "all reasonably minded persons, and politicians even more so, could not have the slightest doubt that the confirmation in the future peace treaty with Germany of the Polish western frontier fixed in the Potsdam Agreement would be purely a formality." The West's silence on the matter, he charged, was "a form of payment to the West German imperialists" for their participation in NATO, and did not reflect a desire in the West to return those territories to German administration. He suggested that the Western powers also wanted to use the issue as a bargaining counter to detach Poland from the Soviet bloc, a hope which he said would be futile.

He reminded the West that Poland had also lost territory to the Soviet Union. The attitude of the West German government toward the Oder-Neisse territories

was a natural one, since "no nation lightly accepts the loss of territory which had previously been part of its State, even though it had been possessed illegally."

"We know this very well from our own Polish example of Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian territories which have justly been returned to their mother Soviet republics, just as our Pias lands on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse have been returned to their Polish motherland. It usually takes time, and primarily it takes a correct policy by State and Party leaders to make a nation—and not only its progressive part—understand that the frontier changes that have been carried out are just."


Repeating the Soviet charge that the West's policy on Germany had been dominated by "Adenauer and the West German militarists" who wished to lead Germany back onto "the well-known militarist road of *Drang nach Osten*," he stated that Poland fully supported the Soviet proposals for a peace treaty and the transformation of West Berlin into a free city with its status guaranteed by the United Nations.

USSR: First Among Equals

He gave a new formulation of Poland's relation to the rest of the Communist bloc. Since October 1956 this relation had been a sensitive question in Poland, and the Polish Party had been visibly reluctant to accept the Soviet Union as its titular leader—a point on which the other Satellite Parties seemed to feel no difficulty. The Poles had been willing to allow only that the Soviet Union was "the first country of Socialism." Gomulka's new periphrasis seemed to grant everything that Moscow could possibly want, without actually conceding the verbal point:

"In the international Communist movement there are no superior and inferior Parties. All are equal and independent. . . . But all the Parties together, aware of the responsibility for the unity of the international Communist movement, are guided by the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism. . . . These principles are common to all Communist and Workers' Parties, though one of them, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, enjoys in this group of equal Parties special authority and occupies a leading position. To this position it has been driven by history. . . . The Soviet Union is the central nerve of the world Socialist system, the mainstay of all Socialist countries, and together with them the hope of all progressive mankind for the salvation of the world from the destructive abyss of atomic war."

The exception to this, of course, was Yugoslavia, which had broken away from the movement by "its own will and the will of its leaders. Where does it belong, then? Nowhere. It has gone astray. The League of Yugoslav Communists does not belong to any part of the world workers' movement, neither to the part led by the Communists nor to that which remains under the influence of reformist Socialist and Social Democratic parties." He went on to deliver what has become the standard attack against Yugoslav "revisionism" and the refusal of the Yugoslav Communists to sign the twelve-Party Moscow declaration in November 1957. "Our Party, as well as all the Parties which are members of the international Communist move-



Polish First Party Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka delivering his six-hour speech to the Third Congress.

Swiat (Warsaw), March 15, 1959

ment, is not linked by any Party bonds with the League of Yugoslav Communists. . . . With Yugoslavia as a State, Poland maintains normal, friendly relations." His censures were mild, however, compared with those that have been issued in most Communist countries, and did not approach the diatribes of the Chinese and Albanians.

Poland's Economy

IN THE FIVE YEARS since the previous Congress, Poland had weathered an economic crisis of proportions that would have seemed large for a capitalist country and impossible for the rationally planned society of the Marxist storybooks. The crisis, which resulted from the haste, waste and thoughtlessness of the Stalinist planners, had underlain most of the political developments since the beginning of 1956. (For a detailed discussion of the subject, see "Poland's Economy Since 1956," beginning on page 15.)

The Congress was intended to mark the end of the crisis and to launch the country on a new period of economic development. In his address, Gomulka tried to show a continuity between the economic policies of the Second Congress and those of the Third. He maintained that the Second Congress had recognized the developing crisis and had introduced "fundamental changes in economic policy"—a statement which did more than justice to the temporizing measures of his predecessors. "Nevertheless," he continued, "the changes introduced at the Second Party Congress proved insufficient. A number of important problems demanding solution emerged. A more radical leveling off of the disproportions in the national economy, better supplies for the market, a change in the methods of planning and management of the economy, increased material incentives in production, and so forth, were necessary."

He did not try to claim credit for the measures themselves, which he evidently regarded as beyond controversy. He presented himself as the leader who had been able to carry the measures out, and to rally the people to a new confidence in the wisdom of the Party. "The toiling masses gave support to the Party policy because they convinced themselves that the Party was conducting a correct policy, that its words tallied with deeds. This capital of trust is the greatest achievement of our policy during the period since the eighth plenum of the Party's Central Committee [when Gomulka was made First Secretary—Ed.]."

The task of leading the Party through that crisis period and of rescuing it from the consequences of its economic sins had been a large one indeed. The enthusiasm of the first years of Poland's postwar reconstruction had vanished by the end of the Six Year Plan (1949-1955), which had been touted as the pathway to a golden future but which had instead produced a large democracy of misery. To sell "confidence" in the Party to a restless, embittered proletariat and a hostile peasantry required extraordinary maneuvers, and Gomulka had not really succeeded. At best he had bought a certain amount of acquiescence. The Five Year Plan (1956-1960) had been several times revised in an effort to raise living standards as quickly as possible, and Gomulka could show evidence that real


wages had gone up nearly 25 percent since 1955 as a result of his policies. Concessions to the needs of a functioning agriculture had improved the position of the peasant and encouraged him to invest in his own future. The methods and goals of economic planning had been reshaped to a sufficient degree so that a rational man could hope for continued industrial progress and a slow, undramatic rise in the standard of living. The Party was ready for a look into the future, and that was the chief item on the Congress agenda.

The Next Seven Years

The new Plan is, in effect, a Seven Year Plan corresponding to the one announced by Nikita Khrushchev at the Soviet Party Congress in January. It comprises the last two years of the current Five Year Plan (1959 and 1960) and a Second Five Year Plan covering the years 1961 through 1965. It meshes Poland's economy with those of the other Soviet bloc countries through long-term trade agreements and through the coordinating activities of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (an inter-governmental body charged with working out a division of labor among the Satellite economies). Whatever the sentiments of the Poles, their destiny is now linked more firmly than ever to the economic development of the Soviet Union.

POLISH FAMILY'S BUDGET

U.S. FAMILY'S BUDGET



One measure of living standards is the proportion of the budget that is spent on food. In 1955, average workers' families in Czechoslovakia spent 50 percent of their budgets on food; in Austria, 46.3 percent; and in Switzerland, 38.2 percent.

Sources: Polish Statistical Office, *Biuletyn Statystyczny* (Warsaw), January 1959; U.S. Department of Labor, *Economic Forces in the U.S.A. in Facts and Figures*, 1957; International Labor Office, *Year Book of Labor Statistics* (Geneva), 1957.

Although Poland is an agricultural country, its people must work long hours to obtain the mere necessities of life. The chart illustrates the distance between the Polish worker and his fortunate American counterpart. In Denmark, in 1955, the corresponding figures were: potatoes, 7; sugar, 6; rice, 15; bread, 10; milk, 8; margarine, 10; eggs, 20.

Sources: Polish Statistical Office, *Biuletyn Statystyczny* (Warsaw); U.S. Department of Labor, *Economic Forces in the U.S.A. in Facts and Figures*, 1957; National Industrial Conference Board, *The Economic Almanac* (New York), 1958.


During the next seven years Polish industrial output is to expand by 80 percent, or at an average annual rate of 8.5 percent—figures identical to those envisaged by the Soviet planners for the same period. In 1965, according to Gomulka, Poland should produce 9 million tons of steel, 112 million tons of bituminous coal and around 44 billion kilowatt-hours of electric power. The new planning is a return in some respects to the old Communist preoccupation with heavy industry, including the belief that production of the means of production ought to rise faster than the production of consumer goods, even in the long run. On the other hand, it reflects the new emphasis—sponsored by Khrushchev—on chemistry and synthetic materials and fertilizers, vital elements in any modern economy.

Collectivization Still the Goal

To the Polish peasant, Gomulka's address must have sounded ambiguous and somewhat depressing. He lectured his Party comrades, as every good Communist must, on the importance of collectivizing agriculture. At the same time he cautioned them to bear in mind "the voluntary principle and respect for the will of the peasant." It was the same formula so often invoked in the Communists' long struggle with the East European peasant: in Hungary, during the first three months of 1959, it has been consonant with the herding of 350,000 peasants into collective farms; in Poland, for two years, it has meant an uneasy compromise with private farming and a stagnation of the collective sector at less than one percent of the arable land. What it will mean for Poland's farmers in coming years will apparently depend on the balance of political forces both at home and abroad. For the record, at least, Gomulka was emphatic. "The Socialist reconstruction of the countryside is in the best interests of the working peasantry, just as the Socialization of industry is in the interest of the working classes and the entire nation. That is why it is necessary that our Party . . . talk with peasants as often as possible, mold their awareness, and, as far as peasants appreciate their own stand and ours, help them in setting up collective farms."

If production of food is to be the criterion, Gomulka will hold off on collectivization a long time (though that consideration has not deterred his colleagues in other countries). "We need badly," he said, "an increase in agricultural production of some 30 percent over the next seven years." He asked the farmers to raise grain yields per hectare by 20 percent, potato yields by 33 percent, the number of cattle by 28-34 percent. These targets, fairly conservative by the standards of Communist planning, would bring Poland's farm output to a little above the level that had been envisaged for 1955 back in the hopeful year of 1949.

MINUTES OF WORKTIME REQUIRED TO BUY CERTAIN ITEMS (FOR AN AVERAGE FACTORY WORKER)



The Party and the People

HAVING GIVEN UP certain salients of political power during the strategic retreat of 1956, Gomulka now seemed intent on winning them back. About a third of his speech was concerned with critical areas in which the Party was not the militant force that, by profession, it should have been. "When there is a weakening of the Party's activity," he said, "and of its leading position, when Party organizations and committees let the helm of social life slip from their hands, the way is paved for action by hostile anti-Socialist forces. Social life does not tolerate a political vacuum."

Warning to the Church

The only area he crossed off the Party's political map was that of personal religious belief. The Church as an institution, however, must recognize "the social system existing in Poland" and behave "in accordance with the *raison d'état* of the Polish People's Republic . . . remain solely a church . . . limit itself to questions of faith and stay within the church." This restriction, he said, was not always observed in practice. "We warn the church hierarchy against breaking the law and State decrees, a practice which has again become noticeable. We advise them to stop provoking the people's authority, because it will do the church no good."

"Socialist Legality"

He also staked out the Party's claim in the area of civil administration and justice, where political considerations had been a notorious source of abuse in the past. He said that the Party had "overcome and removed the distortions and abuses, the violations of legality which appeared in the period from 1949 through 1954," but implied that the counter-tendency had perhaps gone too far. What was needed now was a "rapid overcoming of the excessive liberalism expressed in the light treatment of activities directed against the people's State, in the withering away in some organs of the judicial system of the class attitude toward the problems of administration of justice, and in the overly tolerant treatment accorded frauds and thefts of public property." He said that officers of justice and State employees occupying responsible posts should be chosen on the basis of political qualifications as well as for their competence.

"A decisive significance for insuring Socialist legality is wielded by political work among the workers of the judiciary and of the apparatus of State control, and by assurance that the Party has a guiding influence and control over the entire apparatus of State rule. Our primary task in this sphere is to insure that staffs are recruited from people who are honest, devoted to Socialism, and possess necessary qualifications."

Educating Communists

During 1956 the Party suffered a severe setback in its activities among the youth, who had rebelled against Party

Production of Basic Items per Capita, 1957 (In kilowatt-hours and kilograms)

	Poland	Czechoslovakia	France	West Germany	Italy	England
Electric power	748	1,327	1,307	1,747	881	2,052
Coal	3,325	1,811	1,291	2,786	21	4,416
Crude steel	187	387	320	521	140	429
Cement	159	275	289	365	251	236
Aluminum	0.7	1.2	3.6	2.9	1.4	0.7
Sulfuric acid	17.6	33.3	36.3	50.7	42.6	46.2
Plastics	0.7	3.9	3.7	11.0	2.6	7.7
Synthetic fibers	2.1	3.5	3.2	4.8	3.3	4.4

Source: *Gospodarka Planowa* (Warsaw), November 1958.

direction, and it was forced to acquiesce in the disbandment of the Polish Youth Union (ZMP). In place of the old Stalinist organization two new ones were created: the Socialist Youth Union (ZMS) and the Rural Youth Union (ZMW), which now have a combined total of 480,000 members as compared with the 2,000,000 of their predecessor. While not satisfied with their present state, Gomulka depicted them as growing "ideologically and politically stronger."

"On the initiative of the ZMS, the movement of labor competition in industry is reviving, 3,600 youth production brigades have come into being, and the voluntary labor detachments are developing. . . . The ZMW takes an increasingly larger role in the agricultural training of youth and in the spreading of education, culture, and sport in the countryside. . . . The fundamental task of the youth organizations is the development and deepening of ideological-political work, the recruitment of ever broader masses of the youth for our cause, and the organization of the young patriots' selfless efforts in Socialist building, in the implementation of the Party's plans."

In his remarks on higher education, particularly the universities, Gomulka implied that the Party would keep its hands out of scholarly matters so long as the scholars did not use their liberties to spread "bourgeois ideology." In this he maintained the relatively tolerant attitude that has prevailed in Poland since the "thaw" of 1955 and 1956. He tempered his tolerance with a warning that "in recent years we have witnessed the negative feature of increased pressure by bourgeois ideology, the pressure of various tendencies of bourgeois thought. These tendencies owe their influence and importance not to their own strength . . . but to weak counteractivity by our comrades who frequently either remained silent or even supported, from revisionist positions, the attacks of hostile ideology against Marxism. It is true that recently cases of revisionists allying themselves with open opponents and enemies of Marxism have become rare, but the silence of many is still a testimonial to their internal conflicts."

He was mainly concerned with the social sciences, be-

cause of "their close links with ideology and politics." He observed that "it cannot be a matter of indifference to us what philosophical, sociological, economic, pedagogical and other views are spread throughout society, views in the spirit of which the young generation of our intelligentsia is being brought up." He set down four considerations that ought to govern the Party in its approach to the social sciences:

"What is involved in the first place is a consistent fight against all attempts to discriminate against Marxism, wherever they still appear in the scientific sphere.

"Secondly, what is involved is the fact that lectures bearing on outlook or general ideology, such as lectures on philosophy, sociology and economics, which are held for all students, should be conducted exclusively in a spirit of Marxism. These lectures have, after all, an educational purpose. . . .

"Thirdly, as far as the training of specialists in the social sciences is concerned, it is right that they should get the widest and deepest knowledge of the various trends and views appearing historically or at present. . . . Only in this way is it possible to train people to think independently and creatively. . . . At the same time, however, one should also be concerned with the profound Marxist research of these students.

"Fourthly, in the sphere of scientific research . . . one has to realize clearly that there are in our country quite a few serious scientists in these disciplines who are not Marxists . . . but whose output may be of far-reaching significance to our culture. . . . We need not fear the clash of views with such scholars. . . . We shall not, of course, allow the publication of pseudo-scientific works written from points of view hostile to Socialism. However, we shall not intervene administratively in normal scientific arguments, since such arguments ought to be settled by the scholars themselves. . . ."

While, within these limits, he was willing to leave the scholars in peace, he called for a resumption of Party influence on the students themselves. The old concern with the social origin of students was to be revived, and the Party was also to meddle with their thoughts. "More influence than previously must be exercised on the social composition of the students and the establishment of an ideological atmosphere among them. The new scholarship system gives us a major weapon to use in this matter."

No More "Black Literature"

Gomulka's tolerant totalitarianism will also be applied to literature and the other arts. The wide-open criticism of reality that broke forth in 1956 has long since been squelched, but the Polish artist still enjoys a relative amount of freedom compared with his brothers in other Communist countries. Gomulka put in the customary appeal for "Socialist realism," but added that artistic effort need not be confined to this formula. "We also support progressive creative work broadening man's horizons and shaping his moral character and his feeling for beauty. We publish the artistically valuable work of modern and contemporary artists who, without standing on a Marxist platform, serve by their work the cause of man's liberation."

These words were obviously a concession to the unreconstructed rebels in Polish arts and letters, many of them members or former members of the Party, who had shown a stubborn resistance to Gomulka's efforts to bring them back to Communist orthodoxy. He expressed his "anxiety" at the fact that some of the leaders of the Polish Writers' Union had defied the Party and were defending literary work that catered to "revisionist and bourgeois liberal political tendencies."

"Under the influence of these tendencies a certain number of works of a harmful ideological aspect have been created, a black literature proclaiming man's despair and helplessness in his social endeavors. Works have been created which blacken Socialism and praise its enemies. We refuse and shall continue to refuse to publish such works because they are not works of art but a weapon of political propaganda for anti-Socialist forces."



Poland's change in territory: 1939, top, and 1950. Eastern areas have been absorbed into the Soviet Union; the formerly German Western Territories have been added. The maintenance of the new western boundary is one of the cardinal points of Polish policy.

Map from "Poland," edited by Oscar Halecki, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957

He implied that the resistance of the writers to Party direction was possible only because a large bloc of Party members and spokesmen of the cultural elite did not share the official distaste for bourgeois ideas. These people, he complained, were still preoccupied with "the errors of our past policy" and refused to join in the Party's campaign against "revisionist ideology and fruitless negation."

Stresses in the Monolith

THE UNITED WORKERS' PARTY of the Third Congress was a purged and chastened body, smaller than at the previous two Congresses and numbering among its members ever fewer proletarians and peasants. The ranks had shrunk from about 1,503,000 in December 1948 to 1,023,425 in February 1959. About 200,000 members had been dropped between 1948 and 1954, most of them holdovers from the Polish Socialist Party whose left wing had "merged" with the Communists in 1948. Another loss of about 300,000 members occurred in the period 1956-1958: first, when 100,000 departed as a result of the events in 1956, and later, in 1958, when 200,000 were struck from the Party rolls during the "verification" campaign.

White-Collar Vanguard

Nearly one-half of the present members are white-collar workers, teachers, intellectuals or housewives. Only 42 percent of the members belong to the proletariat, and only 12 percent are peasants (although more than 40 percent of the Polish people live on farms). These proportions represent a marked change from the great days of 1948, when "workers" comprised 60 percent of the membership and peasants 18 percent. It has been a continuing tendency of the last decade. Gomulka blamed the trend on a snobbish attitude toward workers in some segments of the Party, on the cancerous growth of the Party in the State bureaucracy, and on "general weaknesses." He said optimistically that recent recruits have included a much higher proportion of workers and peasants—but exactly the same statement was made at the time of the Second Congress, and the downward trend continued.

Party United "In Principle"

During the crisis of 1956, and for some time afterward, the unity of the Party had been rent by conflicts between those who wanted to carry liberalization further than it had gone, those who wanted to resist any major change in policy, and those who felt the need for certain concessions but wanted to keep them as small as possible. As the leader of the latter group, Gomulka had been forced to wage an ideological battle against the "revisionists" on the one hand and the "conservatives" or "dogmatists" on the other. He told the Congress that his battle had been largely won. "Today we can say that the ideological and organizational consolidation of the Party has been, in principle, attained. The old feuds splitting the Party and paralyzing its ability to act are heard today only as a distant echo."

In the battle against factions, which he had launched in May 1957, Gomulka had argued that the chief danger

was revisionism, which catered to the bourgeois elements in a society not yet completely Socialist, while dogmatism was only a weak and passing phenomenon. His thesis won a pragmatic victory when Khrushchev succeeded in driving his "dogmatist" opponents out of the Soviet Presidium and Gomulka was able to maneuver his Party back to ideological conformity with the rest of the Soviet bloc. He now told the Congress that the menace of revisionism had lain not in the number of its supporters but in "the fact that it undermined the Party's ideological unity from within."

"The revisionists, championing pseudo-leftwing phrases, usually accepted the basic elements of the ideology of Social Democracy. . . . The revisionists sought to weaken the State of the dictatorship of the proletariat by opposing to it the postulate of an integral democracy and demanding 'the free play of social forces.' . . . In their chase for popularity, the revisionists put forward demagogic social slogans, voicing various anarchist conceptions of the organization of the Socialist economy which were actually directed against the system of Socialist planning and the all-national ownership of industry. The revisionists aimed their blows at the unity of the Socialist camp, at proletarian internationalism. They attempted to exploit correspondingly the resolutions of the eighth plenum, which envisaged the creation of the optimal conditions for knitting tighter bonds of brotherly friendship between Poland and the USSR, in order to unleash an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign and try to drive a wedge between our fraternal countries."

The revisionists, he said, had done "serious harm" by penetrating the organs of mass propaganda such as the press and radio. By fighting against revisionism, the Party had found it easy to overcome the opposite peril of dogmatism. "Revisionism pushed many honest but ideologically weak comrades into the embraces of dogmatists, who, by their demagogic hue and cry, presented themselves as the allegedly sole authentic champions of Marxism and Communism. Dogmatism in theory bred sectarianism in politics, more particularly a desire to solve, mainly by administrative measures [i.e., force—Ed.], conflicts which had arisen within the people's masses, conflicts which can and should be solved by a proper policy and methods of persuasion."

The Party's Changing Structure (Membership in thousands)

	First Congress	Second Congress	Third Congress
Workers	900	627	428
Peasants	268	171	124
White-collar workers	260	471	431
Others	75	28	40
Total	1,503	1,297	1,023

Sources: First Congress, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), December 21, 1948; Second Congress, *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 3, 1954; Third Congress, *Trybuna Ludu*, March 11, 1959.



Polish life, particularly as reflected in the urban press, has far more of a Western flavor than that of any other country in the area. Above are some examples of this Western influence which are unique to Poland (clockwise from top left): fashions and photography (*Swiat* [Warsaw], February 22, 1959); a Picasso—non-representational art is frowned upon elsewhere in the area, and Picasso, whatever his political beliefs, is almost entirely ignored (*Przekroj* [Cracow], January 18, 1959); not Brigitte Bardot, but a Polish girl from Lublin whose resemblance to the French film star was heightened by make-up—the girl made a considerable splash in the Polish press (*Swiat*, June 2, 1958); a comic strip (*Nowa Wies* [Warsaw], March 8, 1959); a young couple at a student dance in Warsaw where the music was provided by the local “Two Beat Stompers Jazz Band”—only the Polish press is without the traditional Communist puritanism. (*Sztandar Młodych* [Warsaw], January 8, 1959).

He said that most of those Party members who had flirted with dogmatism had later been won back to Marxist principles through the Party's unremitting struggle against revisionism. The implication was that they had no other place to go. The revisionists, on the other hand, were a continuing danger to any Party engaged in “building Socialism.” They gave lip service to the same goal, but were more concerned with democracy and freedom than with the real work of the Party. “There is no freedom for the enemies of freedom,” said Gomulka. “Our watchword is democracy for the working people, for the adherents of Socialism, and we expanded this democracy on the basis of the resolutions of the eighth plenum.”

The danger of revisionism was a theme that ran through most of the speeches at the Congress, and it was given extended treatment in the final resolution on Party policy.

“There Was No Deviation”

Gomulka's return from his disgrace of 1948 to leadership of the Party and arbiter of its policies needed only one final touch—a formal recognition that he had been right and his enemies had been wrong. The matter was broached by Politburo member Jerzy Morawski, who told the Congress that it was time for “a new evaluation of the decision of 1948 about the nationalist-rightwing deviation in the Party.” Morawski is a long-time Party functionary who served faithfully during the Stalinist years, though he did not reach top rank until October 1956. He was able to speak as one who had been misled and had later seen the light. In his long apology he said that differences had existed in the Party leadership in 1948 which “ought to have been ironed out at that time through discussion.”

"In the political climate prevailing at that time and shaping the trend of our thoughts, not only had these differences been magnified, but a character of fundamental divergency from the principles of Party policy and from the ideological foundations of the Party had been imposed on them. Such was the origin of the theory about the rightwing-nationalist deviation. . . . For a long time we believed in the genuineness of that charge, yielding to the general atmosphere which prevailed in our movement and in our Party."

"History," he concluded, "the most just verifier of all political views, . . . settled the problems which at one time were the subject of dispute, in a manner leaving no doubts. Today we can say, on the basis of historical achievement and experience, that there has been no rightwing-nationalist deviation in our Party." The formal abrogation of the decision of 1948 was embodied in the resolution on Party policy, which the Congress passed unanimously on its final day.

Changes in the Party Statutes

The Congress inevitably made amendments in the Party statutes, which were discussed on the floor by Politburo member Roman Zambrowski. (*Trybuna Ludu*, March 17.) He emphasized the fact that in past years "we did not adhere fully to Leninist principles, although the statutes of our Party were based on them from the very beginning." For this reason the changes he was proposing in the statutes were minor compared to "the actual process of development which has taken place inside the Party [since the Second Congress]." The ideal that he laid before the delegates was that of a unanimous but democratic Party leading but not administering the nation—in sharp contrast to the reality that prevailed during the Stalinist years.

The new statutes (published in *Trybuna Ludu*, March 24) raise the requirements for membership in the Party. Members must be people "prominent for their moral attitude and social activities, who enjoy the confidence of their fellows, who are devoted to the cause of Socialism and who desire to implement the policy of the Party." They are also expected to work actively in organizations outside of the Party. However, Zambrowski said that the committee revising the statutes had rejected demands—presumably from "dogmatists"—that candidates for membership be required to show mastery of Marxism-Leninism and to give up their religious beliefs. He indicated that the leadership wanted no barriers to a rapid increase in membership, and said that it was the job of the Party to instill "a scientific, lay world outlook" in the new members.

Zambrowski cited a number of new provisions that he said were designed to assure more democracy within the Party: elections to Party offices, freedom of speech at meetings, the right of appeal to higher authority, the obligation of the leadership to inform members on current problems and decisions taken, etc. Other provisions are aimed at strengthening "Party unity." He read to the Congress paragraph 22: "Internal Party democracy must not be abused for ends contrary to the Party's interest, and in



Wladyslaw Gomułka




Józef Cyrankiewicz




Edward Gierek



Stefan Jedrychowski



Zenon Kliszko



Ignacy Loga-Sowiński

Above and opposite: the Politburo of the Polish Party after the Congress. Gierek, Kliszko and Spychalski are the new members. *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), March 30, 1959

particular any activity of a factional or group character; any undertaking threatening the ideology of the Party, its general political line or the unity of its ranks cannot be reconciled with Party membership."

Still other new provisions spell out the Party's conception of its role in society: leadership and "political control" in factories but not the administration of them; the organization and guidance of mass organizations in rural areas (agricultural circles and other cooperative groups); and community activity by Party members in their home



Jerzy Morawski



Edward Ochab



Adam Rapacki



Marian Spychalski



Roman Zambrowski



Aleksander Zawadzki

neighborhoods. The latter form of activity, said Zambrowski, is a new one. "Hitherto, for many long years, we conducted Party work in towns almost exclusively in places of employment. Consequently, a large group of people not connected with places of employment found themselves outside the range of organized work by members of the Party."

The preamble to the statutes still maintains that collective farming is the Party's goal in agriculture, but a passage dealing with "the struggle against the kulak" was dropped. Article 24 requires that a Congress be called every four years, rather than the three years previously stipulated. (Six years elapsed between the First and Second Congresses, and five years between the Second and Third.)

The New Leadership

THE NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE, elected on the final day of the Congress, established Gomulka's power beyond likely challenge. At the same time, it reflected Gomulka's stress on Party unity and showed a marked degree of continuity in the Party's upper ranks.

The Central Committee

The new Central Committee contains 77 members, as did the old. Of these, 57 are holdovers from the old CC, 10 are former alternates promoted to full membership, 2 are former members of the Auditing Commission and only 8 are really new. The 20 who were dropped from the Committee included the well-known "dogmatists" Franciszek Jozwiak, Wacław Lewikowski, Stanisław Lapot, Kazimierz Mijal, Stanisław Pawlak and Franciszek Mazur (transferred to the Auditing Commission). The eight new faces include two generals, the Minister of Mining and Electric Power, three provincial First Secretaries, a Secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions and the chairman of the Miners' Union. At the same time, two of the ten alternates who were promoted to full membership are known for their "dogmatist" affiliations: Leon Kruczkowski, a specialist in cultural affairs, and Adam Schaff, a specialist in Marxist theory.

Gomulka's personal following in the Central Committee was, it appears, increased from 10 members to 25. The so-called "Pulawska Group"—represented in the Politburo by Zambrowski, Zawadzki, Ochab and Jedrychowski—increased its apparent strength from 19 to 25. (These are old-time Communists who have formed the Party's basic leadership since the war, but opposed the extreme measures of the Stalinists. It was with their support that Gomulka became First Secretary in October 1956 against the opposition of the Stalinists. Pulawska Street, in Warsaw, was the site of their caucuses.) Former members of the Polish Socialist Party are represented by 11 members in the CC, one less than previously. The "Natolin" group, Gomulka's opponents in the Party, now have only 10 certain adherents in the 77-member Committee.

A more radical change took place in the list of alternate members of the CC. The total number was increased from 43 to 63, and 44 of the alternates are new. Fifteen of the previous alternates were not reelected, while 10 were raised to full membership and two were transferred to Party commissions. Among the alternates who were dropped were Stefan Staszewski, former head of the Warsaw Party organization who had distinguished himself for his support of Gomulka in October 1956, and Helena Jaworska, another hero of the October days.

The Politburo

The first plenary session of the new CC was held on March 19, the last day of the Congress. It reelected to the Politburo all nine of the previous members (last elected in October 1956) and added three new members: Edward Gierek, Zenon Kliszko, head of the CC Organizational

Department, and Minister of Defense Marian Spychalski. Kliszko and Spychalski have been close to Gomulka for many years, and shared disgrace and imprisonment with him in the years from 1949 to 1956. Gierek is a prewar Communist who was prominent in the Party during the Stalinist years and now heads the powerful Party organization in Katowice, in Silesia. The new Politburo is fairly evenly divided between Gomulka's personal followers and the forces of the "Pulawska Group."

* * *

Edward Gierek

A MAN WHO HAS SPENT much of his life in Western Europe, he was born in 1913, in Sosnowiec county near Katowice, the son of a coal miner killed in a mine disaster. He emigrated to France, and in 1931 joined the French Communist Party. Because of his activities as a strike organizer he was arrested and deported to Poland, where he stayed briefly. He went to Belgium and from 1935 to 1946 was a member of the Belgian Communist Party. During the war he was a resistance leader in Belgium. He returned to Poland in 1948 and became deputy director of the Party organization division in Katowice. In 1951 he was promoted to Second Secretary of the Katowice provincial organization, and a year later he was elected to the Sejm from Sosnowiec. He became a full member of the Party Central Committee in 1954. From 1954 to 1956 he was the CC specialist on heavy industry. In July 1956 he became a Secretary of the CC. Gomulka, on becoming First Secretary, made him head of the Party organization in Katowice. Although not one of Gomulka's personal following, he is known as a whole-hearted supporter of the present Party policy.

Zenon Kliszko

BORN IN LODZ IN 1908, in a working class family. In 1929 he became a law student and also was active in the left-wing union movement. In 1933 he was sentenced to two years in prison. During the war he was one of the founders of the Polish Workers' Party and the Union of Fighters for Freedom. He is said to have organized People's Army units during the Warsaw Uprising and to have escaped, after the rebellion was crushed, across the Vistula River. He was a member of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party and head of the personnel section, becoming a member of the CC of the United Polish Workers' Party when it was organized in 1948. In 1949 he was expelled along with Gomulka, and later imprisoned. In the summer of 1956 he was rehabilitated and made Deputy Minister of Justice. Gomulka brought him back to the Central Committee in October, and he again became head of the Organizational Department. He is one of Gomulka's most trusted supporters.

"600 Violations by the Clergy"

IT SHOULD BE stated . . . that the reaction has placed great hopes in the activities of a part of the clergy. Numerous occasions have been observed in the recent past of deviation from and breaking of binding legal regulations by individual representatives of the Catholic Church. Thus we came into contact with the violation of the regulations of the building law and the publishing law . . . cases of violation of foreign currency regulations . . . demoralizing and bribing of employees of the administration . . . violation of the regulation on associations and meetings, illegal fund raising, and even attempts at reviving the medieval custom of tithes or at leveling taxes on the citizens for the building of churches. That all this is not of a sporadic character is proved by the fact, aside from court trials known to the comrades, that the penal administration authorities had to settle, during the second half of 1958, 600 cases of various administrative violations by the clergy."

Minister of Home Affairs Wladyslaw Wicha, speaking to the Third Party Congress, March 17.

(Trybuna Ludu, March 18.)

Marian Spychalski

HE WAS BORN in Lodz in 1906. As a student of architecture at Warsaw Polytechnic he joined the leftist student group called "Life." From 1933 to 1935 he worked for the Municipal Board of Poznan, acting at the same time as regional Secretary of the Communist Party organization. In 1937 he became Deputy Chief of the Planning Department of the Warsaw City Council. During the war he organized the Struggle for Liberation Movement and the People's Guard, becoming Chief of Staff of the latter under the pseudonym "Marek." When the Polish Army was organized behind Russian lines he became Chief of Staff, and when the Red Army arrived at the east bank of the Vistula he was made mayor of Warsaw. In March 1945 he returned to the army as deputy commander of its political-educational department, and was promoted to Major General. Under the postwar "national unity" government he was Deputy Minister of Defense. In 1948 he became a member of the CC of the PZPR. He shared Gomulka's disgrace after 1949, was accused of hatching a plot in the army and imprisoned. In October 1956 he returned to the CC and to his post of Deputy Minister of Defense, and after Soviet Marshal Rokossovski's recall he became Minister.

Poland's Economy Since 1956

Less than three years ago, Poland was on the verge of economic collapse. Its demoralized Communists, having barely escaped the revolution that overtook their comrades in Hungary, were forced to admit that they had wasted much of the country's substance in bad economic planning. To their new leader, Gomulka, fell the task of rescuing Poland's economy from the mistakes of his predecessors and leading a disillusioned population slowly back along the path of Communist orthodoxy. This article, in two parts, describes the course he took and the alternative roads that he spurned.

IN JUNE OF 1957 Wladyslaw Gomulka journeyed to the town of Poznan in western Poland to talk to the workers of the Cegielski factory. These were the workers whose public protests a year earlier had touched off the bitter Poznan riots that had shaken the Communist world and brought Gomulka back to power. His visit was one of apology and reconciliation, carried off in the forced-hearty manner that high Communists adopt when they go among the people. Agreeing to answer questions presented to him in writing, he found that some were "of the rumor-mongering type" and did not deserve serious attention. One worker asked: "Is it true that Minc, the former chairman of the State Economic Planning Commission, left for Switzerland and opened a bank there with our money?" To this question, so indicative of the public's disillusionment over the results of the Six Year Plan, Gomulka replied with a laugh. "This information is slightly distorted. Minc did not go to Switzerland but left for the planet Jupiter. There he founded an interplanetary tourist agency, not a bank, and he got the money for that purpose from the Devil. He did not take even a farthing from us."

Results of the Six Year Plan

The failure of the Six Year Plan came as a surprise to many people, inside and outside Poland, whose attention had been fixed on the feverish activity of the early 1950's. The Poles had labored gigantically. In six years they had doubled the production of electric power, raised steel production by 92 percent, put up 12,000 industrial buildings and 1,514 schools, and trebled the output of leather shoes. Nevertheless the Communists found themselves in the position of an architect who has to admit, after the building is partly up, that he made a mistake in the blueprint. The ensuing reversals in the fields of politics and culture caught the world's attention. At the same time, and more obscurely, the economists began to examine the method of "building Socialism" in Poland and to ask where and why it had gone wrong.

The Plan—and its carrying through—had given highest priority to heavy industry while allowing other sectors to fall behind the normal requirements of a growing economy. In agriculture the production of bread grain and potatoes was still below the level attained before the war, and



Coal from the Silesian mines, the heart of the Polish economy.
Photo from *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 3, 1958

in order to feed the population of the expanding towns it was necessary for this agricultural country to import grain at the rate of more than a million tons a year. Housebuilding had proceeded at about half the rate necessary to shelter the growing population at the low standards previously existing; the situation was worsened by a bottleneck in the building materials industry which would condemn the Poles to miserable living conditions for many years to come. Many of the most ordinary articles of use were in short supply or of poor quality because the Communists had stifled small private enterprise and handicraft production. Even the vital bituminous coal industry had been underinvested in relation to what was required of it; the Communists had raised production by 20 million tons between 1949 and 1955, but part of this increase resulted from the use of forced labor and Sunday shifts—expedients which now became politically impossible on any large scale.

Wrong Kind of Plan

Some of these failings could be ascribed to political decisions dictated by Moscow over the heads of the Polish experts. The Korean war, in particular, had led to an increased emphasis on heavy industry and armaments production throughout Eastern Europe which had drained investment funds out of projects affecting social welfare and living standards. Other failings were the result of over-optimism or miscalculation on the part of the planners. A more serious difficulty, however, lay in the nature of the Six Year Plan itself which the Communists now admitted had not been cut to Polish requirements. The kind of industry favored by the Stalinists necessitated heavy imports of iron ore and other metals, most of which had to be brought from the Soviet Union, while relatively little attention had been given to industries such as chemicals, for which Poland was favorably endowed. In short, many years had been wasted in trying to build the wrong sort of economy by a mechanical imitation of the Soviet experience.

The eminent Polish economist Oscar Lange said in a lecture in February 1957, "There is a growing conviction among economists that in this field we (not only Poland but also other People's Democracies) have mechanically copied the Soviet model. . . . Each of the People's Democracies created for itself a sort of miniature of the Soviet model of economic structure. The most glaring example of this is Hungary, which developed a steel industry even though it has no coal, iron ore or any condition for the development of this industry." He went on to say: *

"Blind imitation of the Soviet model could not lead to good results, since the economic structure of the Soviet Union was shaped in specific geographic and historical conditions.

"Firstly, the Soviet Union, in contradistinction to other Socialist countries, had the possibility of an autarkist economic development because of its vast area, abundant variety of natural wealth and enormous reserves of people. One may say that geographically two countries in the world have possibilities for an autarkist develop-

* Oscar Lange, *Some Problems Relating to the Polish Road to Socialism*, Polonia Publishing House, Warsaw, 1957.



Air force jets made in Poland (they are copies of the Soviet MIG-15). They were shown in Poland (Warsaw), Nov. 9, 1955. The efforts made by the Polish economy to produce such heavy armaments was one of the reasons for the failure of the Six Year Plan (1950-1955). Subsequently, greater emphasis was put on the production of much-needed consumer goods.

ment: the Soviet Union and the United States. Each of them constitutes a kind of self-sufficient world. . . .

"[The Soviet structure of economic development] cannot be transposed to countries with less abundant natural wealth, more one-sided, smaller, and in which economic development takes place under different circumstances. . . .

"Our agricultural technique was a copy of the Soviet-American type, which means extensive farming operating on large acreage where there is a sufficient amount of land, where the aim is not so much a high yield per hectare as the saving of labor power. Our relations in agriculture are different from those in the Soviet Union or the United States. . . ."

Lack of Popular Support

These economic mistakes were serious, but their significance was enlarged by a political fact: Communism and its ideology are not indigenous to Poland. The Communists, including Gomulka, retain their power in this Roman Catholic, peasant country only through the looming might of the Soviet Union. Their very lack of popular support forces them to appease popular demands for a better standard of living, and makes a failure to do so more serious than it would be in the Soviet Union or China. Moreover, unlike their Russian and Chinese colleagues, the Polish Communists cannot substitute visions of world power or rocket flights to the moon for the more immediate satisfactions of life. They must "sell" their programs to the people in everyday terms.

The Six Year Plan failed not only on technical grounds but because it did not fulfill the expectations generated by the huge propaganda that had accompanied it. The various political indecencies of the early 1950's, the sweated working conditions, the lowered living standards, might all have been borne somehow if the Polish people had been willing to go on making sacrifices for the future. They were not willing, and in order to appease them the Gomulka regime had to offer immediate concessions on such a scale as to threaten the viability of the economy.

The Gomulka Period

THE TWO YEARS following the summer of 1956 were, in the phrase of the Gomulka regime, a "period of stabilization." The country found itself faced with a whole complex of persistent economic problems. It discovered that any real assault on poverty in Poland would require many years. The disparity between everyday needs and the economic structure which had been erected at such cost made the existing state of affairs more intolerable and demoralizing than it need otherwise have been. The Party was forced to change the terms of its economic calculus from tons of

steel and squadrons of jet airplanes to bread, refrigerators and square meters of living space. But even the scrap of appeasement which it now offered the people was a considerable strain to the economy.

Forced to give in to demands for higher wages, the regime sought desperately, and with only partial success, to stem the resulting inflation. The consumer goods necessary for a real increase in the standard of living were not available in Poland and therefore such goods, or the materials for producing them, had to be imported—with a resulting deficit in foreign exchange. During the two years following October the problems of inflation and an unsatisfactory trade balance were a major preoccupation of top officials. At the same time the regime took steps to correct the mistaken policies of the past and to establish a base for further industrialization along more "balanced" lines.

The second Five Year Plan (1956-1960), which had been drafted before the political crisis, was revised twice officially and a third time in practice. As finally approved by the Sejm in July 1957, it placed more emphasis on living standards and less on industrial development than originally intended. Total investment was cut by nearly 10 percent and its distribution was changed in favor of sectors

Six Year Plan Targets and Fulfillment

Product	Unit	1949	1955 Plan	1955 Actual	Percent of Fulfillment
Hard coal	million tons	74.1	100.0	94.5	94.5
Brown coal		4.6	8.4	6.0	71.4
Electric power	billion kwh	8.3	19.3	17.8	92.0
Pig iron	thousand tons	1,391.1	3,500.0	3,112.1	88.9
Crude steel		2,304.4	4,600.0	4,426.4	96.2
Rolled steel		1,596.0	3,200.0	3,038.3	94.9
Tractors	units	2,513	11,000	8,052	73.2
Combines		0	750	300	40.0
Trucks		245	25,000	12,480	49.9
Sulfuric acid	thousand tons	275.8	540.0	450.0	83.3
Calcined soda		120.6	389.0	210.8	54.2
Caustic soda		56.4	162.0	101.6	62.7
Nitrogenous fertilizers		73.9	230.8	154.1	66.8
Phosphorous fertilizers		73.6	250.0	131.9	52.8
Cement		2,343.9	4,950.0	3,812.9	77.0
Bricks	millions	1,167.4	3,756.0	2,714.2	72.3
Lime	thousand tons	868.0	1,600.0	1,341.9	83.7
Cotton cloth	million meters	406.5	607.7	564.9	92.9
Woolen cloth		50.1	74.9	75.7	101.1
Leather shoes	thousand pr.	8,582.5	22,200.0	24,567.2	110.7
Rubber shoes		8,669.3	16,400.0	18,674.3	113.7
Sugar	thousand tons	745.3	1,100.0	980.5	89.1
Meat		457.7	952.0	628.8	66.1
Butter		22.8	116.0	61.3	52.8
Soap		52.3	88.1	54.7	62.1

Sources: Plan targets from *Plan Szescioletni* (Warsaw), 1950; figures for actual production in 1949 and 1955 from *Rocznik Statystyczny 1956* (Warsaw, 1957).

which had been neglected in previous years. The sums allotted to agriculture, forestry and building were more than doubled as compared with expenditures during the Six Year Plan. The rather modest increase of 30 percent in real incomes was to be assured by reducing the production goals for industry, although total industrial output was still expected to rise by 8 or 9 percent annually. The revised Plan called for the construction of 1.2 million dwelling rooms during the five years, but as one Communist deputy pointed out on the floor of the Sejm, this amount would at best only prevent the housing shortage from growing worse. Some of the specific targets for heavy industry were revised downward in 1958, when it was seen that they could not be achieved.

Wages Raised

The authorities were forced to accede to a series of increases in money incomes. Higher prices granted the peasants, higher pensions given to retired workers, and substantial wage raises for the urban proletariat swelled purchasing power at a dangerous rate. The total wage bill of the State-run sector of the economy rose by 45 percent from 1955 to 1958. Since employment also increased, the rise in per capita income was 35.7 percent. The inflationary tendency was stemmed by better food supplies—resulting from good harvests—and by heavy imports financed through foreign loans. Despite this, the cost of living rose by 7.1 percent according to government estimates, reducing the 35.7 percent increase in average money incomes to a real increase of 24.8 percent in take-home pay per worker. The increase varied, of course, in different sectors of the economy. (*Biuletyn Statystyczny*, January 1959.) Peasant incomes are said to have risen to approximately the same extent.

Late in 1958 Party and government spokesmen claimed that wages had been brought under control, but were evidently perturbed over rising prices. First Secretary Gomulka told the Twelfth Plenum of the Party Central Committee in October that even some of the State-run enterprises were seeking to evade price controls by "abandoning the production of cheaper goods" in favor of more expensive goods, in order to raise their revenues. The regime's pledge to raise

Yields in Agriculture (Quintals per Hectare)

	Four Grains	Sugar Beets	Potatoes
1934-38	13.7	265	138
Plan 1955	16.1	240	150
Actual 1954-57	13.9	192	125
Plan 1960	15.3	217	140
Plan 1965	17.5	236	160

Prewar figures are in terms of postwar boundaries. The four grains are wheat, rye, barley and oats.

Sources: Figures for 1934-38 from *Rocznik Statystyczny* 1958 (Warsaw, 1958); 1955 targets from *Dziennik Ustaw* (Warsaw), 1950, No. 37, pp. 439-440; figures for 1954-57 from *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), February 10, 1959; targets for 1960 and 1965 from *Trybuna Ludu*, October 25, 1958.



War ruins in Warsaw. The article accompanying this photo, in *Swiat* (Warsaw), August 3, 1958, makes the point that this photograph can be considered a "historical document" only because three weeks previously demolition and reconstruction had at last begun in this area.

real incomes 30 percent by 1960 was being taken seriously by both the Party and the people; and with a minimum of progress in the next two years it seemed likely that the promised increase would be attained.

The most vexing problem in the field of living standards is that of housing. The neglect of residential construction during the Six Year Plan, coupled with a high birth rate and heavy migration from the countryside to the cities, made a bad situation even worse. The revised Five Year Plan set a goal of 1,200,000 new rooms by 1960, but Poland's total population was expected to grow during the same period by more than 2,500,000. Among the factors that make any short-run improvement impossible are a shortage of building material—particularly timber—and the competing demands of other economic sectors. While the Five Year Plan called for sharp increases in the production of building materials (cement, 78 percent; bricks, 56 percent), no substantial alleviation of the housing problem can be expected before 1965. The preliminary draft of the Second Five Year Plan (1961-1965), published on October 24, 1958, limned the shape of the drab future with the comment that "the average density of housing in urban areas will decline from 1.75 persons per room in 1960 to 1.54 in 1965."

Farm Policy Revised

To the discontent of workers and intellectuals was added the huge silent resentment of the peasantry. Poland was in desperate need of greater agricultural production, and the obvious choice was to adopt policies that would encourage private farmers to produce as effectively as possible. The price was high: it meant abandoning the administrative and economic tactics that had been employed to get the peasants into collective farms and keep them there; and

allotting to agriculture some of the resources that had formerly been used for industrial investment. After Gomulka's installation as First Secretary, the collectivized area, which at its peak had covered only about 9.2 percent of the agricultural land, shrank in the space of a few weeks to little more than 1 percent. In his Eighth Plenum speech Gomulka admitted that the collective farms had proved, on the whole, less productive than private farms, and gave these figures for the average value of output per hectare in 1956:

Individual farms	621.1 zloty
Collective farms	517.3 zloty
State farms	393.7 zloty

While the Communists did not abandon collectivization as an ultimate goal, and still continue to talk about it, they have as a practical policy sought to encourage private farming. A formal program issued in conjunction with the United Peasant Party in January 1957 promised support for "the small and middle peasants" through "free development of individual holdings on the basis of mutual help, agricultural associations and peasant groups." Steps were taken to raise peasant incomes: compulsory deliveries to the State were sharply cut; prices paid by the State were raised; and the tax on larger landholdings was reduced.

Supplies of materials farmers needed, such as building materials, artificial fertilizers and farm machinery, were increased. The country machine stations (GOMs) were liquidated and their machinery sold to the peasants. The Machine Tractor Stations (POMs) which had formerly been the State's mechanism for controlling collective farms, were deprived of half their administrative personnel while

at the same time their facilities for repairing machinery were greatly expanded. The supply of credit to private farmers was more than doubled in 1957. On March 12, 1958, the Sejm passed a bill authorizing the sale of 300,000 hectares of land belonging to State farms, as well as 200,000 hectares of other land belonging to the State. The land from the State farms, comprising about 12 percent of their total area, needed large investments for its proper development and had remained a liability to the farms.*

Peasant Incomes Raised

Some of these policies were long overdue and would have been introduced even without a change in Party leadership. The Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria also abolished or reduced compulsory deliveries during this period, and made various other concessions to the peasantry. The unique feature of the Gomulka program was its attempt to make private farming a viable way of life rather than to strangle it to death in favor of collectives. The effect on the countryside was almost instantaneous. The price of land and livestock rose sharply as peasants sought to expand their holdings. The decapitalization of the countryside was halted, and recent visitors to Poland report signs of new building everywhere.

The cash income of the peasants in 1957 was estimated to have risen 23 percent above the level of 1956 as a result of the changes in delivery quotas and prices. (*Trybuna Ludu*, February 15, 1958.) Official sources charged that

* For a detailed survey of developments in agriculture since Gomulka took power, see *East Europe*, October 1957, pp. 16-23, and May 1958, pp. 17-23 and p. 42.

The CDT department store in central Warsaw, the largest in the city. This new building is one of the most prominent in the rebuilt Polish capital.

Photo from *Swiat* (Warsaw), August 31, 1958



the higher income was partially obtained by evading deliveries to the State in favor of the free market. The plan for State deliveries in 1957 was said to have been fulfilled by only 76 percent, whereas free market sales—at higher prices—were 35 percent above the level of the previous year. However, half of the new income was absorbed in higher prices for the goods farmers had to buy, including fodder, building materials, artificial fertilizers and farm machinery.

The effect of the new policies on agricultural production is not so easy to assess. The harvest of the four main grains (wheat, rye, barley and oats) in 1957 was the best since the war, representing an increase of 20 percent over the average of the years 1951-55. However, this was a good year generally in Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, with its agriculture almost completely collectivized, reported a corresponding increase in its grain harvest of 14.6 percent; and Hungary, where Kadar has pursued a mild policy toward the peasantry, reported an increase of 18.8 percent.*

Further improvement in the efficiency of Polish agriculture, if it comes, will be the result not so much of the toleration of private farming as of positive measures more enlightened than in the past. By raising the quantity of resources devoted to agriculture—i.e., the share of this sector in total net investment—and by taking steps to improve the technical efficiency of the private peasant, the Gomulka regime has laid the basis for a long-run development of agriculture in keeping with the country's requirements. Current planning is more realistic than in the past: the agricultural targets set for 1955 under the Six Year Plan, and not even remotely achieved, have now been pushed ahead as far as 1965.

The Crisis in Foreign Trade

THE DELICATE BALANCE between what Poland exports and what it must import to satisfy its economic needs was knocked seriously awry by the decisions made in 1956, and by subsequent developments on the world market. The surplus of imports in 1957 reached a value of 262 million dollars, or nearly 12 percent of the total trade volume. In 1958 it was estimated at 6.7 percent of the total volume. The chief factors in the adverse balance are three: the large increase in imports of food and various industrial raw materials made necessary by the promise to improve living standards; a decline in coal exports; and a worsening of Poland's terms of trade with western countries (i.e., a decrease in world market prices for export goods relative to those for import goods). The deficit was financed by credits from the Soviet Union, the United States and several western European countries.

The decline in coal exports was a deliberate policy. During the Six Year Plan Poland had exported an average of 25 million tons of coal a year, but this level had been maintained at the cost of increasing shortages at home and compulsory overtime and forced labor in the mines. The Gomulka regime could not continue these drastic measures.

* United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1957* (Geneva, 1958), Chapter 1 Table 1.

Exports fell from 26 million tons in 1955 to 19.5 million tons in 1956 and 15 million tons in 1957. The reduction was to be concentrated in exports to the Soviet bloc, while exports to western countries were to remain at about the previous level. However, unexpected difficulties arose in the western European coal market. During 1957 the demand for imported coal in western Europe increased more slowly than in previous years, while at the same time the United States became a serious competitor because of a fall in transatlantic freight rates. Consequently Polish coal deliveries to western Europe and Scandinavia in 1957 were more than a million tons below those of the previous year.

The decline in many world commodity prices affected Poland adversely. From July 1957 to March 1958 the average price obtained for exports of raw materials was said to have fallen by 17 percent, while the prices of imported raw materials fell only by 7 percent.* The Polish News Agency reported on January 1, 1958, that the fall in world raw material prices in 1957 had cost Poland about 150 million dollars in foreign payments.

Exports and Foreign Credits

The structure of Poland's foreign trade is that of an underdeveloped country rather than an industrial one. In 1956 coal and coke accounted for more than two-fifths of the total value of exports, and all raw and semifinished materials (including zinc, rolled steel, chemicals, timber and paper) made up nearly two-thirds of total exports. On

* United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Geneva, 1958), p. 33.

Poland's Foreign Trade, 1955-1958

	1955	1956	1957	1958
Exports (millions of dollars)	920	985	978	1,057
Machinery, plant and equipment (%) ...	13.0	15.6	20.0	26.9
Raw materials, semi-finished goods, etc. (%)	64.4	63.8	61.0	50.1
Farm produce and food (%)	15.3	11.7	12.6	15.3
Industrial consumer goods (%)	7.3	8.9	6.4	5.0
Imports (millions of dollars)	932	1,022	1,251	1,200
Machinery, plant and equipment (%) ...	30.9	33.2	23.8	26.4
Raw materials, semi-finished goods, etc. (%)	51.7	48.6	53.6	53.9
Farm produce and food (%)	13.1	12.4	17.4	11.4
Industrial consumer goods (%)	4.3	5.8	5.7	8.3

Sources: United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1957* (Geneva, 1958), p. A-57; *Polish Foreign Trade* (Warsaw), 1958, No. 3, p. 9; *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), February 10, 1959.



English Fords, bound for Czechoslovakia, arriving at the Polish port of Szczecin. Maritime and transshipment activities are an important part of the Polish economy.

Photo from *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 6, 1958

the other hand, the characteristic exports of an industrial nation, machinery and industrial consumers' goods, comprised less than a quarter of the total. A substantial change in this pattern has become one of the chief aims of the economic planners. Exports of machinery are to be greatly increased, both to the Soviet Bloc and to overseas countries which produce the sort of raw materials Poland can use (Latin America, the United Arab Republic, India, Burma and Ceylon). Machinery exports are to be trebled by 1965. Much hope is also placed in a revival of Poland's traditional food exports, chiefly meat, eggs and sugar. Though coal will continue to be exported in approximately the present amount, it will eventually take second place to machinery as a foreign exchange earner.

The revised Five Year Plan calls for a 46 percent increase in the value of exports by 1960 as against a 27 percent increase in imports (as compared with 1955). In the interim Poland will have to rely on international loans—always in short supply—to make its books balance. Most of the assistance so far received has come from the Soviet bloc, in the form both of credits and cancellation of past obligations.

In November of 1956, the USSR agreed to cancel outstanding claims on Poland totalling more than two billion rubles, in recognition of past deliveries of coal at prices considerably below those of the world market. Between September 1956 and June 1957 the USSR also granted Poland loans and credits totalling 1 billion 250 million rubles. In 1957 and 1958 the United States agreed to make two loans totalling \$193 million. There have been smaller credits, mostly of short duration, from France, Canada, Turkey, Austria, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and Sweden. East Germany provided credits of 400 million rubles for the development of Polish brown coal mines, and Czechoslovakia granted credits of 460 million rubles for the development of bituminous coal mines, the joint exploitation of Poland's rich sulfur deposits and other purposes.

Most of the credits will not have to be repaid until the 1960's, and by that time Poland's economic growth will presumably make the payments bearable. The problem at present is to expand exports sufficiently to balance the rise

in imports and avoid recourse to further borrowing. Government sources claim that encouraging progress was made in this direction during 1958 despite Poland's unfavorable terms of trade. According to Minister of Foreign Trade Trampczynski, the goal of reducing short-term indebtedness by 100 million currency *zloty** was more than achieved: exports increased about 8 percent (to 4.2 billion currency *zloty*) and imports declined about 4 percent (to 4.8 billion currency *zloty*), reducing the adverse balance of trade from 1.1 billion currency *zloty* in 1957 to about 600 million in 1958. Exports of machinery and food products, he said, were greater than planned. (*Zycie Warszawy*, Jan. 14, 1959.)

Poland's economy is now tied fast to the economies of the other Communist countries and particularly to that of the Soviet Union. In 1956 more than 60 percent of Poland's trade was with the Soviet bloc, and about 30 percent of it with the USSR. Even though present plans stress an increase in trade with western countries, Poland will depend on the Communist world for more and more of its strategic raw materials. A trade agreement signed in early 1958 provided that the Soviet Union would supply Poland in 1958 with 74 per cent of its imported iron ore, 90 percent of its imported crude oil and oil products, and 44 percent of its grain imports. (Radio Warsaw, February 4, 1958.) The long-range development of Polish industry has been plotted in collaboration with the rest of the Soviet bloc for the years 1959-1965, and an even longer range "perspective plan" is now being drafted for the years up to 1975.

(To be continued)

* Valued at four *zloty* to one dollar.

Changing Structure of Investment

	1951-55	1956-60 (Plan)	1956-1960 as percent of 1951-55
Total (billion <i>zloty</i> at 1956 prices)	210.6	301.8	143.3%
Percent going to:			
Industry	44.8%	39.7%	126.9
Agriculture	12.2	18.4	216.3
Forestry	0.4	0.5	210.4
Building	1.8	2.7	215.8
Transportation and communication	12.2	9.2	107.4
Housing	11.7	16.2	199.6
Municipalities	2.4	3.1	184.3
Domestic trade	3.3	2.6	110.0
Social and cultural facilities	4.9	6.1	178.6
Defense and administration	6.0	1.5	34.9

Of the total sums invested in 1956-60, 18.4 percent or 55.5 billion *zloty* was to be spent on agriculture, or 216.3 percent of the amount devoted to that purpose in the period 1951-55.

Source: *Dziennik Ustaw* (Warsaw), 1957, No. 40, p. 476. percentages in first column, totalling 99.7, as in original.

The Police

A Play by Slawomir Mrozek

"The Police" (or "The Policemen" as it is now commonly referred to in the Polish press) had its premiere in Warsaw on June 27, 1958. The author is one of Poland's best young satirists, already familiar to readers of East Europe through the reprint of "Three Fables," taken from a collection of satirical sketches titled "Slon" ("The Elephant"), in the January 1959 issue. In this play, as in the shorter works, Mr. Mrozek uses dead-pan irony to probe, gently but searchingly, the essence of a contemporary problem. In this case the subject is the Police State, and very much the Communist variety thereof, even though the setting is in the more remote romantic past. Every member of the audience in Poland must have known that Mr. Mrozek was pointing to the innate absurdity of the Stalinist period, when terror ruled supreme and the police thrived on the perpetuation of this terror. That this play was published and produced bears testimony to the extent of the Polish police and censorship relaxations. It could have been staged in no other country in the area. Even in Poland, its future now seems uncertain; while the police have not regained their uncontested sway, censorship is again being tightened. In the meantime, however, the young author's popularity is high. His photo and the autobiographical sketch on the opposite page were taken from the original in the English-language magazine Poland (Warsaw), No. 2, 1958.

(ENGLISH TEXT, COPYRIGHT FREE EUROPE PRESS, 1959; MAY NOT BE USED WITHOUT PERMISSION.)

Author's Note to the Producer

THIS PLAY DOES NOT CONTAIN anything it does not contain, i.e., it is not an allusion to anything; it is not allegorical; its meaning should not be sought between the lines. Its dominant element is the naked text itself, and this text should be presented most faithfully to the spectator, with the logic of sentence and scene clearly observed. Because of its concentrated structure, the play will require—if ever it is produced—the spectator's concentrated attention. If it is not produced clearly and naturally, it will be tedious and exhausting.

The statement that the play is not an allegory but merely what it is—reduced, in its stage existence, to time and space—leads to the following observations:

No scenic trickery, either for the sake of wit or decoration is to be allowed. Nothing in the play ought to be "emphasized," and its "mood" ought to be respected. Nor can any "extension in depth" be added in its production. In brief, nothing should be allowed that would be contrary to the clearest possible production—severe, pure and as natural as possible. Past sad experience has proved that any attempt at excessive "interpretation," "emphasizing," and exaggerating the author's text has always resulted in artistic failure.

Nor is this play—God help us—a comedy, and anyone who deals with it is requested not to emphasize its humor. Whatever humor it contains does not belong to the category usually prefaced by the words: gentlemen, now comes the

humorous part. If this rule is not observed, the thing will fail and be awkward, if not downright tasteless.

I also wish to state most emphatically that this play is not in any sense whatever a "modern" or "experimental" play. I do not think it necessary to explain exactly what I mean by such terms.

I am well aware that my postulates may leave me open to the charge of being completely ignorant of things theatrical. Indeed, it may be very true that I neither know nor have a feeling for things theatrical. However, I do know, and very well indeed, that certain "theatrical" elements, such as theatrical thinking, have been reduced to the level of the cliché, the superficial and the fetish, and have become part of the stereotyped, the thoughtless and the automatic. Thus, any attempt to interpret plays as allegories, though new and creative in itself, may become stereotyped and automatic (particularly when one considers that this play of mine provokes one to—how shall I put it?—"make things easy" by applying such commonplace inventions as, for instance, "allegory," "the comic," and "the modern").

Thus, knowing what this play is not, I do not know what it is, but I do not consider this my duty. It is for the theater to know such things. And to assume that the above "negative" postulates limit the director and stage designer in their work and leave them no room to move about in, would simply imply that I have no respect for the theater and suspect it of ignorance and poverty of imagination.



ŚLAWOMIR MROŻEK

Winner of the 1957 prize awarded by the weekly, "Przegląd Kulturalny" (Cultural Review)

I am 27 years old. I spent the greater part of my life in and around Cracow. I studied architecture, then went to the Academy of Fine Arts and still later studied oriental philology.

I wrote two small collections of short stories and a novel (a failure); I also illustrated a somewhat spiteful album entitled "Poland in Pictures." For a number of years I worked as a journalist. I was also a theatre critic and at one time translated English poems into Polish and did drawings for a sports paper.

For a year now I have been editing the microscopic weekly, "Po-
stepowiec," (its staff made up of one person) which is now being printed by "Życie Literackie." Besides this, I do weekly drawings for Poland's oldest illustrated magazine, "Przekrój," and also write short stories for literary publications.

Cast

THE COMMISSIONER

THE PRISONER, formerly a conspirator, later the General's Aide

THE SERGEANT, an agent-provocateur

MRS. PROVOCATEUR, the Sergeant's wife

THE GENERAL

THE POLICEMAN

Acts I and III take place in the Commissioner's office. Act II in the home of the Sergeant-provocateur.

Act I

Office of the Commissioner. Indispensable props: desk, two chairs, door placed in a conspicuous position. Two portraits: one, of The Infant (an infant in an old-fashioned baby carriage, or a child painted in the bourgeois style of the 19th Century), the other, of The Regent (an elderly, grim-looking individual, heavily mustached). All people connected with the police have heavy mustaches. The Prisoner wears a goatee after the fashion of 19th Century Progressives. The policemen have high leather boots and swords. Their collars are high and stiff. The buttons on their navy-blue uniforms shine like the sun. The Prisoner's civilian jacket is short and tight.

COMMISSIONER (standing, finishes reading the paper he holds in his hand): "And so, having finally and in deep disgust renounced all my crimes, I shall serve our government from now on and forever with reverence and love . . ." (The Commissioner sits down and folds the paper.)

PRISONER: Don't put it away. I want to sign it.

COMMISSIONER: I beg your pardon?

PRISONER: I want to sign it.

COMMISSIONER: You want to sign it? Why?

PRISONER: What do you mean *why*? For ten years you have interrogated me. For ten years you have tried to get me to sign this paper. And every time I refused you threatened me with the most terrible consequences, and so on. And now, when I finally want to sign, leave prison, and serve my government you are surprised and ask me why.

COMMISSIONER: So suddenly? . . . Without any warning? . . .

PRISONER: I have undergone a metamorphosis.

COMMISSIONER: What kind of metamorphosis?

PRISONER: An internal one. I don't want to fight the government any more.

COMMISSIONER: What do you mean, you don't? Why not?

PRISONER: I'm tired. Let someone else take over. I don't know who—maybe some spies of a foreign power. Agents. I've had enough. I've done what I had to do.

COMMISSIONER (sadly): I must say, I never expected this

from you. You want to stop fighting the government? You? Can it be you saying this? You, the most tireless prisoner in the country?

PRISONER: That's how it is, Commissioner. By the way, is it true that I am the last prisoner in the country?

COMMISSIONER (*hesitantly*): Yes. . . .

PRISONER: Well then, you can see for yourself, can't you? Everyone is convinced that ours is the best system in the world. My colleagues confessed to their crimes long ago, were pardoned and went home. There's no reason to arrest anyone anymore. I am what you might call the last conspirator. But, after all, what kind of a conspirator am I, really? Actually, I'm a stamp collector.

COMMISSIONER: That's what you say now. But who threw the bomb at the General?

PRISONER: Oh, that happened so long ago. Anyway, it never went off. There's no point in bringing it all up again.

COMMISSIONER: You know, I hardly recognize you. For ten years you refused to confess. You stood up to everything so well, and with such dignity. How many times do I remember when, instead of breaking down and signing the confession, you spat proudly at the portraits (*he gets up and stands at attention*) of our Infant and His Uncle The Regent. (*He sits down.*) We got to know each other quite well. Everything was as it should be. And now, suddenly, out of the blue, you want to destroy the past completely.

PRISONER: Because it doesn't make sense any more. If I didn't feel so isolated ideologically, perhaps I might consider going on. But when I think of our rich, happy, peaceful land which for some time now has been celebrating the glory (*he gets up*) of our Infant and His Uncle The Regent, when I realize that all the prisons in the country are empty and I am the last one to. . . . No, Commissioner, I am perfectly sincere: I have shed my former beliefs. It means something, doesn't it, that the entire population supports the government—against me? I can draw only one conclusion: our government must be good, very good indeed, and nothing I say will change the fact.

COMMISSIONER: Hmm . . . Hmmm. . . .

PRISONER: Yes, Commissioner?

COMMISSIONER (*rises and adopts an official tone*): Accepting with profound joy and satisfaction the prisoner's confession, which testifies to his metamorphosis under the educational influence of imprisonment, I nevertheless consider it my duty to find out exactly to what extent his new, encouraging and indisputably scientific views are sincere and permanent. (*He sits down and drops his official tone.*) Would you be kind enough to explain why you think our government is so good?

PRISONER: My dear Commissioner! Where are your eyes? Can't you see for yourself? Can't you see that our country has never before enjoyed such prosperity? What do I see when I pull my cot over to the window, put a bucket upside down and stand on my toes? I see a beautiful meadow

which blossoms every spring in a thousand colors. At harvest time I see the harvesters busily wandering to and fro. Even from the distance I can see their beaming faces—and they beam more and look happier every year.

COMMISSIONER: You know that the rules prohibit looking out the window.

PRISONER: Ah, but not if you have in mind ideological-educational aims. But wait, that isn't all. Beyond the meadow there is a hill and beyond the hill an industrial plant has sprung up in the past seven years. I often see its chimney smoking.

COMMISSIONER: As an enemy of untruth, I must inform you that it's a crematorium.

PRISONER: My dear Commissioner! Do you mean to tell me that the dead ought to be buried the same way they used to be hundreds of years ago? Would you really deny atheists the right to dispose of their bodies as they choose? What you're saying, Commissioner, merely confirms my belief that our country enjoys broad freedom, religious and otherwise.

COMMISSIONER: Ye . . . s.

PRISONER: Or let's take culture and the arts. How many times have I walked up and down my cell thinking about them! I was so enthusiastic when I thought of. . . .

COMMISSIONER: Yes, it's difficult to deny all this.

PRISONER: So there you are, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER: I am on duty and this prevents me from taking my work lightly. What I mean to say is I can't accept your metamorphosis just like that without an investigation. I must be absolutely sure that you have no more doubts, that you aren't wavering between this or that shade of opinion. Does everything you see around fill you with hope and enthusiasm? I can't disregard details, you know, even though in general everything seems to be fine. Now take the railroads, for instance. . . .

PRISONER: Even the most avowed enemy of our system would not dare to deny the existence of railroads in our country. (*A period of silence follows. The Commissioner and the Prisoner look at each other. The Commissioner gets up, walks to the middle of the room and paces up and down. He stops. Without saying a word, he looks at the portraits of The Infant and His Uncle The Regent. The Prisoner follows him with his eyes like someone watching the ball in a ping pong game.*)

COMMISSIONER: All right, let's take it from another angle. . . . (*he points to the portraits*) . . . Haven't you ever had any—well, you know what I mean . . . thoughts . . . (*irritably*) you know what I mean?

PRISONER: I don't quite see what you're driving at, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER (*irritated*): Really, from the way you sound now, one would think it was a pretzel you threw at the General, not a bomb. Has it ever occurred to you that (*he stands at attention*) our Regent, our Infant's Uncle, (*relaxes*) is a moron?

PRISONER (*jumps up indignantly*). Commissioner!

COMMISSIONER (*controlling himself*): All right, all right. Of course he isn't. (*Paces up and down*) That is, as far as his intellect is concerned. But you must admit that even the most brilliant mind may have a flaw of one kind or another—perhaps in its habits or preferences. (*He stops, looks at the Prisoner and winks. The Prisoner does not react. The Commissioner gets closer to him and winks again, as if wanting to communicate something extremely important but so obvious that it would be impossible not to understand. He winks emphatically with his whole head, his open eye practically popping. The Prisoner turns around, indicating that the wink must be meant for someone behind him. Silence.*)

PRISONER: Why do you wink at me, Commissioner?

COMMISSIONER (*opening his collar in exasperation*): You should be ashamed of yourself. You, an old conspirator, asking me such questions!

PRISONER: But this is precisely the result of the prison education you mentioned a while ago, Commissioner. Word of honor, I have simply forgotten what winks mean. Were you making some kind of allusion? Did it have something to do with our Infant and His Uncle The Regent? For heaven's sake, tell me!

COMMISSIONER: Then you don't think our Uncle The Regent is an old pervert?

PRISONER: He? That pure old man?

COMMISSIONER (*resumes his pacing*): All right, all right. (*He stops.*) On behalf of the Central Command I congratulate you on your transformation. (*He shakes hands with the Prisoner.*) But let's not rejoice prematurely. This goes for you—whose metamorphosis is, we hope, genuine—as well as for me—whose function it is to distrust everyone and to move cautiously. So you say you don't think our Uncle The Regent is what you realize he is? Remember, psychology teaches us that man sometimes thinks that he does not think what he thinks. What do you say to that?

PRISONER: You're right, Commissioner. That's just how it is. Sometimes it seems that we aren't thinking, but we are thinking all the same—whereas in reality we aren't thinking. Thought is a great thing, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER (*contemplative, suspicious, severe and explorative*): But only in the service of man?

PRISONER: Yes, of course.

COMMISSIONER (*impatiently*): All right then. Take a look at our Infant. Short, isn't he?

PRISONER: Like all children.

COMMISSIONER: You might almost say he was a squirt, a shrimp, a punk—eh?

PRISONER: My dear Commissioner! Were it not for your uniform and your position I might begin to suspect you meant what you said. But when the Commissioner himself says that our child ruler is a squirt—no, I can hardly

believe my ears. If a storekeeper or a bricklayer had said this to me—well, I might have had doubts. But when it comes from the Police Commissioner himself. No! In fact, your words have only strengthened my respect and admiration for our Infant and—it goes without saying—His Uncle The Regent.

(*Tired, the Commissioner sits down. The Prisoner gets up, approaches the desk and takes over. . . .*)

PRISONER: Please believe me, Commissioner. I have completely renounced my old, erroneous views. My metamorphosis has, so to speak, a dual character—an external character and an internal one, and precisely because of this double motivation my evolution is profound, legitimate and permanent—something that you're so rightly concerned about. The external reasons are those we have just mentioned—the general, universal development of our country which can easily be verified, if only by picking up any newspaper. Look around you, Commissioner. Don't shut your eyes to our successes. How can anyone say that things are not what they should be? But it's enough to take your salary as evidence that all wailing and complaining is absolutely unfounded. I have become an enthusiast and I don't hide the fact. (*He sits down in a chair which he has pushed close to the Commissioner's desk. His voice becomes more confidential.*) If, however, you doubt that such general reasons are strong enough to guarantee my re-education, I will give you others—the ones I call internal, or personal. You see, not since early childhood have I been exposed to symmetry, order, discipline and noble purpose. All I cared for and constantly thought of was freedom and more freedom. The monotony of my spiritual food—if I may use the expression—satisfied only part of my ego. Rebellion against rigidity and rules, the will to oppose limitation and authority—yes, I made the most of such feelings. But all the time I felt I was missing something. Gradually, I came to the conclusion that I was an incomplete man. And so I, a free rebel, a model conspirator, etc., acquired a peculiar kind of nostalgia. What's wrong? I asked myself. Why am I so cruelly tried by fate? Why am I deprived of the wonderful feeling of being part of a general harmony, submission and loyalty? The glorious feeling of being at one with the government? The grand feeling of political inevitability, which seemed even grander when I realized that I would not have to create the inevitability myself? Why was I deprived of the conviction that I could be active without taking any action whatever? I was indeed an incomplete man, Commissioner, and then it struck me that it wasn't too late to change my fate. The time came when the rebellious, inquisitive me died from over-exposure to rebellion and the new me was born, proudly demanding a happy, peaceful harmony, eager hope, the tranquillity that comes from joining, joining in at last. The joyful conviction that the rule of our Infant and His Uncle The Regent (*both rise and sit down*) is as good, wise and virtuous as we ourselves are—this conviction fills me with warmth—a feeling unknown, how well I realize this, to poor individualists who are limited by their very negation, and incomplete in their humanity. It is only now, Commissioner, that I have achieved

real fulfillment. Here I am—the last prisoner in this loyal flourishing country. The last blemish, the last unsightly spot in the blue firmament of our Infant and His Uncle The Regent. The one black crow whose dirty wings soil the pure rainbow of our State. It is because of me—me alone—that the police force is maintained, that judges and guards cannot go home, or empty prisons be converted overnight into kindergartens. It is because of me—me only—that you are forced to stay here, Commissioner, in this stuffy office, instead of being able to wander through multi-colored fields with a fishing rod, or maybe a hunting rifle, free at last of your stiff, tight uniform. Yes, I fervently declare that you have won, Commissioner. The police have carried out their mission successfully. I, the last man at odds with the government, lay down my arms. I want nothing but to join the choir of citizens singing the praises of our Infant and His Uncle The Regent. For the first time in the history of man the ideal State has been established—with no reservations. I, Commissioner, I was the last obstacle, the last detour on the road to glory. Today should be a great day in your life, Commissioner. It is the day of your total victory, your crowning achievement, for you have fulfilled the long, arduous task it has been your lot to perform, to which, alas, you were summoned. Today I'll sign the paper you've been asking me to sign for ten long years. I will be free and have the chance to serve my government. And what is more, I will write an open letter immediately to The Infant and His Uncle The Regent—the most humble, loving, respectful letter ever written.

COMMISSIONER: You mentioned that you were a stamp collector?

PRISONER (*surprised*): Yes, but why do you ask?

COMMISSIONER: I want you to think everything over carefully before you decide to leave us for good. It's better to think things over, you know. One usually regrets what is done on the spur of the moment. Meanwhile we could give you a bit of help with your stamp collecting. We have intelligence agents in many interesting and exotic countries. They send us reports. We'll save their stamps and give them to you—for your album. Believe me, you won't be able to get such stamps so easily on the outside.

A POLICEMAN (*enters*): The Sergeant is here.

COMMISSIONER: Show him in.

(*The Sergeant enters. He is a thick-set, rosy-cheeked fellow with a mustache twice as long as anyone else's. He limps and is supported by the Policeman. He has a black eye. He jumps to attention as he passes before the portraits of The Rulers—then sinks slowly into a chair. He is wearing a raincoat and a green hat with a small brim.*)
COMMISSIONER: So? How was it? Did you have any success? (*He looks closely at the Sergeant.*) What a sight you are! What happened?

SERGEANT: (*Moans*)

COMMISSIONER: Are you in pain?

SERGEANT: (*Nods, pulls a handkerchief out of his pocket*

and holds it over his eye. The Commissioner motions to the Policeman to leave.)

COMMISSIONER: Now you can talk.

SERGEANT: They beat me up when I tried to get them to shout anti-government slogans.

COMMISSIONER: Who beat you up? Don't tell me the—

SERGEANT: Yes, the people.

COMMISSIONER (*sinks deeper into his chair with a grim expression on his face*): I expected something like this. . . .

PRISONER: You see, Commissioner? This confirms my thesis admirably.

COMMISSIONER (*sharply*): Please don't interfere! (*To the Sergeant*) Tell me all about it.

SERGEANT: I set out as soon as I received your instruction. First I bought civilian clothes—though, as you know, I detest them. For the sake of appearances, I put on a small-brimmed green hat and a raincoat. Then I went out into the streets. First, I waited in front of the Government Office for Measures and Weights, making provocative faces—but nobody paid any attention. So I went to the square and made faces in front of the statue (*he rises*) of our Infant and His Uncle The Regent (*he sits down*). Still nothing. You know how it is—people always rush in the morning. So I left the square and got on line in front of a store that sold beer. I looked around a bit—they all seemed like plain, ordinary citizens—in the thirty-thirty-eightish wage bracket. Good, I said to myself. The line started to move, and I began thinking about what approach to take. Then, just as my turn came, I had an idea. So I said to the storekeeper—innocent-like, you know—"Give me two small ones. What the hell!" You hear that, Commissioner? I said, "What the hell!" What I meant was—small beer. That's all the government lets us have, and something ought to be done about it. But the man didn't understand, or acted as if he didn't. So he said: "Light or dark?" Well, then I let him have it—to make myself clear. "Oh, what the hell," I said. "Agriculture is going downhill, and if a person doesn't steal he'll never make ends meet." Then the people behind me stepped up closer and one of them asked if I was alluding to our reality—you know, he was a government clerk and would never allow anyone to make nasty cracks about the State. So I gave it to him good. About cattle breeding and foreign trade, and then I threw in a bit about the police, especially the secret police. And then a young man wearing one of those sport caps—you know the kind—broke through the crowd, looked me in the face and said: "Listen, buddy, leave the police alone. Who knows, maybe soon you'll begin making cracks about the army and demand the end of military service or something. And here I am called up for the Fall." And then a puny old woman, standing a little ways came up to me and began to rattle away: "You see him! Why only a week ago I went and submitted an application to have my house searched, and here he is, interfering. You know how it is when they search your house every now and then; it makes you feel free and loyal." Well, I saw that it was nothing doing. But you know me, Commis-

sioner, I've served since I was practically a kid. My duty, especially my present job as a provocateur, is sacred to me—though it's hard going sometimes and, as I said, I get sick even thinking about civilian clothes. Well, I braced myself and went on. I said a few words about taxes, you know, and then something about hospital conditions, and then finally I brought up the subject of our Infant (*he gets up*) and His Uncle The Regent. "So that's your game," they all shout. "You want to crack dirty jokes about our beloved rulers!" And they gang up on me.

PRISONER: Brave, good brave people.

SERGEANT: But (*he continues, ignoring the Prisoner's intrusion*) you know, Commissioner, while they were beating me up I was torn between two feelings—two at the same time. I was sad because I couldn't carry out your orders, Commissioner. I couldn't incite a single one of them, and so again we have no one to arrest. But at the same time I was happy, because I saw that respect and love for our Infant (*he gets up*) and His Uncle The Regent is strong and universal among the people—as you can see from my black eye. (*He sits down.*)

PRISONER (*enthusiastically, as if speaking to himself*): Wonderful people! Wonderful country!

COMMISSIONER: Try some sauerkraut for that eye of yours, Sergeant.

PRISONER: My dear Commissioner! The Sergeant's report has dispelled any trace of a doubt I may have had. I want to renounce my old views at once. I can't think of them without disgust. I'll sign the loyalty pledge this very second. Please, give me the paper, pen and ink.

COMMISSIONER (*rather resigned*): So, you won't change your mind?

PRISONER: Nothing and nobody can change my mind now. As soon as I leave this building, I'll join the busy, loyal life of other citizens. Let's have the paper.

COMMISSIONER: You give up your stamps too?

PRISONER: What are stamps to me when at last I have a chance to serve (*he gets up*) our Infant and His Uncle The Regent? What is the passion of a stamp collector compared to the beauty of serving one's country? What are albums, filled though they may be with stamps, compared to the joy of loyal service, the feeling of belonging which, for the first time, I share with others after a long, dark period of anarchy?

COMMISSIONER: All right, if that's what you want, I won't insist. Here's paper, pen and ink. You've brought it all on yourself, you know. (*Angrily, he takes the signed paper from the Prisoner, waves it, blows on it a few times, and throws it on his desk. Then he presses the buzzer and the Policeman enters.*)

COMMISSIONER: Bring him his things. (*To the Prisoner*): I'm very disappointed in you. I thought you'd be harder to crack. You were so good. . . .

(*The Policeman brings in the Prisoner's effects—a hooded coat, a mask and a bomb.*)

COMMISSIONER: You're entitled to the things you had when we arrested you.

PRISONER: Ah, these ghosts from the past. (*He takes the conspiratorial coat, throws it over his shoulders, and pockets the mask. The Policeman hands him the bomb.*) Oh no! I don't want this any more. I've finished with this sort of thing for good. Commissioner, would you like to keep this as a souvenir of the times we spent together? For old times sake, eh? It will also be constant testimony to your noble triumph over me. This is all that's left of the last conspirator! Keep the mask too. (*He pulls it out of his pocket and gives it to the Commissioner.*)

COMMISSIONER: All right, as you wish. (*Indifferently, he takes the mask and bomb from the Prisoner and shoves them into a drawer.*)

PRISONER: My congratulations, Commissioner. The last conspirator is dead. A new citizen is born. If I were you, I'd fire a few salvos and let your men take three days off. After all, what are three days really? From now on they'll have nothing to do anyway. Goodbye, Commissioner, and thanks for everything.

COMMISSIONER: Don't mention it. (*The Prisoner shakes hands with the Commissioner, the Sergeant and the Policeman, and leaves. The Policeman salutes and leaves also. The Commissioner and Sergeant sit for some time in silence. Suddenly, there is a loud, terrifying cry outside.*)

PRISONER (*shouting at the top of his lungs*): Long live our Infant and His Uncle The Regent!

COMMISSIONER (*leans back in his chair and hides his face in his hands*): My God, my God. . . .

SERGEANT (*to himself, dreamily*): Maybe I should incite him. . . .

Curtain

Act II

The Sergeant-Provocateur's apartment. On the wall, the now familiar portraits of The Infant and His Uncle The Regent, as well as a wedding picture of the Sergeant and his wife. A door, a window (conspicuously placed), a table and two chairs. On a tailor's dummy, a meticulously-cut full dress uniform of a Police Sergeant with all the necessary insignia and medals. Next to the dummy, a small screen with a pair of high boots showing. A tall plant, perhaps even a palm tree. A small table with a dumbbell on it. The Sergeant's wife and the Commissioner are in the room. The Commissioner's face is hidden by the hood of his overcoat, which he has thrown over his uniform.

He is, of course, wearing his sword.

COMMISSIONER: Good evening. Is your husband home?

MRS. PROVOCATEUR: No, he hasn't come off duty yet.

COMMISSIONER: He hasn't? I thought it was his day off?

MRS. PROVOCATEUR: He doesn't like to be idle. Is there anything special you want to see him about? *(The Commissioner walks to the middle of the room and throws back his hood.)* Commissioner!!!

COMMISSIONER: Sssh . . . Not so loud. Did he say when he'd be back?

MRS. PROVOCATEUR: No. He went to do some inciting on his own. Who knows how long it will take him.

COMMISSIONER: Please, don't let me interrupt you. What are you doing? Sewing?

MRS. PROVOCATEUR *(shyly, trying to hide her sewing)*: Eee . . . you know how it is. I'm only putting some ribbon on my husband's long johns. He doesn't like civilian clothes. . . . A little something here and there, a small military trifle, even if it's hidden, makes all the difference. *(Suddenly changing the tone of her voice: pleading)* Commissioner?

COMMISSIONER *(looking around)*: What is it?

MRS. PROVOCATEUR: Please take him off his present assignment. Don't make him wear civilian clothes while he's on duty.

COMMISSIONER: Why? What's the matter?

MRS. PROVOCATEUR: Oh, if you only knew how much weight he's lost, how miserable he's been since he began walking around in civilian clothes. He can't live without his uniform. He's wasting away.

COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry, but nothing can be done about it. You can't be a provocateur, you know, unless you're in civilian clothes.

MRS. PROVOCATEUR: Couldn't he even wear a cap? At least then he'd have something. . . .



Photo of "The Police" actors from *Encyklopedia Współczesna* (Warsaw), No. 7, 1958.

COMMISSIONER: No, he couldn't. It would attract attention.

MRS. PROVOCATEUR *(adopting a more intimate, almost confiding tone)*: Oh well, if he can't he can't. You know, its been so long since he made his last arrest. Maybe when he's with you he doesn't show how upset he is, but here, at home, he suffers so much that sometimes it's difficult to live with him. One little arrest would do him a world of good.

COMMISSIONER *(as if voicing an old truth, known to everyone)*: You can't have an arrest without a provocation.

MRS. PROVOCATEUR *(sadly)*: Oh, I doubt if there'll ever be any arrests.

COMMISSIONER: Well, what about you? Don't you know of anyone who would be suitable. . . ?

MRS. PROVOCATEUR: Oh, I wish I did. But everyone is so loyal nowadays it's hopeless. Anyway, if I'd found anyone I would have told my husband about it long ago to ease his suffering. He keeps asking me himself night and day. . . .

COMMISSIONER: How about your neighbors? Or maybe some relatives?

MRS. PROVOCATEUR: As loyal as anything—all of them. There was one old man down the street who used to complain, but it turned out that all that bothered him was a stiff back. Anyway, he died. To be on the safe side, you know.

COMMISSIONER: Yes, that's how it is. Peace and quiet everywhere. By the way, how did you meet your husband?

MRS. PROVOCATEUR: Oh, that was a long time ago. He denounced me, I denounced him—that's how we met.

COMMISSIONER: Any children?

MRS. PROVOCATEUR: Two, but I've locked them in their room. Shall I let them out?

COMMISSIONER: No, that's all right. I didn't mean to inter-

feré. I just dropped by to see your husband, that's all.

MRS. PROVOCATEUR: Maybe he's back already. He likes to eavesdrop first on the stairs. I'll look and see. *(She goes out. Her footsteps are so soft you can hardly hear them. The window opens and the Sergeant climbs through. He is in civilian clothes, of course, and holds his coat and hat in his hand.)*

SERGEANT: You here, Commissioner! What an honor!

COMMISSIONER: Sshh . . . I'm here unofficially. I'll explain later. Why are you entering your own house through the window?

SERGEANT: I came by way of the roofs. I thought maybe I'd find something illegal. I had to come back anyway, so I said to myself, why not by the roofs? It's the same distance, and you never know, something interesting may turn up. The streets are in such perfect order.

COMMISSIONER: Well?

SERGEANT: Nothing, nothing at all. All I saw was birds. Isn't my wife here?

COMMISSIONER: She just stepped outside. She thought you might be on the stairs.

SERGEANT: She always eavesdrops on the stairs, so it'll take her a little while to get back. I hope you won't be offended if I change into my uniform, Commissioner. I feel naked without it.

COMMISSIONER: Go right ahead. You're in your own home, and anyway it's your day off.

SERGEANT *(goes behind the screen)*: So it is, isn't it? But, you see, I had a feeling that today would be my day, so I went out. I tried to incite a few people this morning, but as usual it all came to nothing. All they do is walk around shouting pro-government slogans.

COMMISSIONER: If everyone in the police force worked the way you do maybe we never would have had to live to see such terrifying loyalty. What I mean to say is that thanks to you we have perfect order in the country. You deserve a promotion.

SERGEANT *(changing his clothes behind the screen)*: Don't mention it, Commissioner. You see, I just thought I'd walk around for a bit and see what I could do. I even enjoy it, you know. *(Pause. The Sergeant finishes dressing and comes out, fully dressed, sword and all, with his medals showing. He stretches with obvious pleasure.)* Ah, what a relief! At last I feel comfortable. To come home, change your clothes—you have no idea what a pleasure it is, Commissioner. Oh, I beg your pardon, Commissioner. *(He realizes that he is being too familiar and stands at attention.)* That's what civilian clothes do to me. It's demoralized me. Please forgive me, Commissioner, I ought to be more careful.

COMMISSIONER: Forget it, Sergeant. We have more important things to discuss. Send your wife out somewhere so we can be alone. She's probably still on the stairs. I have no doubt that she's a worthy woman, but I want to talk to you confidentially.

SERGEANT: Yes sir, Commissioner! *(He leaves. The Commissioner takes off his coat and sits down. Footsteps are heard. The Sergeant returns.)* I sent her to buy some water-resistant glue.

COMMISSIONER: Couldn't you think of a better pretext?

SERGEANT: It wasn't a pretext, Commissioner. My rain-coat got torn when they started to beat me up last time.

COMMISSIONER: All right, all right. Has she far to go?

SERGEANT: It'll take her at least three quarters of an hour.

COMMISSIONER: You're probably surprised to see me here?

SERGEANT: As you say, Commissioner!

COMMISSIONER: So you are surprised?

SERGEANT: I am, Commissioner. Why, I'd have expected a revolution first.

COMMISSIONER: Now, now, don't let's start dreaming, Sergeant. Although, to be frank, a vigilant Police Sergeant should always be on the lookout for revolutions. But that isn't what I wanted to say. Your work in the service has been irreproachable.

SERGEANT: How could it be otherwise, Commissioner?

COMMISSIONER: In your exemplary behavior, however, there is something that goes far beyond ordinary diligence and efficiency.

(The Sergeant jumps to attention.)

COMMISSIONER: Don't, please. Sit down.

SERGEANT: With your permission, Commissioner. I would prefer to do my exercises. That is, if it's all right with you.

COMMISSIONER: Oh, you do exercises?

SERGEANT: Yes, I do. Every day at about this time if I'm home I do exercises with the bells. I have to keep in condition so I'm ready for whatever happens. Exercising makes you strong. *(He flexes his arm.)* Would you like to see my muscles, Commissioner?

COMMISSIONER: No, I can see them from here. If you want to do your exercises, go ahead. *(The Sergeant rolls up his sleeves, takes the dumbbell from the table and walks over to a spot near the Commissioner. As he listens to what the Commissioner is saying, he does the usual exercises. Now and then he feels his muscles to see how hard they are. He may test both arms, if the director wishes. At the same time, he is deeply engrossed in his conversation with the Commissioner.)* As I said, Sergeant, you are something more than just a perfect policeman. Much more.

SERGEANT *(in the tone of a private reporting to his superior officer)*: Yes sir, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER: In you I have found a carrier of ideas.

SERGEANT: Yes sir, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER: Didn't you put on civilian clothes when duty demanded it, even though you dislike them?

SERGEANT: Yes sir, Commissioner. I'd do anything in the line of duty.

COMMISSIONER: There you are then. So what you really do is sacrifice your own feelings on the altar of duty. Right? But even this isn't all. Observing you, I have come to the conclusion that your fervor, your readiness and your loyalty go far beyond the call of your present tasks—which you perform very well even though they aren't easy.

SERGEANT: Yes sir, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER: Watching you, I am reminded of Hercules cutting wood and carrying water. No doubt such tasks were useful, and even difficult, but surely he was capable of greater things. There's strength in you, Sergeant, but it's only partially used in the course of your ordinary work. For you are far more than a mere performer of tasks. . . . You are inspired by the ideals of order and universal discipline. You are a mystic of the police spirit, Sergeant, a policeman saint. You've lost a lot of weight recently, Sergeant.

SERGEANT: I don't sleep too well, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER: That's precisely what I have in mind. Tell me, do you have dreams?

SERGEANT: Yes, but they're kind of stupid.

COMMISSIONER: Tell me about them anyway.

SERGEANT: I don't even know what it all comes from. Sometimes I think there are two of me.

COMMISSIONER: Yes, yes, go on. . . .

SERGEANT: I dream that there's one me in a uniform and another me in civilian clothes. We walk across a big field, the birds sing, it's warm. . . . And then I—I mean the two of us—that is, the two of me—well, we sort of feel like giving our all for something big, you know, something grand . . . the smell of grass, well, you know how it is, Commissioner, spring and all that. . . . And suddenly I have a terrible longing to arrest someone, anyone, even a rabbit sitting peacefully in the warm grass, or a little bird, a wagtail say, anybody or anything I can lay my hands on. . . . So there we are, the two of us, looking and looking until our eyes hurt, but there's no one, nothing in sight. And there would still be nothing even if we threw ourselves on the soft spring earth, and kicked and wept until our tears ran dry. That's where the most stupid part of my dream comes in. . . .

COMMISSIONER: Yes, go on, go on!

SERGEANT: Then I dream that I am arresting myself, Commissioner. That is, the me in uniform arrests the other me in civilian clothes. And I wake up sweating. (*It is obvious that telling the story is a very difficult affair for the Sergeant, who interrupts his exercises as he talks.*)

COMMISSIONER: What you're saying is very interesting, Sergeant, very interesting indeed. Tell me, when did you make your last arrest?

SERGEANT (*obviously upset by the recollection*): Eh, it's better not to think about it, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER: Now listen carefully to what I am going to tell you.

SERGEANT: Yes, sir, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER: Do you realize that we will never arrest anyone again, never!

SERGEANT (*dropping the dumbbell*): You can't mean what you're saying, Commissioner!

COMMISSIONER (*gets up and walks up and down the room*): And that is by no means all, Sergeant. Not only will we never arrest anyone, but your son and your grandson and your great grandson will never arrest anyone either. The whole police force is standing at the edge of a precipice, on the threshold of a catastrophe. What is the real purpose of our existence? To arrest those who commit violations against the existing order. But what if such violators no longer exist? What if, thanks to the greater and greater efficiency of a bigger and bigger police force, the last trace of rebellion—bah!—the last, tiniest echo of discontent has died out in our citizens, giving way to general and profound enthusiasm? What if love, love alone fills the hearts of all citizens for our Infant (*he stands at attention*) and His Uncle The Regent? What then? What should the police do then? I've tried to set matters straight and ordered you to play the role of provocateur. But you yourself know best how futile these efforts have been. Not only did you fail to incite anyone, but you yourself were beaten up when you shouted anti-State slogans.

SERGEANT: The swelling has gone down a bit.

COMMISSIONER: That's not what I'm talking about. I'm speaking in more general terms. The moment I have long dreaded has now come. Our last prisoner has signed a loyalty pledge and, released from prison, has gone to serve our Infant and His Uncle The Regent. I tried, I tried my best to stop him, I offered him stamps—but it was all in vain. Do you know what that means, Sergeant? It means that while we have beautiful, expensive prisons, devoted and well-trained personnel, courts and an administration—not to mention a superb filing system—we do not have a single solitary prisoner. We don't even have a suspect—not even the slightest shadow of a violation. The people have become cruelly, wildly, bestially loyal.

SERGEANT: Yes, so they have, Commissioner. I would show them if . . .

COMMISSIONER: The hour will soon strike when we will have to take off our uniforms for good. And then, Sergeant, then you'll really know what it is to long for just one tiny, brief interrogation. Then you'll know what it is to toss sleeplessly at night. No ribbons sewn on your underpants will help you then, Sergeant, believe me! You've had nights now, haven't you, though you're still in the service. Think of what you'll feel like then—when it's all over.

SERGEANT: No, no, Commissioner, stop!

COMMISSIONER: Yes indeed. They'll take your uniform, give you a civilian coat and a pair of knickerbockers and send you on your way. Go on, they'll say, get out into the fields, go to a river, take a fishing rod, or maybe a hunting rifle, and enjoy yourself. Arrest as many rabbits or wagtails as you want, Sergeant, providing it isn't off season.

SERGEANT: And there's nothing one can do about it, Commissioner?

COMMISSIONER (*places his hand on the Sergeant's shoulder and says in a warm voice*): I've come to you not only as chief of police, not only as your superior. In this hour of need we are both ordinary policemen, that's all, two simple policemen who, confronted with a disaster that threatens to destroy our whole life's work, shake hands simply and discuss—like brothers—the means of averting the danger. (*He puts out his hand, which the Sergeant, deeply moved, shakes, while wiping a tear with his left hand.*) Now, listen carefully. The man who can save us all is you!

SERGEANT: Me?

COMMISSIONER: Yes, you. Now listen! What is it that we really need? What we need is one man, just one man, we can arrest and throw in jail. Throw in jail for doing something that, at least in some degree, smacks of anti-State activity. After the many attempts we've made, it is now clear that we will not find such a man in the normal course of procedure, in—permit me to use the phrase—a natural way. We must, so to speak, create him. And for this purpose, I have selected you.

SERGEANT: I don't quite understand, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER: What don't you understand?

SERGEANT: What I'm supposed to do.

COMMISSIONER: Just what you've been doing all along. Shout anti-State slogans. But from now on, we will not tolerate your shouting, and we'll throw you in jail.

SERGEANT: Me!!

COMMISSIONER: I assure you that the task I am now entrusting you with is—from the viewpoint of police morality—nobler and loftier than arresting a citizen for an ordinary provocation. What is involved there is the mere performance of a policeman's duty—but here, we are face to face with a fervent act—not devoid of poetry—that can be performed only by a chosen, inspired, and genuinely police-minded policeman. That was what I had in mind when I said I saw in you the fire of a policeman-saint, a fire that is rare even in the best of us. I saw in you something that had long been waiting for expression, for the mission with which I am now entrusting you. You, Sergeant, will be the redeemer.

SERGEANT: Commissioner . . . I always . . . with full vigor . . . I've got a headache.

COMMISSIONER: That's all right, Sergeant, you'll be all right. Go and change back into your civilian clothes.

SERGEANT: Again? But why, Commissioner?

COMMISSIONER: You can't incite yourself dressed in uniform, can you?

SERGEANT: You mean now, this very instant?

COMMISSIONER: Of course, we've no time to lose. Change your clothes. We'll open the window so that your voice

is heard far down the street. Then you'll stand at the window and shout at the top of your lungs something against our Infant (*they both snap to attention*) and His Uncle The Regent. Then I'll take out my sword, arrest you, and that will be that.

SERGEANT: Jesus Christ, Commissioner! I'm from the police myself.

COMMISSIONER: More so than anyone else. But it's precisely because you are from the police while pretending you aren't that you are from the police more than anyone—that you are doubly from the police, I might say. It's only when you're from the police and pretend you aren't—that's what I call really being from the police, fully and genuinely, that's what I call being a super-policeman, a policeman like no other policeman, even if he is doubly a policeman.

(*The Sergeant goes behind the screen where, sighing and weeping, he changes into civilian clothes. The screen is so small that his head and calves can be seen.*)

COMMISSIONER: I'll send my report to the General immediately—today, in fact. Tomorrow our Infant and His Uncle The Regent will be informed that a conspirator has been exposed and duly arrested. We'll be saved.

SERGEANT (*buttoning his jacket*): So what shall I shout?

COMMISSIONER: Can't you think of anything suitable from your usual repertoire?

SERGEANT: How about, "The Regent, our Infant's Uncle (*he jumps to attention*) is a swine?"

COMMISSIONER: It's a little too ambiguous. You must say something simple, strong and clear, so that I'll be able to arrest you one hundred percent.

SERGEANT: What about "an old swine"?

COMMISSIONER: That's a little better. Let's open the window. (*They open the window*) One, two . . .

SERGEANT: Just a second, please, Commissioner. (*He rushes from the window, takes a brush from behind the screen, carefully brushes his uniform, now on the dummy again, puts the brush away, and returns to the window.*) All right, I'm ready. (*He takes a deep breath.*)

COMMISSIONER: One . . . two . . . three.

SERGEANT (*roars like a lion*): Our Regent, our Infant's Uncle is an old swine.

COMMISSIONER (*taking out his sword, energetically*): I arrest you in the name of our Infant and His Uncle The Regent!

MRS. PROVOCATEUR (*enters, running*): Good Lord! He's at it again. You might take a rest now and then. . . .

COMMISSIONER: Be silent, woman, this time he's succeeded.

Curtain

Act III

The Commissioner's office, as in Act I. In anticipation of the General's arrival, the Policeman is hanging green wreaths on the wall. The Commissioner and the Sergeant are seated opposite each other, the former behind his desk, the latter where the Prisoner once sat.

COMMISSIONER: You tried to saw a window bar again, and kicked the guard. It's your second attempt.

SERGEANT: I really don't know what's happened to me lately, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER: Are you lacking anything?

SERGEANT (*in a dull voice*): No, thank you.

COMMISSIONER: Well, you look as if you are. You're pale, silent.

SERGEANT: Maybe it's because I'm in prison, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER: Every day I send reports about you to the General. Thanks to you, we've obtained funds for extending the prison, training new personnel and strengthening patrols. (*The Sergeant makes a face.*) . . . The General has taken a personal interest in you and your case. He says that you're very dangerous and that it's fortunate I apprehended you in time. (*The Sergeant shrugs his shoulders.*) . . . Anyone who didn't know you would think you were unhappy about all this. The General announced that he'd be here today to witness an interrogation personally.

SERGEANT: Ech . . .

COMMISSIONER: Perhaps you're ill? Have you been sleeping well?

SERGEANT: Not too well.

COMMISSIONER: Do you dream about anything in particular?

SERGEANT: Sort of.

COMMISSIONER: What do you dream?

SERGEANT: That I'm walking across a big field.

COMMISSIONER: And you can hear the birds singing, eh?

SERGEANT: How do you know, Commissioner?

COMMISSIONER: Are you in uniform or civilian clothes?

SERGEANT: Civilian clothes. An overcoat and knickerbockers.

COMMISSIONER: Yes, and . . . ?

SERGEANT: I'm walking and all of a sudden I see a tree. I look up and there, Commissioner, you are, sitting on a branch eating cheese.



Przegląd Kulturalny (Warsaw), August 28, 1958.

COMMISSIONER: I'm sitting there eating cheese?

SERGEANT: Yes. And just as I'm standing under this tree, Commissioner, you open your mouth to arrest me and the cheese falls to the ground.

COMMISSIONER: And so you pick it up, eh?

SERGEANT: No, I don't like Gouda cheese.

COMMISSIONER (*dissatisfied*): It's a stupid dream.

SERGEANT: Isn't it though, Commissioner?

COMMISSIONER: How about a drink? (*Without waiting for a reply—to put an end to the embarrassing situation—he opens his drawer and takes out a bottle of beer and glasses and fills them.*)

SERGEANT: Thanks. (*He drinks. Suddenly, he puts the glass back on the desk.*) You know, Commissioner, I shouldn't really be drinking with you.

COMMISSIONER: Why not?

SERGEANT: Because I'm only a simple . . . Commissioner, what is it I am now, really?

COMMISSIONER: What a question! You're yourself, of course.

SERGEANT: But what does it mean to be yourself, Commissioner? For I myself don't know what I am: policeman or prisoner. Am I myself when I'm a policeman or when I'm a prisoner? Or, in other words, if I'm myself, what am I—a policeman or a prisoner?

COMMISSIONER: I explained all this when I arrested you. Now don't start all over again.

SERGEANT: It was clear then, Commissioner, because it was only the beginning and I knew very well who I was then—a good police sergeant in the secret service. Although, to be frank, things began to go wrong a little before then—when I became a provocateur. Please don't be angry, Commissioner, but now I see it was then that it all began. And if I had known then what I know now I

would have asked you to use someone else as a provocateur. Now I see why it bothered me so much to wear civilian clothes. A policeman should never take off his uniform—you know, to be on the safe side.

COMMISSIONER: But despite all that, it never entered your head to complain, did it? You worked on your own, even on your days off.

SEGREANT: Yes. Because, as I said, it wasn't quite the way it is now. I didn't even have an inkling then. And even later, when you came to my home and opened new prospects to me and said I reminded you of Hercules—even then, hard as it was, I still saw quite clearly that I was a good, first-class policeman. You said yourself, Commissioner, that I was better than the others. Things went wrong only after you arrested me and I started prison life. That's when it all began. And it wasn't so much being in prison as becoming the sort of prisoner I am. That kind of thing affects a man, you know. I began to get confused.

COMMISSIONER: Speak clearly, man!

SERGEANT: In the beginning I still remembered what it was all about, Commissioner. But later I began to have lapses, blackouts and things like that; I got scared and kept repeating to myself: I'm a policeman from the secret service, I'm a police sergeant from the secret service, super-secret at that. But later . . .

COMMISSIONER: What do you mean, *later*?

SERGEANT: Later I stopped repeating these things to myself because I couldn't understand what it was all about. But what was it I meant to say, Commissioner? Oh yes. I wanted to say that I was a simple . . .

COMMISSIONER: Simple what, for heaven's sake?

SERGEANT: A simple policeman or a simple prisoner, but whether the first or the second . . .

COMMISSIONER: You can only think in primitive terms, Sergeant. This is what happens when people without higher education are given positions of responsibility. Now in your place a man with education. . . .

SERGEANT: I wanted to say that whether I'm the first or the second, Commissioner, I shouldn't drink with you this way. Because if I'm a policeman I can't approve of your drinking here with a prisoner—me, that is—because I'm a prisoner, right? And if I'm a prisoner, a conspirator who is feared by the General himself and even the government, I can't be sitting here with you, drinking.

COMMISSIONER: Why not?

SERGEANT: Because as a prisoner I must act in accordance with a prisoner's morality, and therefore I can't drink with a representative of the law—with the Police Commissioner himself.

COMMISSIONER: Have you gone mad?

SERGEANT: No, Commissioner, but it's stronger than me. After all, can you release me now? No, you can't. So I have to stay here. And if I stay here, it's only natural that I become more and more affected by that circumstance,

right? I've tried to resist the feeling, I really have. But as the days go by, I keep feeling that something terrible is happening to me, something I don't quite understand.

COMMISSIONER: Are you sure you're not ill? Have your lungs been giving you trouble?

SERGEANT: Oh, it isn't that, Commissioner. I'm as strong as an ox. You saw me doing my exercises, didn't you? It isn't that at all. Do you know that since you've shut me up here new thoughts, all kinds of new thoughts have been coming into my head.

COMMISSIONER: You'd better watch yourself, my boy.

SERGEANT: That's what I say myself, Commissioner. For instance, when I used to ride on a train I never especially thought about it. But when a man's shut away he begins to grow a bit critical, so to speak. He remembers things and he begins to think—out of boredom, that is. And do you know what conclusion I've come to?

COMMISSIONER: How should I know? Come on, get to the point.

SERGEANT: That our railroad system is pretty bad.

COMMISSIONER: Do you realize what you're saying? I warn you, I'll take notes on what you say.

SERGEANT: Oh, go ahead and take them, Commissioner. It makes a person so angry thinking about it that he can't hold it in any more. Or take arts and culture, for example. Tell me, Commissioner, why did we persecute and molest those poor artists. . . .?

COMMISSIONER (*taking notes rapidly*): A little more slowly, please. What were those last two words?

SERGEANT: Those poor artists, I said.

COMMISSIONER: . . . tists. There (*Takes his eyes off the paper and stops writing.*) No, it's impossible. In the name of your long and faithful service, Sergeant, I must ask you if you really have such thoughts. We've worked together for so long and everything has been so nice, and here, all of a sudden—out of a blue sky—you come out with such things. Do you really believe that things are as bad as all that? Give it a bit more thought, Sergeant.

SERGEANT: Why should I? When I push my cot against the window of my cell and place a bucket upside down and stand on it I can see a meadow. The harvesters gather there every day just about this time of year. And when I watch them for a while I begin to have thoughts. If you ever saw their faces, Commissioner—they're so sour and discontented.

COMMISSIONER: But this is pure subjectivism, Sergeant. Regardless of the conclusions you may draw—loyal or disloyal—subjectivism as a method is opposed to our program. I would have had to punish you even if you hadn't mentioned their sour faces. Besides, you know very well that the rules forbid prisoners to look out the windows.

SERGEANT: Yes, but they don't apply to those who are fighting the government, Commissioner. Fellows like that won't deny themselves the privilege of committing a small, additional violation, no matter how insignificant. On the

contrary, they'll think it is their duty to do it, a kind of pleasant supplement to their careers. Anyway, the fact of the matter is I do look out my window and the crematorium I see makes me think. I wouldn't call it an economic investment, you know.

COMMISSIONER: You mean you would deprive atheists of the right to dispose of their bodies as they choose? You're against religious freedom, and at the same time you have the audacity to criticize the State's activities in other fields.

SERGEANT: They're dead, so it isn't a live argument. Anyway, even if I couldn't look out the window I still would be able to read the sayings scratched on the walls of my cell. There's nothing to do there, so I read. You know, when you think about some of those sayings you see that they aren't really that stupid.

COMMISSIONER: What kind of sayings?

SERGEANT: "Down with tyranny," for instance.

COMMISSIONER: Enough! Enough! So that's how it is! You've fallen that low. You probably think (*he snaps to attention*) that our Infant's Uncle The Regent is a moron? (*The Sergeant remains seated.*)

SERGEANT: (*sadly*): Yes, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER: And that our Infant Himself is a squirt?

SERGEANT: Yes, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER (*choking with anger and indignation*): Ha! (*All this time the Policeman has been walking about the room quietly arranging flowers and hanging wreaths. He disappears. Now he returns.*)

POLICEMAN: The General has arrived.

(*The Commissioner jumps up, hides the beer bottle, and straightens his uniform. The first person to enter, dressed in the uniform of an aide-de-camp, is the former conspirator and prisoner. He no longer has a beard but instead has acquired a policeman's mustache. He stands at attention, facing the audience, at the door through which the General is about to enter. The Commissioner and the Policeman stand at attention. Unwillingly, the Sergeant gets up. The General, decked in all his paraphernalia, enters. He also has a mustache. He walks up to the Sergeant, stops, and looks at him.*)

GENERAL: So he's the one . . .

COMMISSIONER: Yes, that's him.

GENERAL: He looks like a ringleader. Have the rest of his men been rounded up?

COMMISSIONER: Not yet, but we're submitting him to systematic interrogations.

GENERAL: A dangerous bird, eh? Have you found any explosives on him?

COMMISSIONER: No, not yet. But we haven't lost hope.

GENERAL (*emits a long whistle*): So, he's even more dangerous than I thought. A slippery character. An ordinary conspirator always carries a few pounds of the stuff. It

seems that we've gotten hold of a rare bird. What's your opinion, Lieutenant?

AIDE: You're right, General. If nothing's been found on him it means that the whole thing is deeper than it looks.

GENERAL: Permit me to introduce my aide-de-camp, Commissioner. He's recently been appointed special advisor on conspiracies and anti-State activities. An expert in the field.

COMMISSIONER: But it's impossible, quite impossible, General!

GENERAL: Are you feeling all right?

COMMISSIONER: Please forgive me, Your Excellency, if I dare . . . You've fallen victim to an error or a plot, General. This man . . .

GENERAL: Yes, go on.

COMMISSIONER: But he's the one who threw a bomb at Your Excellency!

GENERAL: Who?

COMMISSIONER: Your present aide, my former prisoner.

GENERAL: Please go on, Commissioner, proceed.

COMMISSIONER: I swear I'm not mistaken. I know him very well. For ten years he sat there opposite me, in that chair. It's impossible for Your Excellency to have such an aide.

GENERAL: What do you have to say about this, Lieutenant?

AIDE: The Commissioner is right, of course. I'm his former prisoner. The fact that he has recognized me in this uniform, and despite my changed appearance, speaks very well, very well indeed, of his powers of observation and professional qualifications.

COMMISSIONER: Don't be so arrogant, my man.

AIDE: I am indeed the Commissioner's former prisoner. But he seems to forget that I signed a loyalty pledge and was set free. (*To the Commissioner*) His Excellency has been duly informed of this.

GENERAL: Take it easy, Commissioner. I've been duly informed of this. Don't you see that I must have had good reasons for introducing the Lieutenant as an expert on anti-State activities?

COMMISSIONER: But the bomb . . . the bomb . . . I have in my drawer.

GENERAL: My dear Commissioner, all of us at one time or another have thrown a bomb at some general. It's only human. And the sooner one goes through this stage the better. As for me, I have complete trust in my aide, precisely because he has put all that behind him. There are so many people who haven't fulfilled this all too natural need. Please don't be offended, Commissioner, if I ask whether you yourself have ever thrown a bomb at some general?

COMMISSIONER: Your Excellency!

GENERAL: You see? Neither have I. Please forgive me, but

in this respect I trust my aide more than I trust you—or for that matter, myself. I suggest, Commissioner, that if you want to be a model police chief you include in your plan of operations measures which will prevent me from ever throwing a bomb at myself. Have you ever thought of that?

COMMISSIONER: No, Your Excellency.

GENERAL: There you are again, Commissioner. I would give it some thought if I were you. A general is State property, and not merely an individual who happens to hold that rank. Any attempt to indulge in that sort of thing—even by me—would have to be considered an act of violence against the army, and thus against the State. If ever you have to arrest me, Commissioner, let the fact that I am telling you this today, reporting it, so to speak, supplying you, Chief of Police, with confidential information—let this fact be an extenuating circumstance in my favor. I say this to you just in case.

COMMISSIONER: (*jumps to attention*)

GENERAL: As for our Lieutenant here, I'll tell you another thing. He entered the service only recently, came over to our side from positions which, to put it delicately, were quite opposed to ours, and he has already become an officer. Not without merit, I assure you. He deserves our congratulations for his ardor and diligence. We, Commissioner, the old guard, have arrived at our views gradually, whereas in him love for the government exploded suddenly—freshly and purely. And as for his qualifications, I hope you don't doubt he's more expert at fighting anti-State activities than practically anyone we know. So, by being unfriendly to him, you open yourself to the charge—groundless, no doubt—of simply envying him his brilliant career.

COMMISSIONER: I wish to say, General . . .

GENERAL: All right, all right. . . . I brought him along because I knew what a difficult job awaited us here with this (*he points to the Sergeant*) enemy (*he jumps to attention*) of our Infant and His Uncle The Regent. You'll see what a show he'll put on. Shall we begin? (*They take their seats and settle down comfortably. There is the commotion usual before a theater performance.*) Please begin, Lieutenant!

COMMISSIONER: I would like to point out . . .

GENERAL: There you go again, Commissioner. Your animosity towards men younger than yourself is really beginning to arouse suspicion.

AIDE: I'm afraid, Your Excellency, that you're going to be very disappointed. So will the Commissioner. As far as I can see, this case is going to be short and sweet.

COMMISSIONER: Do you really think so, young man?

GENERAL: I'm also inclined to think that you're exaggerating, Lieutenant. Because of the defendant's perfidy and cunning we have no actual proof against him—though his underground activity was clearly established when he began shouting things about (*they get up*) our Regent, our

Infant's Uncle, and the said shouts helped us to expose the criminal and led to his immediate arrest. For if he shouted such things for everyone to hear, think of what terrible things he must have said to himself—in privacy. However, we don't have any evidence that would enable us to discover his actual deeds. Consider, as proof of the above, the already mentioned fact that no explosives have been found on his person. What makes you say the case is so simple?

AIDE: Everything is indeed as you describe it, General. I couldn't—I see now—point to the defendant's hostile acts this very second—at least in so far as they have appeared on the surface. I maintain, however—emphatically, I may say—that although still uncommitted they have already crystallized in the defendant's personality, and if they are indeed still uncommitted they are nevertheless as real as if they had been committed; that is, if we accept the fact that time cannot be divided into past and present. From the point of view of this investigation, the truth is as complete and damning as any truth can be.

COMMISSIONER: May I, General—one word if you please?

GENERAL: Of course, go ahead.

COMMISSIONER: I don't deny that we have here an unusually dangerous criminal, and all those who maintain that the police have nothing to do deserve our utmost contemptuous indulgence—or perhaps ought even to be arrested. It seems to me, however, that it isn't the Lieutenant's—my colleague's—statement so much as his method that is an expression of a pleasant though somewhat immature faith in his own powers, a faith typical of all beginners.

GENERAL: Commissioner, I have already asked you to . . .

AIDE: From what I understand, the defendant began his unusually energetic anti-State activities after a long period of loyalty to and even cooperation with the government?

COMMISSIONER: Yes, that's so.

AIDE: Then we do indeed have an extremely dangerous specimen here. What has taken place is a process similar to the one which the General was kind enough to describe in connection with my person—but a process that is precisely opposite. The defendant is a man who at a relatively mature age—a fact contributing considerably to the severity of the symptoms—learned for the first time the pleasure that can be derived from feeling persecuted. As is known, this feeling gives one an illusion of superiority and dignity, just as honest loyalty and harmony with the existing views do—but the first feeling is diametrically opposed to the second, and hence very attractive to specimens who have not yet experienced it.

COMMISSIONER: I don't agree. The defendant is obviously a monstrous specimen of a criminal, but I must say that I don't quite see why he has to be worse than those who . . . who throw bombs at generals!

GENERAL: You're at it again, Commissioner! (*Consternation, grunts; the Commissioner makes angry noises through his mustache.*)

AIDE: I assure you, Commissioner, that this man, without so much as blinking an eye, is perfectly capable of throwing a bomb at three generals.

COMMISSIONER (*spontaneously speaks to the Sergeant in his old tone of superior officer*): Attention! (*The Sergeant instinctively jumps to attention.*) Tell me now, immediately, would you ever throw a bomb at the General?

GENERAL: Come on, tell us, don't be embarrassed.

SERGEANT: Oh no, Commissioner, I would never do that. It's true I have different thoughts—I don't deny it—you know, about our railroad system, agriculture, and a number of other things—but to throw a bomb at the General . . .

COMMISSIONER: (*triumphantly*): There, you see gentlemen!

AIDE (*to Sergeant, in a compelling voice*): Imagine that it's Sunday and you're walking along the street, and you just happen to have a bomb on you. You know, you don't have it for any reason, you just have it, you don't know why. And all around you there are people, crowds of people, beautiful women—and then, suddenly, you notice a general.

SERGEANT: A real one?

COMMISSIONER: (*sharply*): Sergeant, I call you to order!

AIDE: Of course a real one. The general is walking straight at you, not a step out of the way. He's simply inviting you. His medals glisten, his high boots shine. You feel that now you'll pay him back for everything, that never again will another general like this come your way.

SERGEANT: The sonofagun.

COMMISSIONER: For the last time . . .

AIDE: Well? Come on, Sergeant, what do you do?
(*Silence*)

SERGEANT (*torn by inner struggle; finally, he sighs deeply, as if giving up the vision*): No, I couldn't. (*Tension relaxes.*)

COMMISSIONER: That, I hope, is proof enough, General?

GENERAL: You know, speaking frankly, I'm beginning to wonder why you're putting so many obstacles in the way of this interrogation.

COMMISSIONER: Obstacles?

GENERAL: That's the way it looks. Do you want to prevent us from proving the defendant's guilt?

COMMISSIONER: I protest . . .

GENERAL: You're obviously doing all you can to disturb the Lieutenant in his effort to unmask the criminal, to finally expose his perfidy. I warn you that I consider it my duty to discuss your attitude with (*they rise*) The Regent, our Infant's Uncle.

COMMISSIONER: And I would like to inform Your Excellency that, as Chief of Police, I have at my disposal certain means to show Your Excellency the inadvisability of such an undertaking.

GENERAL: Are you threatening me?

COMMISSIONER: I wouldn't think of it, General. I merely wish to say that I wash my hands of the whole business and will not bear any responsibility for future developments.

GENERAL: All right then. Let's get back to work.

AIDE: May I request that the prisoner be removed for a few minutes?

GENERAL: But of course. Would you please, Commissioner. . . .

COMMISSIONER (*rings the buzzer and the Policeman enters*): Take him out into the corridor. Bring him back when I ring.

(*The Policeman takes the Sergeant out.*)

AIDE: I still maintain that the defendant is in essence guilty of throwing a bomb at the General. The difficulty is that, as a primitive individual, he lacks imagination. But I have a plan.

GENERAL: We'll be happy to hear it.

AIDE: The Commissioner has in his drawer the bomb I once threw at you, General. The bomb doesn't work—the best proof being your presence here, General. I suggest we call in the defendant and hand it to him. We'll open the door, the General will go out, and I guarantee you that with the bomb in his hand and the General before him, the defendant's instincts will be aroused—his instincts for freedom and anarchy. Unable to control himself any longer, he'll throw the bomb. And thus we'll have the best possible proof of his evil intentions as well as his crime—under conditions as close to nature as you can get.

GENERAL: But this is madness! What do you think, Commissioner?

COMMISSIONER: I think that your aide, a marvellous expert on these problems and a promising officer despite his brief service—is right. You mustn't reject the experiment out of hand, General, and hinder the investigation.

AIDE: I repeat—the bomb doesn't work. The fuse is faulty. Or at least it was when I last used it.

GENERAL: So you think, Lieutenant, that . . .

AIDE: I'm doing my duty and suggesting the best means of exposing anti-State activities. It's all for the good of (*he gets up, the others follow his lead*) our Infant and His Uncle The Regent.

GENERAL: You know, my young friend, I think you're a bit too able.

COMMISSIONER: Speaking also as your friend, General, I advise you not to hinder the investigation. I must tell you confidentially that in the secret reports I send directly to our Infant's Uncle The Regent (*they get up and sit down*) I'll be forced to describe your attitude in detail—your sense of duty, or, in this particular instance, the degree of your eagerness to expose enemies of (*they get up and sit down*) our Infant and His Uncle The Regent.

GENERAL (*obviously upset*): Show me that bomb. I'll think it over. (*The Commissioner walks over to his desk,*

takes out the bomb and hands it to the General who hands it to the Aide who returns it to the Commissioner.)

AIDE: Yes, it's the same one.

GENERAL: Are you sure?

AIDE: Positive.

COMMISSIONER: So what about it, General? You don't want to do it?

GENERAL: What are you trying to accuse me of? Make the arrangements with the defendant.

(The Commissioner rings the buzzer. The Policeman brings in the Sergeant.)

COMMISSIONER: You may go. *(The Policeman goes out.)* You're to throw a bomb at the General.

SERGEANT: Just like that, all of a sudden?

COMMISSIONER: The General will stand in the corridor, you—here.

GENERAL: Perhaps we should postpone it until tomorrow.

COMMISSIONER: As you wish, General. Or perhaps we should consult the government.

GENERAL: No, no. All right, I'm going. *(He closes the door after him.)*

(The Commissioner instructs the Sergeant; he moves his arm about, shows him how to throw the bomb, and hands it to him.)

AIDE: Are you there, Your Excellency?

GENERAL *(half-opening the door)*: Yes?

AIDE: Please leave the door open. How can he throw a bomb at you otherwise?

GENERAL: Oh yes, I'm sorry. *(He leaves the door open.)*

AIDE: Give him the mask, Commissioner. It must still be in the drawer. The illusion must be complete. *(They give the mask to the Sergeant.)*

COMMISSIONER *(finished with his instructions)*: Everything's all set. Go ahead, Lieutenant, it's all yours.

AIDE: All right, here we go. So . . . you're walking along the street . . . beautiful women all around; here, where the Commissioner stands, the sun is shining—and there *(he points to the corridor)* there is the General. His medals glisten, his high boots shine, and you begin thinking that now, finally, you can pay him back, pay him back for everything, pay back . . . the ge-ne-ral. . . .

SERGEANT: *(Throws the bomb)*

(The lights go out for a moment; there is an explosion, bright light, noise and, for a second, darkness; the lights go on again. The Commissioner and the Aide face each other in silence.)

COMMISSIONER: It seemed to me that you liked the General. As your superior he was even quite good to you.

AIDE: He wasn't quite that to you, was he, Commissioner? The fact that you've been Chief of Police all these years

doesn't exactly make it look good. A nice old age pension is something worth dreaming of, eh?

COMMISSIONER: What would you say if I arrested you now? You must admit that this bomb business is—to put it delicately—not quite clear.

AIDE: I fully agree, Commissioner. It's not clear in so far as your own participation has made it dark. We could have an interesting example of mutual arrest.

COMMISSIONER: I see that you'll go far, young man, but not as far as you hope—definitely not as far as my position—my position as Chief of Police. In fact, you'll go in just the opposite direction. I arrest you. *(Pulls out his sword and arrests the Aide.)*

AIDE: Very well. But I'm afraid that having done this you have reached the limit of your possibilities. I also want to point out that all your, I must say rather comical, efforts to charge me with responsibility for the explosion will automatically work against you.

COMMISSIONER: Is that so? And how do you figure that, young man?

AIDE: Very simple, my dear old man. You'll accuse me of anti-State feelings and intentions and of making an attempt on the General's life. You'll be asked where you were when that lieutenant—me, that is—signed his loyalty pledge and left prison. What kind of police chief are you when a prisoner can throw wool over your eyes? What kind of guardian of order are you when you couldn't see through his game, and let him go free? If you maintain that you set me free because my transformation was genuine, you'll be right, because I was indeed loyal, sincere and almost madly true to the government. But if you maintain this, you will destroy your own case and put yourself in the ridiculous position of a base intriguer. But let's get to the point. What would you say if I arrested you?

COMMISSIONER: Please don't think that the police are above arrest. No. Arrests are above the police. Arrests are above everything. I am an old-fashioned policeman. . . . So please go ahead. . . . If you can substantiate. . . .

AIDE: Of course I can. This is the way I see it: one of the basic duties of a police chief is to guard generals against attempts on their lives. And you—what have you done? You yourself put the bomb in the conspirator's hands, and showed him how to use it. Shocking, isn't it?

COMMISSIONER: Have you gone mad? It was you who suggested the whole thing!

AIDE: . . . and you who eagerly snapped up the suggestion.

COMMISSIONER: I did it under duress; you wanted it done; you insisted on carrying out the bomb experiment.

AIDE: But I'm not Chief of Police. I repeat: what is the basic duty of a police chief? A child could tell you: guarding generals from attempts on their lives.

COMMISSIONER: But the bomb was out of commission. You said so yourself.

AIDE: I won't go into that. You didn't have to believe me.

COMMISSIONER: But only a moment ago you assured me yourself that you were telling the truth—that you were loyal to the government.

AIDE: I am loyal. But you, Commissioner, as Chief of Police, should know that all that is of no particular importance; it may mean one thing or another, depending on the circumstances. See? Despite your experience, it appears that you can only reason primitively.

COMMISSIONER (*resigned*): All right, all right. Let's arrest each other until the situation is cleared up.

(*The Aide pulls out his sword and arrests the Commissioner.*)

GENERAL: (*Enters*)

COMMISSIONER: You! Alive?

GENERAL: I'm not that stupid. I hid in the lavatory.

AIDE: I want to draw everyone's attention to the fact that the cry of surprise uttered by the Commissioner weighs heavily against him. His astonishment, expressed in the sentence, "You! Alive?" shows that the Commissioner expected or absolutely counted on something else.

GENERAL: I am forced to arrest both of you, gentlemen. There are only two possibilities: either it was an accident or one of you three unscrewed the fuse. Because even we have not yet learned to arrest accidents, we are faced with the second possibility. I'm disregarding the prisoner, because he's under arrest already. That leaves you two, gentlemen.

COMMISSIONER: You're perfectly right. The Lieutenant's past will tell the court a lot.

AIDE: And the Commissioner's motives will be a classic example for those who conduct investigations. It may very well be that, aside from his other, more serious violations the Commissioner wanted to compromise the General's aide-de-camp. A very understandable motive, arising out of purely personal sentiments, but having absolutely nothing to do with service to the government.

COMMISSIONER: I regret to inform you, General, that I'm arresting you in the name of the government.

GENERAL: Me? What for?

COMMISSIONER: For carelessly exposing a general to a bomb. You're suspected of encouraging subversive activities. You yourself warned me to be vigilant and this will undoubtedly act in your favor.

AIDE: What we still have to solve is the problem of whether a policeman who has arrested a person who has arrested him can arrest a third person who has previously arrested him along with the first person who is linked to the policeman in a state of mutual arrest.

COMMISSIONER: As the arrested person you have nothing to say.

AIDE: The same goes for you, Commissioner.

GENERAL: Gentlemen, it seems that the police has its hands full.

SERGEANT: (*he has been standing silently and modestly on the sidelines; suddenly, he gives a loud shout and throws his arms up in the air. The rebel in him has been completely awakened*): Long live freedom!

Curtain

Polish Press Reactions

LIKE MEN WALKING ON eggshells, Polish theater critics have tried to avoid commenting on *The Police's* ideological implications. For the most part, reviewers have focussed on Mrozek's humorous and dramatic technique, implying that to raise the issue of Mrozek's meaning would be to raise an undesirable political storm. Some of them, disturbed by this obvious evasion, have broached the subject indirectly; others have thrown the ball back to Mrozek, asserting that the author himself denies that the play contains any hidden meanings. On August 22, 1958, the *Trybuna Ludu* critic declared, possibly with tongue in cheek: "After such a veto [in the prologue] how can one undertake to analyze allusions and allegories?" At the same time, he took issue with another reviewer for declaring that Mrozek's humor was rooted in the abstract and did not represent reality. The *Trybuna Ludu* commentator suggested that such an estimate would be unfair to Mrozek who was, after all, a highly rational writer. The *Polityka* critic, November 13, 1958, restricted himself to the bare remark that Mrozek's play was not socially dangerous. And the *Przegląd Kulturalny* reviewer, August 28, 1958, maintained that the play was ambiguous: it might be a satire on administrative order, or a satire on the "internal metamorphosis" of intellectuals. Because of this, the reviewer insisted, *The Police* was not an example of "thaw literature" but a refutation of it; that is, it did not distort issues or reality for a deliberate political purpose.

What Kind of Catholicism?

The first of these two Polish articles appeared in the pro-regime *ZYCIE WARSZAWY* of February 3, 1959; the second, in *TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY*, the organ of Catholic laymen, on August 17, 1958. Both pieces, though convolute in conception and fuzzy in expression—probably expressly so—go to the heart of the religious controversy in Poland today. The question is whether the Church is united or whether, under the impact of recent developments and influences from abroad, there are two opposing trends within it. The regime says there are; the Church denies it. This is of course not a philosophical discussion or a question of semantics. It is quite apparent that the regime favors an internal division and is not above fostering such a split. This offensive is, in milder form, a replica of the older kind of interference, applied by force in the other countries, which consists in creating pro-regime "peace" movements among the clergy. In Poland, there is still officially a truce between the Gomulka administration and the Church. Religious instruction has been re-introduced in schools and the faithful are still generally free to follow religious practices. On the other hand, following last year's raid on Jasna Gora, pressure is mounting. According to one of the speakers at the recent Party Congress, no fewer than 600 Church cases were legally "processed" in the second half of the year. The subject of these two articles, the unity of the Church, is therefore of crucial importance to both sides.

I. "Catholics and Socialism"

SOCIALIST IDEAS have invaded the world of Catholicism. . . . Christian conscience led to an intellectual revolt against Catholic leaders and the social doctrine they proclaimed. Apparently, this was the first successful revolt inside the Church in its history, and because the world has changed so basically it probably will never be condemned; it is a Catholic movement, not a potential or actual heresy.

This movement began in France. We can easily imagine how dramatic and courageous must have been the decision to proceed with a revaluation of the history of the Church and of Catholicism—for as a result of this criticism it became necessary to seek new solutions.

Next to God, man as an individual became the focus of interest. Personalism was developing. Catholics were searching for new roads to Socialism.

Also, particularly in the last two years, Poland became a center of changes and new thoughts inspired by Socialist reality and modelled on French ideas. . . . Putting one's own house in order began. . . .

The defeat of political Catholicism is nowadays even more evident. There is a growing feeling that Christianity



Against the Church's policy on birth control: title—"Spiritual Comfort"; caption—the priest says, "If God gave the children, he will give wherewithal for the children."

Szpilki (Warsaw), October 5, 1958

should undergo an internal transformation and adjust itself to new historical reality.

Within Polish Catholicism a dispute flared up over the nature of religious activity. . . . This dispute is not in the least settled. There are still many who do not see history in perspective, and there remain in Poland stains of traditional backwardness—a sad heritage of the past. . . .

Some leading Church circles at times draw astonishing conclusions from changes in the contemporary world. Being unable to oppose them directly, and fearing a basic defeat, they confront historical necessity by changing only their tactics. Their adaptation amounts to an acceptance of modern forms of action, a dressing up of old ideas in modern garb.

This "enlightened Catholicism"—if one may use such an expression—is emerging. This term, because of its historical associations, probably best defines the tendencies now spread by these Church circles. Though it is not much of a change, it is an admission of past weaknesses. . . .

However, there is concrete ground for optimism, for the practical and political victory of the Polish October was also a victory in the settling of relations between Communists and Catholics. Here we observe an interesting phenomenon: Catholics also supported our October, but of course from positions different from those of Marxists; many of them even took an active part in the political and social changes. And yet, only two years later, it can now be said that, in spite of appearances, it was precisely then that the foundations were laid for a deep and effective

laicization. What is more, a mighty blow was inflicted on all reaction, including Catholic reaction, by disarming it of its many justified and unjustified reproaches.

October has the potential of decimating political, reactionary Catholicism. It has certainly opened the door to Socialism for thousands of Catholics who were previously in the opposition. The duality in this situation is that, on the one hand, it helps to eliminate certain internal Socialist alienations, securing for men freedom, justice and some measure of prosperity, while, on the other hand, through this very freedom, it permits Catholics to live without the questionable happiness of "martyrdom for their faith."

Catholics, who thus graduated to full citizenship, now recognize their opportunities and needs as participants in the new reality. The extent of their involvement is varied, but there are at least two basic motivations; one is a recognition of the present *raison d'état* and historical necessity, and the other an ideological acceptance of Socialism. The former is widespread not only among Catholics, but is also a positivistic, patriotic stand.

Theoretically and from the point of view of future prospects, the second kind of involvement is incomparably more interesting. It can best be described as a "critical acceptance of Socialism."

II. "Neither Spanish nor French"

FIRST WE MUST ASK whether [the two varieties]—"French," and "Spanish" Catholicism—actually exist. The answer is no. There exists a universal Church and universal Catholicism and as such it lives and is spreading the gospel in *France, Spain, Poland*, etc.

The conditions which, in the course of centuries, have been created for the Church by the national "specifics" of various countries are reflected in certain variations in the customs and cultural life of the Church; this fact, however, is no indication that these specific national characteristics amount to an attribute, since the goals and the teachings of the Church remain the same *everywhere*. Also, a more or less advanced Catholic intellectual movement cannot be transformed into such an attribute, because it is being created around something that is, and always has been, unchangeable. Thus, there is no such thing as "intellectual Catholicism," although there were and still are Catholic intellectuals. . . .

It has already been said that there is no "French" or "Spanish" Catholicism, that there exists only one Catholicism. Why then, this stubborn differentiation? The answer is simple: it is the basis for a method [of polemics]. But why the persistence in application, if it is so easy to prove the artificiality of this method? Undoubtedly there must be misunderstandings which favor polemicists.

The first of these is based on an erroneous interpretation of tradition. The Church in Poland, by the nature of its existence, is related neither to French nor Spanish, but to

universal *Catholic* traditions. And as far as the methods of the propagation of its faith and cultural activities in Poland—and only in Poland—are concerned, these are derived primarily from Polish traditions that have materialized during the course of a millennium.

It is perfectly obvious that it would be nonsense to consider tradition as made up of complex phenomena not subject to discussion. Tradition constitutes the object of evaluation and choice of those elements which enhance current life, and not those which pauperize or destroy it. We do not accept as propitious to such phenomena elements such as bigotry, hypocrisy, inquisitorial mentality, intolerance, superstition and theocracy. This rejection does not stem from fear of some alleged dangers posed by "Spanish Catholicism," but rather from a fear of the aforementioned dangers threatening Catholicism *everywhere*. These are perils that are created not so much by tradition or so-called "models," but primarily by contemporary life. And there probably is no country on earth where the tradition of the Church does not contain such components as we are unwilling to associate ourselves with in this day and age.

Attempts have been made and are still being made to attack in *general* all Polish traditions of the Church; however, this neither was nor is of any advantage to contemporary life as far as the expected results of this method of polemics are concerned. Therefore, something diametrically opposite is being created in polemics: the friction of patterns or models derived from foreign tradition and the suggestion of their alleged "predominance" which makes for the appearances of an alternative situation. The existence of local tradition is thus methodically relegated to the sidelines. Undue advantage is taken of the one fact that the Church in Poland—as the *universal* Church—rightfully benefits from the experiences of the Church in other countries—which it actually does. Fortunately, however, in everyday life this drawing from foreign achievements is not another name for imitation and deference to patterns.

I believe that I have more or less explained the first misunderstanding that is being exploited by the 'per division' method of polemics.

The next misunderstanding is in my opinion associated with a phenomenon that has been erroneously and commonly termed "French Catholicism." What are we here dealing with?

We have every right to take wise and proper advantage of the experiences of the Church in other countries if these aid us in tending our flock in our own backyard. It is our prerogative to enrich Polish culture with the values inherent in the cultures of other nations, not excluding XX-th Century French Catholic culture.

The experiences of the Church and Catholic culture in contemporary France are extremely rich and varied. They encompass many fields of human endeavor, are new and, above all, attractive. And in Poland it is this combination of characteristics that, on the one hand, somewhat facilitates the tasks of persons engaged in polemics with the Church, and, on the other, causes a kind of thoroughly erroneous confusion among Catholic society.

The task of the polemist is facilitated by the fact that when holding forth on this attractiveness—however, only from the formalistic point of view (“modernity,” “trail-blazing”)—it is relatively easy for them to impute to French Catholicism . . . some sort of custom and thought-formation *antagonistic* to other, non-French, achievements. Thus, it is easy to coin the erroneous and misleading term: “French Catholicism.” In this way it is possible to use to advantage *ad hoc* simplifications such as “progressive” and “backward.” It is also easy, under pretext of respect for the “French orientation,” to introduce the fashion here, in this country, together with all social-conventional consequences detrimental to Catholic life in Poland. Much harm may be done, because fundamental knowledge of French Catholicism is as yet in the possession of only a very few and because a general consensus on this problem has not yet been arrived at.

The confusion caused by the introduction of French achievements in Polish Catholic society is, in my opinion, something that is very natural. The source of the misconceptions is the perfectly understandable and justified onset of shock and self-suggestion. . . . This gives rise to polemics which, however, are not antagonistic, and hence cannot serve the aims of our enemies. The discussion is between Catholics professing a *single* world outlook, and not between representatives of any two Catholicisms. Perhaps this internal freedom is discomfiting to persons who would prefer to see anarchy or fundamental controversy.

By succumbing to the impact of the achievements of Catholicism in France, particularly in the field of culture, certain individuals may be disturbed in their world outlook. They attempt to explain the sense and direction of these disturbances by putting forth an extremist hypothesis: “frenchness,” or “west-europeanness” creates conditions that render Catholicism “acceptable.” The existence of such theories has not been counted statistically; I suspect, however, that they are shared by certain intellectuals outside Catholicism and, among them, by those who are inclined to become Catholics. For them, it is not the Gospel that opens the door to Catholicism, but, for example, the novels of Mauriac. This approach may also be shared by a segment of the intellectual youth, raised as Catholics, but shallowly, so that under the spell of “frenchness” it arrives at a capricious imbalance: “frenchness,” for them is the *conditio sine qua non* of their Catholic world outlook. Life, however, will straighten out these “twists.”

Finally, snobbery. I suspect also that there exist people who consider themselves Catholics simply because they read Maritain or Gilson, view works by Rouault or follow plots in novels by Mauriac or Bernanos. They become “intellectuals” by the grace of circumstances—“intellectuals” of extremely doubtful quality. Such people, of course, are embarrassed by the mass forms of the faith, they are even ashamed of the sign of the cross, reducing it to some indescribable movements of the hand. They read the “Frenchmen” and flaunt their “intellectualism.” This, however, does not prevent them from harboring the most superstitious thoughts. Let us not delude ourselves: Philistinism blooms everywhere.

Therefore, in the face of the above-mentioned misunder-



Against the Church's collections of money from the faithful: a hunger-emaciated hand drops a coin into the plate held by a plump priestly hand.

Cartoon from *Szpilki* (Warsaw), October 5, 1958

standings, should we desist from being interested in the achievements of Catholicism in France and other Western nations? Not on your life! This would lead straight to a ghetto. There are persons, as well as groups, in Poland who aim at popularizing certain achievements in the field of Catholic life and culture that are both foreign and valuable to us. They do this for laudatory reasons. The implementation of such a program constitutes one of the journalistic-literary aspects of *Tygodnik Powszechny* and one of the scientific aspects of the activities at the Lublin Catholic University.

I repeat the word *popularize*. It is being done slowly, however, and those who have undertaken the task of informing and shaping public opinion are not at fault. I am afraid that a certain segment of the Catholic public opinion of Poland views our activities more as “the antics of an educated prank,” than as a *social cause* of great importance. One more thing: perhaps the goal of this work is being forgotten, and yet this goal is Catholicism and Polish Catholics. And something else: this “import” of values does not have as its aim the transformation of Catholicism in Poland into, say, French Catholicism. We are enriching, not copying.

Unfortunately, our work still has selective characteristics, or in other words: it is “elite-ized.” How? Very simply: by means of a snobbish approach maintaining that both “imported” and home-grown themes are intended only for a select group of people, namely the intelligentsia. Nothing can be more erroneous than such an attitude. Although it is true that these themes are first absorbed by the intelligentsia, this definitely does not mean that the intelligentsia is a particularly privileged social group. The intelligentsia is only an intermediary . . . conceptions setting the intelligentsia in a ghetto apart cause harm to Polish Catholic society and facilitate—by creating the fiction of an internal division—the labors of those who enter into polemics with Catholicism.

Current Developments

AREA

Reactions to Tibetan Uprising

The official Moscow interpretation of the revolt in Tibet was to accuse the "reactionary leaders of Tibet . . . acting jointly with rich feudal landlords," of starting an "armed mutiny" against the central government of Communist China. After announcing the complete defeat of the "mutineers," Moscow went on to praise the "people of Tibet" who had condemned "the dark plans of imperialist reaction" and now expressed "their firm determination to struggle further for the development of a new, democratic and Socialist Tibet." The United States, Nationalist China and the "reactionary press of Pakistan" were also blamed for instigating and supporting the rebellion. (Radio Moscow, April 5.)

The East European press and radio, with the notable exception of Yugoslavia, followed the Soviet line. Poland and Hungary in particular also took this opportunity to remind people that those who dare to organize "counter-revolutions" are bound to fail and suffer the consequences; although the 1956 Hungarian Revolt was not specifically adduced, the parallel was obvious.

Nepszabadsag (Budapest), April 3, offered the following "explanation" of the events in Tibet:

"The central . . . government of China took into consideration that the people of Tibet live under much more backward conditions than the Chinese people. . . . While China makes rapid and immense progress on the road to Socialism, in Tibet there are still strong indications of a feudal, or even of a slave society. Under these circumstances any attempt to hasten development would be a mistake. For this reason . . . the central government of China advised the local authorities of Tibet not to carry out even democratic reforms until after 1962. The Tibetan insurgents interpreted this policy . . . falsely; they thought that tolerance was a sign of weakness and believed that their time to attack had come. . . . The Chinese people's liberation army, supported by patriotic elements . . . who were serving the interests of the people, soon suppressed the revolution. . . ."

In Warsaw, *Slowo Powszechne* (April 3), the organ of the "progressive" Catholic organization, PAX, took the occasion to state that the United States has no intentions of giving material aid to anti-Communist rebellions: "America, which is using passive resistance to change relations in the Far East, has once again shown us, and underlined it, that it is not giving any aid to organizations trying to fight against Communism and that the United States does not want to grant such aid. In such cases the US limits itself to words of sympathy . . . [yet] certain circles



Early in 1957, a Czechoslovak truck caravan, using a newly-built road from China, journeyed to Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. This was the first such expedition to get to Lhasa, indeed, it was said to have been one of the first times automotive vehicles had been there. Above, with the Dalai Lama's palace in the background, a Mongol and a Korean girl, in Lhasa for a congress of Asian youth, pose with a Czechoslovak motorcycle. Below, members of the Czechoslovak expedition present a motorcycle to the Dalai Lama himself, center. This is, of course, the same Dalai Lama who, two years later, fled to India during his countrymen's uprising against the Communists.

Photos from *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), January 26, 1957

of Polish emigres still believe that the US and even England could intervene in Polish . . . affairs. This is absurd nonsense."

Yugoslav Opinion

Although terming the Tibetan upheaval an "internal affair of China," perpetrated by "reactionary forces," the Belgrade journal *Borba*, April 3, saw the revolt as "an indication of serious deficiencies in the national policy of Chinese leadership." According to the Yugoslav interpretation, the Chinese Communists, "instead of offering the people of Tibet prospects for really unimpeded national development . . . pushed the people into the embrace of reactionary forces." The Yugoslavs also drew a moral for the rest of the Communist world: "The tragic events in Tibet . . . bear out the view that the Communist Parties and Socialist States cannot close their eyes to the real problems of the Socialist world. Any hushing up of these problems or delays in their settlement inevitably causes unpleasant consequences."

The German Problem

In a bold, free-wheeling speech before the All-German Workers' Conference in Leipzig, March 7, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev elaborated on some of the Soviet pro-

posals for "solving" the problem of a German peace treaty. As far as reunification is concerned, he made it clear that "the world can exist without the reunification of the two German States . . . and not badly. . . . This is not a fundamental question." According to the Soviet leader, "the most reasonable way out would be to sign a peace treaty with the two German Republics. . . . putting on record the existing situation in Central Europe [which] would represent a decisive step toward normalizing the international situation."

In Khrushchev's mind both the collapse of the East German regime and the abolition of "the capitalist system in West Germany . . . would be unrealistic"; he also proposed the establishment of a confederation of East and West Germany. If the Western powers were unwilling to sign treaties with the two German states, the Soviet Union, and hence the East European countries, would be prepared to conclude a treaty with East Germany alone. In the light of this thesis, the Berlin question seemed to Khrushchev of secondary importance; even if West Berlin became a "free city," the Soviet Premier asserted that "no one is going to make the population of West Berlin accept a scheme of things unacceptable to them."

Question of Frontiers

None of the above remarks should have disturbed the East European governments, since essentially they constituted a demand for Western recognition of the Communist take-over in the area. The Soviet Premier, however, also trod on sensitive ground when he took up the subject of present frontiers within the orbit.



"The Royal Decree"

THIS POEM, by the Polish poet Roman Brandstaetter, appeared in the February 1959 issue of *Znak* (Warsaw).

MEN SHALL resemble landscapes,
Timeless and without color:
They shall be leafless.
In their shallow faces
No eyes shall drown in amazement.
We shall drain faces like infected marshes
And fill them with stones and sand
As are stagnant ponds
And psalms.
So shall the precipices be eradicated.
Those who wish to endure
Shall be compelled to surrender the wondrous
Climb up the steep shore—or downward.
Man shall be flat;
Man shall beseech from the low valley.

Referring to the boundary between Poland and the USSR, Khrushchev reminded his audience that "several regions come within Poland's present territory which earlier belonged to the Ukraine and Byelorussia. . . . It is known that the so-called 'Curzon Line' drew the Soviet-Polish frontier considerably more to the West than it runs at present." Passing on to Yugoslavia and Hungary, he stated that "part of the territory which used to belong to Hungary has been included in Yugoslavia, and approximately one million Hungarians live there. On the question of Transylvania, where a considerable number of Romanians as well as Hungarians live and where the interests of royal Romania and Horthy's Hungary clashed very very acutely . . . certain consequences are apparent even now."

He also went on to say: "It is known that part of the present Moldavian Soviet Republic had been grabbed by the Romanian king and was some time ago reunited with Soviet territory . . . however, among the Romanian population there are . . . people who consider that Moldavia is part of Romania." In Khrushchev's view, however, frontiers could be safely ignored: ". . . we consider that to us Communists the question of frontiers are not of major importance and that there can be no conflicts about it between Socialist countries. . . . With the victory of Communism . . . State frontiers will die off." (Tass teletype from Moscow, March 26.)

Reactions to Khrushchev's Speech

While the regimes welcomed the Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty, Khrushchev's remarks about the "secondary importance" of boundaries were passed over in silence in all the East European nations; Belgrade alone publicly took issue with him on this point, questioning Khrushchev's figure of one million Hungarians in Yugo-

Current Developments—Area

slavia and naming its own figure of 507,000. As for Khrushchev's assertion that Yugoslavia had annexed part of Hungary, Radio Belgrade, March 28, was quick to point out that Yugoslavia had only reclaimed land which a pro-Axis Hungary had grabbed during World War II.

Khrushchev's references to Poland's eastern frontier were apparently printed without comment in press releases within Poland; similarly, when *Scinteia*, the Party organ in Bucharest, reprinted the Leipzig speech, no remarks on the border question appeared.

Czechs Attack West Germany, Austria

In the spate of criticism emanating from Eastern Europe and directed against the German Federal Republic, most noteworthy was the speech of Czechoslovak Party boss, Antonin Novotny, March 25, at a meeting of Party members in Brno. In launching a general assault on "West German imperialism," Novotny began with a defense of the present Polish and Czechoslovak frontiers, quoting Premier Khrushchev as saying that "the frontiers of Poland and Czechoslovakia cannot be subject to any negotiations." Coupling his criticism of Adenauer with criticism of the German Social Democrats, Novotny claimed that the Socialist leader, Erich Ollenhauer, was one of "the most ferocious defenders of imperialism."

Austria, too, fell under the watchful eye of the Czecho-

slovak First Secretary "in connection with the growth of revanchism in West Germany." He warned, "we are watching the action of the Austrian revanchists with increased attention," and pointed out that "Sudeten-German days . . . are being prepared in Vienna with the tacit consent of the Austrian government." (Radio Prague, March 25.)

Warsaw Meetings Support USSR Proposals

Two Communist-dominated organizations, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), met in executive sessions in Warsaw and passed resolutions supporting the Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty. On April 4, at the conclusion of three days of discussion, the Bureau of the IADL produced their resolution which also stated that all proposals aimed at disengagement would be studied by its Secretariat. (Radio Warsaw, April 4.)

The resolution of the Executive Committee of the WFTU, released on April 6, repeated in some detail the Soviet position on German reunification and announced that an international conference of trade unionists and workers from European countries would be held May 8-10 on the "Oder-Neisse border" to discuss "a peaceful solution to the German problem." (Radio Warsaw, April 7.)

Equal Voices at Talks?

When the USSR agreed to a Foreign Ministers' confer-

"Let Every Man Gather Manure!"

UNDER THIS TITLE, the Yugoslav newspaper *Barba* (Belgrade), February 1, published another in its series of excellent reports from China, which are unique in their astringent and ironic accounts of the realities of the Chinese "great leap forward":

"Peiping, January 1959. 'In order to make it possible to have an increased harvest this year, it will be necessary to organize a nation-wide movement throughout the country, in the countryside and in towns, for gathering manure. Special teams should be organized in the countryside, and the masses of people in communes should be mobilized, to take part in the movement for a lengthy period to come.

"Can employees, soldiers, pupils and citizens in general, living in towns contribute to this drive? They can, since there are supplies of manure in towns as well. But the drive must be well organized.

"Let every man contribute part of his forces to our agricultural production this year!"

"This is the text of an announcement published recently by one of the leading Chinese papers. Numerous reports received from various provinces show that the general drive for gathering and manufacturing manure grows and increases steadily.

"In the Province of A . . . about two million people are taking part in the drive. About one million people on an average are permanently engaged in gathering manure in the Province of Hunan. The example of the Province of Hopei shows that utmost attention is devoted to the project.

The number of people taking part in the drive for collecting manure has risen to 3,270,000, and in quite a number of towns, it is pointed out, every household and every man is taking part.

"In ten districts and towns there are more than twenty brigades for gathering manure with over fifty thousand members. In the commune 'White Tiger,' the twenty-first brigade, with 3,792 members, has been set up, and its members have collected manure from 964 stables and lavatories, and dug out refuse from 1,115 puddles, thus collecting more than 370 tons of manure in only three days.

"The better to organize this drive and to obtain the best possible results, particular care is taken to combine political education of the masses with material rewards. Thus, the newspapers stress, by combining 'a strong drive for education in the Socialist and Communist spirit with the organization of competitions and the promotion of material stimulus, it has been possible to mobilize . . . the broadest masses to take part in the drive for gathering and manufacturing manure.'

"It is added that the fact that the drive is carried out under the leadership of the Secretaries and members of the partisan committees has greatly contributed to awakening the consciousness and activities of the masses. Meetings are organized, attended by members of communes, and these conduct widespread discussions, after which every individual household or every individual cattle-breeder is given a specific task. Competitions are organized and red flags awarded in token of recognition for the successes which have been achieved."



These three young women, shown in a display of Miss Poland candidates, were, left to right, Miss Wroclaw, Miss Rzeszow and Miss Katowice for 1958. On March 30, 1959, the official Polish press agency announced that Domicela Gorzykowska, Miss Katowice, had been arrested while attempting to leave Poland illegally. The agency stated that she had hoped to make her fortune in the West.

Photos from *Przekroj* (Cracow), September 21, 1958

ence, one of its demands was the presence of Czechoslovakia and Poland on equal terms with Western representatives. (See *East Europe*, April, p. 40.) According to press dispatches from Prague and Warsaw, the USA, Great Britain and France have insisted that the Czechoslovak and Polish Ministers attend the conference in the roles of observers; such a proposal was termed "definitely unacceptable" by Polish authorities, according to Radio Warsaw, March 22. In this same connection, the Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister met with French, British and American diplomats in Prague and demanded that Czechoslovakia take part in the conferences "as an equal partner." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], March 29.)

Yugoslavia: Attacks, Counterattacks

March and April brought no sign of a "thaw" to the "cold war" between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc. In what Belgrade has often called the "Soviet-directed distribution of roles," it was again Bulgaria's turn to take the offensive against "Yugoslav revisionism."

A blistering editorial in the Party journal, *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), March 20, entitled, "Why is the Yugoslav President So Nervous?", focused its attack on Tito's recent trip to Asia, Africa and Greece. Labeling his entire voyage as "anti-Soviet, anti-Chinese and anti-Socialist . . . a conspiracy . . . to destroy the friendly relations between the numerous nations and independent States in Asia and Africa and the Socialist States," the Party organ particularly emphasized the hostile nature of the meeting between Tito and the Greek Prime Minister: "The talks which took place in Rhodes were not devoted to . . . noble aims. On the contrary, plans were made in Rhodes for the revival of the Balkan Pact."

The editorial went on to accuse Greece and Yugoslavia of planning to dismember Albania. Then, after relegating the Yugoslav "revisionists" to an "anti-Communist swamp,"

the editorial concluded by reminding the Yugoslavs that they could not look to Communist China and Gomulka's Poland for sympathy: "A few years ago, Yugoslav propaganda used to disseminate the slander that the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Communists did not approve the criticism of Yugoslav revisionism [i.e., during the "liberal" Hundred Flowers phase—Ed.]. Now Tito's followers do not miss any occasion to slander the Chinese comrades. This same propaganda recently said that the . . . Polish Communists . . . are not in solidarity with the criticism of Yugoslav revisionism. Now after Gomulka's statement at the Polish Party Congress . . . on the schismatic role of the League of Yugoslav Communists in the international Communist movement, the Belgrade press claims that Warsaw is just repeating old slogans and that Gomulka looks at Yugoslav reality through the same telescope as the bloc."

Controversy with Poles

By underlining Poland's apparent "change of heart" toward Yugoslavia, *Rabotnichesko Delo* put its finger on Tito's sore spot. On at least three occasions recently Belgrade has taken time out to answer Polish criticisms, but the tone of these replies has been more in sorrow than in anger. The official Communist organ, *Borba* (Belgrade), March 17, explained that Gomulka's attack on Yugoslavia at the Polish Party Congress was nothing new and only confirmed Gomulka's "constant and successive adherence to that policy of pressure brought to bear on Yugoslavia which is manifest in the so-called Socialist camp." Regrettably, *Borba* reminded Gomulka that during the 1956 "Polish revolution," Yugoslavia "fully supported the efforts of the Polish comrades to surmount the crisis in keeping with the aspirations of the working masses and on the basis of the independent assessment . . . of what constitutes the real interests of the Polish working class."

In another reply to Polish criticism, Radio Belgrade,

March 21, chided the Polish Party journal, *Trybuna Ludu*, for publishing attacks on Yugoslavia by other members of the Communist bloc. Carefully distinguishing between the newspaper itself and the Polish government, the commentator suggested that "perhaps the Polish newspaper had to publish these articles about Yugoslavia, but in this case it would be normal practice to put forward the Yugoslav view as well. . . . *Trybuna Ludu* did not behave as we would have expected of a great Socialist newspaper."

A further example of the mildness of Yugoslav criticism when directed at Poland came when Radio Belgrade, April 4, reported that a delegate of the Polish Communist Party insulted Yugoslavia at a Congress of the British Communist Party: "The Polish delegate . . . joined in the most nonsensical accusations against Yugoslavia. . . . Why did [he] go so far? Perhaps [he] was afraid to remain an outsider in the attacks on Yugoslavia. . . . It is easy to see that this is contrary to the previous behavior of Polish comrades."

Replies to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia

While criticism of Poland still left the door open for an easy reconciliation, attacks against other members of the bloc were unrestrained in their harshness. Answering the above editorial in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, Radio Zagreb, March 25, stated that Yugoslavia would protest to the United Nations if the "provocative policy" of Bulgaria continued.

After an article appeared in the Slovak daily, *Lud*, March 25, commenting unfavorably on Tito's Afro-Asian tour, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Prague officially protested to the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister. (Radio Belgrade, March 25.)

Cultural and Trade Relations Normal

A sign that the Yugoslav offensive and counteroffensive have not, with the partial exception of Albania, led to a break in State relations, is seen in the number of economic and cultural agreements concluded between Belgrade and the other Communist nations. On March 31, for instance, a cultural agreement between Yugoslavia and the USSR was signed (Radio Belgrade, March 31); a conference of Polish and Yugoslav experts on the use of nuclear energy in agriculture and medicine opened in Belgrade, March 25; and a Yugoslav delegate attended the Twelfth Congress of Soviet Trade Unions in Moscow (Radio Belgrade, March 25). Furthermore, a number of specialized delegations in the fields of art, science and sport continued to cross borders in both directions.

Bloc Scores NATO

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of NATO, all the East European governments issued statements attacking the Western alliance and at the same time urging the signing of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Pact powers and NATO. The anniversary also gave the Communist bloc another opportunity to revive the issue of "West German militarism." Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki underlined Poland's continued and whole-hearted support of Soviet foreign policy, stating that



A revealing Polish cartoon on popular indifference to the current massive area-wide campaign attacking NATO and the Western position in Germany. The headline in the background reads: "Soviet Union Renews Offer to Sign Non-Aggression Pact Between NATO and Warsaw Pact Countries." The uninterested gentleman is saying: "And what's all this to me?"

Cartoon from *Trybuna Literacka* (Warsaw), April 5, 1959

"NATO has become the main instrument of the cold war . . . serving the purposes of the revenge-seeking circles in Bonn . . . [in their] campaign to shape the policy of the West . . . to their aggressive designs." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], April 2.)

HUNGARY

Collectivization

After two years of marking time, the Kadar regime has suddenly pushed over 350,000 peasants into collective farms. The new drive, which began in January, added more than a million hectares of land to the "Socialist sector" by the beginning of April, and increased the collectivized area from 13.5 percent of the land to about 37 percent. Counting the State farms (13.7 percent), the State now controls more than half of Hungary's arable land. Recent reports

Current Developments—Hungary

indicate that the drive has stopped temporarily to allow the peasants to think about their spring sowing and to give the regime time to digest its gains.

Dizzy with Success?

A lengthy interview with Party boss Kadar appeared in *Nepszabadsag* on April 4, quoting him as saying that the drive "took place faster and was bigger on a nationwide scale than I anticipated in the first days of December 1958." He maintained that a fundamental factor was "the broadening international perspective of our peasantry," who had learned in 1956 that "the cause of the Hungarian people, supported by the unity of the Socialist camp, is invincible"—i.e., that Communism was in Hungary to stay. He repeated the official thesis that the Party agitators had carefully observed the "principle of voluntariness," although he added that he would not "maintain that the gigantic mass movement affecting several hundreds of thousands of people was accomplished without a single mistake."

The chief task at present, he said, was to "consolidate" the results already achieved. On the political level, this meant extensive organizing work among the peasantry in the collective farms, ideologically unprepared for their new way of life.

"We must realize that peasants who have started a new way of life are not sufficiently aware of the order of cooperative life, its inherent possibilities and force, and are still uncertain on many questions. In addition to this we have enemies who endeavor to cause confusion in the ranks of collective farm members. The strength of organized Communists closely welded together with the members at each collective farm will make this impossible."

Another task, he said, was to turn the new collectives into functioning agricultural units, a job which he implied would be largely up to the members themselves. At present the collectives were faced with a serious lack of the implements of large-scale production which they had presumably been created to exploit, and were "struggling with many difficulties."

"Seeds for hundreds of acres, fertilizers, mechanization, and communal stalls and pigsties for large numbers of animals must be provided. Many buildings must be erected. It goes without saying that the Party, the government, and the entire working class will help in everything and to the largest possible extent. This help is limited, however, and it is a matter of decisive importance that collective farms themselves mobilize all their forces and make use of all their available resources."

(The Yugoslav news agency *Tanjug* reported from Budapest on April 1 that the government was hastily importing farm machinery from other Communist countries. The dispatch said that the government had not expected collectivization to advance so rapidly when it negotiated its trade agreements for 1959. *Tanjug* also reported that the peasants had been selling their horses under the illusion that the collective farms would be amply supplied with tractors.)

Kadar also stressed the need to find good leaders for the new collectives, stating that many peasants hung back from joining for fear that their leaders would not be "competent and humane." He added significance to the statement by saying that "perhaps half the independent peasants would join tomorrow if they were reassured in this respect."



In the Collectivization Drive

Among the methods used by the Hungarian regime in its recent successful drive for agricultural collectivization was the sending of factory workers back to the villages of their birth to agitate for collectivization. According to the Hungarian press, some workers were told not to return to their factory jobs until their parents had agreed to join a collective, no matter how long it took. Above, left, propaganda pictures of a worker back in her village and, right, the president of a kolkhoz handing out material for agitation to other workers.

Photos from *Juvendonk* (Budapest), March 15, 1959

Why Did They Join?

THE PRESSURES USED by the Kadar regime to force Hungary's peasants into the hated collective farms were candidly described by a writer in the Party literary magazine *Elet és Irodalom* (Budapest), March 13. The magazine is noted for its strict adherence to the Party line; hence the following excerpts amount to an admission by the regime itself that "not a single peasant would have joined the collective farm of his own free will."

"In Menfocsanak, my place of birth, propaganda work was [at first] carried out by the local [Party] forces. They summoned some of the men to the council house and visited some of them in their homes. The propagandists acted half-heartedly, sat down, discussed the weather, world politics, accepted the drinks offered to them and, when saying goodbye, observed: 'We have come to make propaganda for the farmers' collective; you ought to know about it in case the matter arises. Good night.'

"Yet it was in the air, like oxygen, that sooner or later this village too would have to take its turn. Various rumors spread. On a former estate the peasants, having been given the land, had dismantled the farm buildings and used the materials to build houses. Now they were told that those buildings had belonged to the State, that the peasants had not paid for the materials, and that they would be forced to pay for them if they refused to join the collective farm. In other places—so I was told—council members were summoned to the council hall and then taken to Győr, to the Red Star Hotel, where they were offered drinks. Toward dawn every council member signed

an application to join the collective farm. When they returned home in the morning in high spirits they were welcomed by a collectivized village. During the night the whole population had joined the collective because they feared that the council members had been imprisoned.

"The factory workers were sent to their home villages on leave without pay and told to return only when they could bring back a certificate from the council attesting that their parents had joined the collective farm. They were also told to use persuasion, and that if their parents should decide to remain independent for five years then they too should stay at home for five years.

"In one village it was simply announced by beat of drum that from that day onward the village was a collectivized village and that everyone was to behave accordingly. Socialism was proclaimed. . . .

"I am convinced that not a single peasant would have joined a collective farm of his own free will, without being won over or organized. (I speak only from my own experience!) Why? Because, from a subjective point of view, the peasants had no interest in any sort of change. Compulsory deliveries and the compulsory sowing plan had been abolished in 1956 [after the October Revolt] and since then the peasant had lived like a lord. During the last two years he regained his strength and grew richer; why should a medium peasant, who has 20 horned cattle in his contract for which he will pocket 200,000 *forint* in a year's time, join a collective farm? Yet he did join. He wept for his young oxen for three nights and then signed the application. Why? For various reasons. . . ."

Private Farmers Needed

In the latter part of March the press had begun telling those peasants who had not joined collectives that they need not fear discrimination by the government. Kadar reiterated this theme in his interview, stating that the private peasant was, after all, "our ally and working brother," and begging him to go ahead with his spring sowing as if nothing had happened. While the Party favored collectives, it realized that "we can only lead the remaining individual peasants to the road of Socialism if we respect them and have confidence in them, if we continue to understand each other as we have done up to now." He promised that the Party and government would continue to help the private peasants "to increase production as much as possible in their small-scale farms."

Collective Farm Statutes

New rules for collective farms were set forth in a government decree on March 19. The decree made a concession to the property-owning instincts of the peasantry by stipulating that members would be paid rent for the land they brought into the collective—as was done until recently in

Bulgaria. It required, however, that the new member hand over "all the land which is in his possession or is owned, rented or used under any other lawful arrangement by any member of his family, including pastures and woods; he may retain for his own use only the lawfully determined household plot." This provision was apparently intended to prevent dissident members of the peasant's family from going their own way with some of the family land. The decree assured elderly people that if they gave up their land they would be assured a livelihood in the form of rent or a share of the crop value, even if they did not work for the collective farm. However, all land except the small household plots was to be the legal property of the collective farm. (*Nepszabadság*, March 19.)

Other decrees were promulgated giving more favorable terms to collective farms in the marketing of their produce. The farms will be paid a bonus on fruit and vegetables delivered to the government, particularly for out-of-season produce. They will also be allowed to make contracts with institutions other than the State purchasing agencies (such as hospitals and factory canteens), and to sell their surplus produce on the free market anywhere. (*Nepszabadság*, March 14.)

Partial Amnesty Decreed


A decree of the Hungarian government granting an amnesty for many serving prison sentences pointedly excluded those who had been involved in the 1956 Revolt. The main provisions of the decree were as follows:

"All those will be absolved from any penalty who were sentenced to not more than two years imprisonment for crimes committed before May 1, 1957; prison terms of those sentenced to not more than four years will be cut in half. Full amnesty is granted . . . to minors, pregnant women, mothers of children under the age of 10, women over the age of 50, men over 60, who committed their crimes prior to May 1, 1957, with the following exceptions:

"Amnesty will not be extended to leaders and instigators of counterrevolutionary organizations, those condemned for war crimes or crimes against the people . . . those guilty of severe crimes against public property as well as persons who have had two or more convictions." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], April 3.)

Zoltan Tildy Pardoned

The six-year sentence given to Zoltan Tildy for his part in the 1956 uprising was also suspended "in view of his remorseful attitude and his advanced age." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], April 3.) Tildy, one of the leading figures of October Revolt, had been the first postwar Premier of Hungary in 1945 and chief of the Smallholders' Party; he was imprisoned from 1948 to 1955.



There has recently been a very notable increase in the amount of attention paid to Africa in the press of the area. The emphasis is, of course, on the "anti-colonial struggle" of the Africans. The map above, captioned "Africa in Revolt," shows the political status of various areas, and indicates the locality of various "anti-imperialist movements." It illustrated an article on current African turmoil entitled "The Paradise of the Cat-o-nine-tails," in the Hungarian weekly *Orszag Vilag* (Budapest), March 25, 1959.

New Sentences

Almost at the same time as the publication of the amnesty, Radio Budapest, April 1, announced that several so-called counterrevolutionists had been arrested, tried and sentenced. Charged with "setting up an anti-State organization after the armed defeat of the counterrevolution," Ferenc Merey, Sandor Fekete, Jeno Szell, Gyorgy Litvan and Andras Hegedus received prison sentences ranging from 2 to 10 years.

Fortieth Anniversary of Bela Kun Regime

After years of official disgrace, Bela Kun, founder of the short-lived 1919 Hungarian Soviet Republic, has been spectacularly rehabilitated, and the "glorious memory" of the 1919 Soviet will now be legally celebrated in Hungary. For the occasion every country of the Soviet bloc, including Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam, sent delegations to Budapest, and in the speeches which followed, neither Stalin's name nor the fate of Bela Kun, a victim of one of Stalin's purges, were ever mentioned; Lenin, on the other hand, was lauded at every opportunity. It seems evident from the proceedings that the purpose behind the celebration was to demonstrate to one and all that Kadar's Hungary has no relation to the Stalinist Rakosi regime, but is linked directly to the Leninist period and to the Hungarian symbol of the era, Bela Kun's 1919 Soviet Republic.

The anniversary was also used to draw a parallel between the defeat of the First Hungarian Soviet and the "counterrevolution" of 1956. Premier Ferenc Munnich, in his main address, March 20, made this clear:

"If the First Hungarian Soviet Republic made a mistake, it was not that it dealt too harshly with its enemies; on the contrary, the mistake was that it was too lenient with them. . . . We have learned from the experiences of the Soviet Republic that the forces of the counterrevolution must be resolutely crushed. . . .

"The counterrevolutionary uprising in 1956 tried to repeat with the help of international imperialism what was done by Horthy Fascism in 1919, namely the restoration of capitalism. . . . In essence, the counterrevolutionary uprising of 1956 produced little that was new compared with 1919 and 1920. . . . And in the same way as Peidl [Socialist Premier for a few days after Kun's fall] in 1919 presented 'entente democracy,' Imre Nagy and his followers in 1956 presented their 'national Communist' prevarications, democratic and humanist slogans, to cover up the essence of the counterrevolution." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], March 21.)

No Top Kossuth Prizes

The Kossuth Prizes, awarded by the government for "prominent scientific, artistic or production achievements" (which include stipends ranging from 20,000 to 75,000 forint), were announced on March 15 in the Budapest Party daily *Nepszabadsag*. This year, for the first time, no one was named for the top award in the 50,000-75,000 forint category. *Nepszabadsag* offered the following explanation for this omission:

"As in previous years, the government applied the prin-

ciple . . . that only . . . works . . . on the highest level . . . may be considered. The application of this principle, correct in every respect, was reflected by a stricter judgment . . . and also by the fact that no one received the first prize. . . . This attitude makes the honor for those who did receive a prize even greater and increases the value of the prize itself."

In the past the Kossuth Prizes have been generally awarded to a large number of writers; this year only Lajos Hatvany, a noted historian and critic, and Mihaly Dobozsy received them. Dobozsy has been known as a friend of Party boss Janos Kadar, and his play "The Tempest," on the "counterrevolution" of 1956, was recently performed in Budapest.

Private Medical Practices Curtailed

A recent government decree has made it impossible for a physician to devote his time exclusively to private practice; only if the doctor has a full-time job in a State organization will he be allowed to have some private patients. The Minister of Health will be the final authority to determine "under what circumstances a physician may have a private practice." (*Nepszabadsag*, March 28.)

Labor Competition Pushed

As part of the economic speed-up announced by the Central Committee on March 6 (aiming "to achieve by the end of 1959 a few of the most important [economic] targets planned for 1960"), the regime has begun to revive the old system of work competition in the factories. Party bigwigs toured the factories urging the workers to exceed the previously planned targets. Dezsó Kiss, the Party leader in Csepel, wrote in *Nepszabadsag* on March 10 that the basis of the new competition would be work brigades. "The chief advantage of this method is that the competition is based on the fundamental organization of production, in which the output of the individual worker becomes the concern of the whole little collective." He admitted that "the number of Socialist labor brigades is still very small."

First Party Secretary Kadar told the Budapest Party Committee on March 12 that the production speed-up was of vital importance to the consolidation of the new collective farms, which needed machinery and materials that only the factories could supply. "Party organizations must mobilize all forces . . . they must give advice to the labor competitions, which will be organized by the trade unions on the basis of expert guidance." (*Nepszabadsag*, March 13.)

A meeting of the National Council of Trade Unions on March 14 was given over almost entirely to the subject of labor competition. Politburo member Jenő Fock discussed the form that the competition ought to take, concluding that "the best method is the competition of individuals within one plant. Various forms of this method can be applied, with particular emphasis on competition between brigades." The task of the trade unions was to guide the competition and make sure that it produced results.

"The competition of brigades for the title of Socialist is of greater political significance than other brigade com-

petitions. . . . Yet, in many instances, brigades simply call themselves Socialist and no criterion has thus far been set which would determine who is worthy of that title. In my opinion, it is the task of the trade union to make such a decision. . . ."

Family Allowances Raised

As of April 1, 1959 family allowances have been raised for all workers and for members of agricultural collectives. According to *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), March 27, "workers living on wages or salaries, members of artisan cooperatives and persons living on pensions will receive a higher family allowance if they support three or more children. The monthly family allotment for three children will be raised from the present 180 forint to 300, and for each additional child the allotment will increase by 120 forint. Family allowances for families with two children will remain unchanged."

The allotment for single (*sic*) working women with one child will be increased from 30 forint monthly to 90 forint; the allotment for two children will be raised from the monthly 75 to 240 forint; for three children, it will become 300 forint monthly, with another 120 forint per month for each additional child. A single woman who was also a member of a collective previously received nothing for her children; under the new law, she will be allowed 70 forint monthly after her first child, and 140 forint after two children.

Other members of collectives will receive the following

At the Lowest Level

THERE IS a little-remarked feature of Communist society which might be called the Provincial Filtration Effect, or the Yokel Warp. In this process, intricately articulated ideological concepts embodying subtle distinctions and redefinitions worthy of a medieval scholastic are formulated at the highest level, as, for example, at the recent Third Congress of the Polish Party. These are embodied in directives which, unfortunately, must in the final event be acted upon by the hearty, unsophisticated bureaucrats of the basic Party organs in the countryside. In the translation, much, often everything, is lost.

An example of this effect was cited by the Warsaw weekly *Polityka*, March 7, 1959:

"A reporter from a central newspaper went to a small town in the district of O. Talking to the Secretary of the basic Party organization, he asked about the success of the local verification [i.e., Party purge].

"It's going very well," said the Secretary. "We have dismissed seventeen comrades — sixteen for revisionism and one for dogmatism."

"This surprised the reporter a little, so he asked, 'You had only one dogmatist? How did he differ from the Party line?'

"Oh," replied the local Secretary, 'he refused to vote for the dismissal of the other sixteen.'"

SWIA



PORTRET
z wystawy obrazów
skłó Edwarda Hartwig
w „Ziemiach”

The Polish Third National Photographic Exhibit opened recently in Warsaw. Above, one of the entries, "Portrait," by the noted Polish photographer Edward Hartwig, as reproduced on the front page of the Warsaw weekly *Swiat*, March 28, 1959.

amounts for children under ten: for three children, the present allotment of 144 *forint* per month will be raised to 210 *forint*, with an increase of 70 *forint* for each additional child.

Reactor, Space-monitoring Station Built

The Hungarian atomic energy commission announced that the first two-megawatt experimental atomic reactor, purchased from the Soviet Union, was completed and in operation on March 25. Presumably the reactor will be used for research and training purposes and the production of medically-useful isotopes. (Radio Budapest, April 3.) A station for monitoring space satellites has been constructed on the outskirts of Budapest, according to Radio Budapest, April 1.

BULGARIA

US Diplomatic Ties Restored

On March 27, Washington and Sofia announced the re-establishment of diplomatic relations after a lapse of nine years. The break occurred in January 1950, when the Bulgarian government linked the then US Minister Donald Heath with a "pro-American spy ring," and named him in this connection as a culprit in the treason trial of Traicho Kostov. Following Stalin's death in 1953, Kostov was rehabilitated, and the evidence presented at the trial was declared false. Radio Sofia, March 28, welcomed the new agreement "because after nine years conditions are once more being created for the development of the tradi-

Current Developments—Hungary, Bulgaria

tional friendship between the two peoples." No mention was made of the original cause of the rupture.

Government Reorganization

On March 14 the Bulgarian National Assembly approved the wholesale reorganization in governmental structure that had been announced by First Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov at a Central Committee meeting in January. Modeled on the system of *sovnarkhozy* introduced in the Soviet Union in 1957, the reform abolishes six of the central ministries and decentralizes their functions among 30 administrative-economic districts or *okrugs*. The *okrugs* will replace Bulgaria's former district and county governments. (See *East Europe*, March issue, p. 42.) The ministries abolished are: Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Food Industry, Electrification and Water Economy, Construction and Building Materials, and Communal Economy, Public Works and Roads. The Ministry of Public Health, which was also to be abolished, has been retained but divested of its social welfare department. Some of the control functions of the former ministries were transferred to four governmental committees: Industry and Technical Progress, Construction and Architecture, Labor and Prices, and State Control.

Personnel Changes

Minister of Heavy Industry Tano Tsolov was made chairman of the Committee for Industry and Technical Progress; Minister of Electrification and Water Economy Kimon Georgiev was transferred to the Committee for Construction and Architecture; and Minister of Communal Economy Stoyan Tonchev will be chairman of the Committee for Labor and Prices. The heads of the other abolished ministries, Stanka Tsekova (Light Industry), Atanas Dimitrov (Food Industry) and Radenko Vidinski (Construction), were relieved of their duties. In addition, Boris Taskov, Minister of Trade, was relieved "because of his failure to cope with his work" and replaced by Rayko Damyanov, a First Deputy Premier. Ninko Stefanov was appointed chairman of the State Control Commission. (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], March 15.)

1959 Economic Plan

The Assembly also approved the economic plan for 1959. This is to be the first year of Bulgaria's "great leap forward," calling for a faster rate of economic development aimed at doubling the country's industrial output in 1962 as compared with 1957, and trebling the production of agriculture in the same period. (See *East Europe*, March, p. 43.) The targets for 1959 are of Chinese magnitude. The overall volume of industrial production is to rise by 27.8 percent, and of agricultural production by 73.9 percent. Total capital investment is to increase by 43 percent, from 4.3 billion *leva* in 1958 to 6.1 billion in 1959. More than 36,000 hectares of new land must be irrigated. Work is to start on six new coal mines, a new fertilizer plant, a sulfuric acid factory, the electrification of the Sofia-Plovdiv railroad, etc., etc. The productivity of labor in industry,

however, is planned to increase by only 8.3 percent, so that most of the rise in production will presumably come from an increase in the working force. Although the plan is even more ambitious for agriculture than for industry, the latter will receive 57.9 percent of total investment and the rural sector only 13.4 percent. Heavy industry will get about 20 percent of the total.

Percentage increases over 1958 in the production of chief items are scheduled as follows (for 1958 output see *East Europe*, April, p. 53): coal, 18; electric power, 23; pig iron, 46; steel, 7; rolled steel, 7; nonferrous concentrates, 23; lead, 38; zinc, 9; cement, 48; calcined soda, 10; bricks, 55; tiles, 32; chemical fertilizers, 111; freight cars, 69; tractor-cultivators, 720; internal combustion engines, 122; cotton fabrics, 22; woolen fabrics, 20; shoes, 14; canned vegetables, 79; canned fruit, 32; sugar, 23; bread grain, 10; fodder grain, 106; sunflower seed, 69; raw cotton, 81; tobacco, 35; sugar beets, 92; vegetables, 50; tomatoes, 56; grapes, 25. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 13.)

1959 Budget

The Assembly approved a state budget 36 percent larger than last year's. The details, as given by Finance Minister Kiril Lazarov in his speech to the Assembly (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 14), compare with last year's approved budget as follows (in billions of leva):

	1958 Planned	1958 Realized	1959 Planned
Revenue	19.9	20.6	27.1
National economy	17.7	—	24.4
Turnover tax	7.3	—	7.8
Profits of enterprises....	2.5	—	4.7
Other	7.8	—	12.0
Revenues from the population	2.2	—	2.6
Direct taxes	1.1	—	1.2
Expenditures	19.8	20.3	26.9
National economy	11.1	—	17.5
Social and cultural	4.9	—	5.6
Education	1.6	—	1.8
Science, art, culture	0.5	—	0.6
Health and recreation..	0.9	—	1.0
Social security	1.8	—	2.2
National defense	1.7	—	1.7
Administration	0.7	—	0.6
Unspecified	1.5	—	1.5
Surplus	0.1	0.3	0.2

The great expansion in the new budget is, of course, dictated by the ambitious economic drive. The key figure is the 17.5 billion leva to be spent on the national economy, as compared with last year's 11.1 billion. The necessary increase in revenue is to be drawn from the returns on this investment, but the budget is not very clear as to the nature of the returns. Proceeds of the turnover tax, an important source of revenue previously, are not expected to increase significantly; enterprise profits will account for a relatively small proportion; and revenues from the collective farms and machine tractor stations are to total only 778 million leva according to the Finance Minister.

The budgets for the People's Councils were increased from 3.2 billion leva in 1958 to 7.8 billion in 1959, as a consequence of their greater economic functions under the administrative reorganization.

Snags in the Economy

While the National Assembly was grinding out laws to implement Todor Zhivkov's theses on the "big leap forward," the Party press found much to criticize in the way the program was being carried out, particularly in agriculture. One complaint was that the peasants were lackadaisical. *Rabotnichesko Delo*, February 21, said that the cotton-growing plan showed alarming lags, especially in the regions of Burgas, Plovdiv and Turnovo. While there was much lip-service to the scheme, very little work was getting done. On March 4 the paper criticized slow progress in building irrigation systems and reclaiming land. Radio Sofia, April 1, said that in some localities near Sofia less than half of the planned reclamation work had been done, and that in some villages scarcely 20 percent of the irrigation program had been carried out. The canning industry was found to be in serious difficulties by *Rabotnichesko Delo* on April 2: the construction of new canneries and expansion of old ones was lagging; materials and spare parts were in short supply; and the trade apparatus, undergoing a thorough reorganization, had been unable to furnish essential supplies to the canneries.

Clash With Turkey

After accusing Greece and Yugoslavia of having aggressive designs on Albania (see Albania, below), Bulgaria turned to the third member of the dormant "Balkan Pact," and attacked Turkey for having signed a bilateral agreement with the United States, which would allow the creation of "atomic and rocket bases in Turkey." (Radio Sofia, April 8.) An official protest was handed to the Turkish

Squalor in Lodz

GENERALITIES ABOUT the severe shortage and poverty of housing in much of the area, and particularly Poland, are commonly heard. The following figures on the Polish city of Lodz, cited in a speech to the Third Party Congress by the Secretary of the Lodz City Party Committee, give vivid form to the reality behind those generalities:

"Lodz has the highest percentage of one-room apartments [47] and the average number of inhabitants per room is 2.9. 75 percent of the city buildings have no sanitary installations and 230,000 persons must still depend on local wells for their water supply. 320,000 of the 700,000 city dwellers must still live in homes that have no plumbing facilities at all and half a million of the city's population have no gas. Only 12 percent of the city's paved street surface has been repaired, while 54 percent can be described as nothing but plain dirt roads without even street lamps." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], March 13, 1959.)



The Bulgarian press seems to have led the area in reacting to the uprising in Tibet and the flight of the Dalai Lama; almost immediately it produced the cartoon above, typical in its crudity and blatant disregard for the political decencies, let alone mere truth. The Tibetan says: "We don't want any such Dalai Lama."

Cartoon from *Sturshel* (Sofia), April 3, 1939

Minister in Bulgaria, who refused it, according to Radio Sofia.

"Elections"

On April 5, elections for councillors, judges and members of the jury for the "people's courts" were held throughout the 30 new "administrative-economic districts," organized in January to replace 13 former territorial divisions (see above). Radio Sofia, April 7, announced the routine, all-but-unanimous vote ("99.82 percent") for the candidates of the regime's Fatherland Front.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Nazi Occupation Anniversary

The March 15th anniversary of the German occupation of Czechoslovakia and the establishment of the Fascist "Slovak Republic" came as a windfall to the regime in the midst of its violent campaign against West Germany (see above). To commemorate this date a memorandum from the Czechoslovak government was handed to the diplomatic representatives of 41 States and released to the press. The text of this document took care to point out the "similarity" between the aims of the present West German State and the Hitler regime, accusing Chancellor Adenauer of publicly declaring that "the Germans from Poland and the Sudetenland must return to their homeland." In contrast, the East German regime was hailed as "peace-loving" and "democratic." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], March 13.)

Among the other exhibitions and speeches marking the anniversary was the publication in the Party organ, *Rude Pravo*, March 16, of a report that the Prague Jewish community (usually ignored by the press) had honored the memory of the victims of Nazi persecution during the Second World War at a special ceremony at the Jewish Town Hall, March 15.

"German Spies" Expelled

A highlight of the World Ice Hockey Championship matches held in Prague during March was the discovery that two West German women who had come as spectators were, in fact, "hired as spies by the American espionage services." A press conference was arranged for them on

March 14 where they "admitted their guilt," and they were expelled. (*Rude Pravo*, March 15.) On their return to West Germany they revealed that they had been threatened with ten years imprisonment if they did not sign confessions.

Shake-up in Slovak Council

Following a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, held in Bratislava, March 11-12, the Presidium of the Slovak National Council announced the following changes in the Slovak Board of Commissioners [Cabinet]:

Jan Marko, Commissioner of Finance, was removed from this position, but retained his post as Deputy Chairman of the Board. The new Commissioner of Finance will be Jan Marcelly, until now Commissioner for Food Industry and Bulk Buying; his former post will be filled by Jozef Gajdosik. Dr. Mikulas Kapusnak was relieved of his position as Commissioner for Justice and Dr. Ladislav Geso, Deputy Prosecutor-General for Slovakia, appointed in his place. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], March 14.)

Pravda (Bratislava), March 7, reported that the Slovak National Council met briefly the previous day to approve the budget for Slovakia, which had already been adopted by the National Assembly in Prague in February. (See *East Europe*, April, p. 51.)

Fourth Congress of Collective Farms

The Fourth Congress of Collective Farms, held in Prague March 19-22, reflected the latest policies of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in agriculture. The chief points of interest were the recent decision to permit Czechoslovakia's collective farms to own heavy machinery, a prospective change in the compulsory delivery system to take effect in 1960, and a requirement that the farms invest more of their profits and consume less. (*Zemedelske Noviny* [Prague], March 20-23.)

The 1,500 delegates—more than half of them collective farm chairmen—were told by First Party Secretary Antonin Novotny that by 1961 all of Czechoslovakia's farmers would be in collectives. (Private peasants still farm more than 20 percent of the arable land.) He stressed the importance of raising agricultural production—which has stagnated in recent years—40 percent by 1965, and of raising farm labor productivity by 60 percent. He admitted that small-scale production "still predominates" in the collective farms and promised that the machine industry would be directed to supply them with agricultural machinery as rapidly as possible.

The new Minister of Agriculture, Lubomir Strougal, told the Congress that the contemplated reform in State purchasing prices would eliminate the present system of compulsory deliveries (now largely abandoned in the Soviet bloc) and substitute State prices "which will be fixed in such a way as to cover average production costs and encourage the collective farms to expand the production of their chief marketable products."

The Congress amended the model statute for collective farms to provide that the farms must invest from 10 to 12 percent of their gross income in fixed capital, rather than

7 percent as hitherto. Another amendment dealt with the payment of the members. First Secretary Novotny had emphasized that too great a proportion of members' earnings were given to them in kind rather than in cash, with the result that the collectives ran short of fodder for their animals and "an undesirable increase [occurred] in the numbers of privately owned animals." The statute was amended to provide that payments in kind not exceed the consumption requirements of a family and an acceptable number of livestock.

Fascist Leaders Sentenced

In March 1958 members of the right-wing Slovak "Hlinka Guard" were tried for crimes committed in 1944-45. (See *East Europe*, May 1958, p. 43.) This year, another curiously belated discovery of Fascist criminals was announced, when *Rude Pravo* (Prague), March 27, reported that after a four-day trial, five members of the former Hungarian Fascist Party, the "Arrow Cross," were sentenced, March 26, for crimes committed in eastern Slovakia during the wartime Hungarian occupation. The sentences ranged from 22 years imprisonment to death.

French Seize Czechoslovak Ship

On April 7, French warships forced the Czechoslovak freighter *Lidice*, bound for Casablanca, Morocco, to enter the Algerian port of Oran; a cargo of what the French claimed were arms destined for the Algerian rebels was confiscated. The Czechoslovak government officially protested this action to the French charge d'affaires in Prague. (Radio Prague, April 10.) After four days the ship was released.

ROMANIA

1958 Plan Fulfillment

The government's report on the economy in 1958 (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], April 3) claimed impressive performance in every sector except agriculture, which had a bad year. Industry as a whole overfulfilled its plan by 3.9 percent, according to the report, increasing production by 9.7 percent above 1957. Labor productivity rose by 5.3 percent. The report said that three new steel furnaces and two rolling mills had been put into operation along with three chemical plants, additions to the electric power network, increases in oil refining capacity, and several smaller industrial plants.

The report gave figures for industrial production as follows (percentage increases over the previous year in parentheses): pig iron, 737,000 tons (7.4); steel, 932,000 tons (7.8); rolled products, 777,000 tons (17.2); metallurgical coke, 563,000 tons (29.2); coal, 7,387,000 tons (4.7); crude oil, 11,336,000 tons (1.4); methane gas, 5.1 billion cubic meters (9.6); electric power, 6.2 billion kwh (13.7); tractors, 7,003 (27.3); grain combines, 5,901 (156.5); motor vehicles, 6,842 (27.8); bearings, 2,839,000 (22); calcined soda, 83,323 tons (23.5); caustic soda, 41,053 tons

(22.6); chemical fertilizers (pure content), 28,926 tons (58.7); organic dyes, 3,082 tons (15.4); cement, 2,687,000 tons (11); lumber, 3,496,000 cubic meters (minus 0.4); window glass, 11,618,000 square meters (13.8); fabrics, 273 million square meters (10.5); footwear, 24,078,000 pairs (10.2); radio sets, 138,642 (22.7); refrigerators, 5,433 (103.8); sewing machines, 49,057 (60.2); bicycles, 100,004 (63.7); meat, 226,296 tons (12.7); meat products, 46,534 tons (11.6); fresh fish, 33,815 tons (7.6); semi-preserved fish, 7,978 tons (14.2); milk, 1,101,000 hectoliters (16.5); butter, 10,161 tons (53.9); cheese 36,636 tons (33.5); edible oil, 63,842 tons (10.4); sugar, 188,082 tons (1.5).

Poor Harvest Year

Grain production was only 7.3 million tons as compared to more than 11 million tons in the unusually good harvest of 1957. This left a long way to go to reach the target of 15 million tons in 1960, called for by the Five Year Plan. The report gave considerable space to comparing crops in the "Socialist sector" with those of private farms, claiming that the former had considerably higher yields per hectare. It said that the area of arable land in collective farms had increased 19 percent since the end of 1957, reaching 1.7 million hectares, but it gave no figures for the amount of land still in private hands. (On March 1, 1958, collective farms had about 12 percent of the arable land. State land amounted to another 26 percent, and "associations" of private farmers included 15 percent. The "Socialist sector" thus totalled 53 percent of the land.)

Average wages, according to the report, rose by 6.7 percent. The consumption of food rose by somewhat larger magnitudes both in towns and in the countryside.

Cabinet Reshuffled

By government decree, Emil Bodnares, Minister of Transport and Telecommunications, Stefan Voitec, Minister of Consumer Goods, and Gherasim Popa, Minister of Heavy Industry, were removed from these posts, although they retained their cabinet positions as Deputy Premiers. The new heads of the three ministries, all former Deputy Ministers, are Dumitru Simulescu (Transport and Telecommunications); Alexandru Sencovici (Consumer Goods); Carol Loncear (Heavy Industry). (Radio Bucharest, April 11.)

The Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications had previously come under fire at the Plenary Session of the Party's Central Committee, November 26-28, 1958, when Party boss Gheorghiu-Dej criticized it for unsatisfactory control of funds, the absence of fixed prices and the handling of production costs. In March, Gheorghe Safer, one of the Deputy Ministers of this department, had been termed "unsuitable" and relieved of his post. (*Rominia Libera* [Bucharest], March 22.)

Land Expropriation

By government decree, many independent peasants will be forced to give up their lands and enter collectives. In Romania, where collectivization has been proceeding at



In March the World Ice Hockey Championship finals were held in Prague. Above, a tense moment in the Canada-Czechoslovakia match; Czechoslovakia won this game, but Canada won the championship, followed by the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The authorities in Prague took care to utilize the occasion for propaganda; for example they provided Western visitors with extensive materials on the recent price reductions.

Photo from *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), March 21, 1959

a slow pace, the new decree "forbids sharecropping, the leasing of land and the hiring of farm laborers," and restricts private holdings to those farmers who are able to work the land themselves or with the help of their families. The executive committees of local councils are to decide if the peasant possesses land beyond the working capacity of his family; if so, his land will be incorporated into a collective, although provisions, as yet unspecified, are to be made for compensating the owners of expropriated lands. (Radio Bucharest, March 29.)

Increased Party Control in State Farms

Another decree, announced over Radio Bucharest, March 28, concerned the reorganization of State farms. So-called farm councils are to be set up which will include representatives of each section of the farm and, most important of all, a Party Organizer who will direct the political activities of the farm, supervise labor discipline and defend "the State property against thefts, embezzlement [and] sabotage." The farm council will also make periodic reports to the district and regional Party organization.

Part-Time Education

In an effort to eliminate "hooligans" and to "improve the quality of students from the working classes," a decision by the Party's Central Committee and the Cabinet was taken affecting the selection of students and teachers for evening and extension courses. For general evening courses, "student candidates must be graduates of apprentice, artisan or agricultural schools with at least one year's work in production . . . the selection of these candidates will be made on the basis of good production records and active participation in civic life. . . . Teachers will be required to have had at least five years' experience and a corresponding political and ideological level."

For specialized technical evening extension courses, the new system will permit "workers, foremen and technicians

active in production to get university training in their own . . . fields without absence from production." The Party organizations will have the task of insuring a "just selection" of candidates who must possess a high school diploma, have three years' specialized experience, and, above all, "must be sons of the working class." (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], April 11.)

POLAND

De Gaulle Supports Oder-Neisse Boundary

Warsaw welcomed French President Charles de Gaulle's statement, March 25, that German reunification seemed to France "to be the normal destiny of the German people provided that this does not bring into question [the present German] frontiers, north, south, east or west." (*Le Monde* [Paris], March 27.) The Paris correspondent of the Party organ, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), March 26, commented: "Whatever the motives, this declaration of General de Gaulle should be welcomed because it underlines the unchanging quality of Germany's present frontiers as an essential condition of the unification of Germany and the maintenance of peace in Europe." (For Polish reaction to Khrushchev's reference to the eastern frontier, see above.)

New Press Code

A mixed Polish commission including jurists and reporters has been organized to draft a "Press Code" which will be submitted to the Sejm [Parliament] in eight months, according to Western sources. The code will allegedly establish the principle of "cascade responsibility" for libel, i.e. if it proves impossible to institute legal proceedings against the chief editor of a guilty paper, the rest of the staff, including technicians, may be brought to trial in descending order of administrative responsibility.

Weeklies "Merge"

The Warsaw periodicals *Swiat i Polska* and *Polityka* merged as of April 1, according to Radio Warsaw, April 5. Although termed a "merger" this might well be interpreted as a ban, since *Swiat i Polska* had been previously labeled as "Western-minded [and] exhibiting revisionist tendencies." (See *East Europe*, April, p. 43.) *Polityka*, on the other hand, has generally been considered an organ of the Gomulka wing of the Polish Party.

Cinemas Under Local Control

As part of the current trend toward decentralization, the office of Polish Cinematography will place 2,600 motion picture houses under the jurisdiction of National Councils [organs of local government] by June 30, 1959. (Radio Warsaw, March 21.) Special departments to administer municipal and county cinemas are to be established in all provinces in place of the now-operating District Motion Picture Theater Administrations. These new departments will have "a free hand in the choice of repertoire."

ALBANIA

1959 Budget


The People's Assembly passed the budget for 1959 on March 4. The figures, as broadcast by Radio Tirana that evening, are as follows, compared with the budget approved in 1958 (in billions of *lek*):

	1959	1958
Revenue	27.7	26.7
National economy	23.8	21.8
Expenditure	26.9	26.2
National economy	16.6	16.7
Social and cultural	5.7	5.2
National defense	2.1	2.1
Administration	0.8	0.7
Surplus	0.8	0.5

Religion and the Rise of Capitalism

THE FOLLOWING report from Poland indicates that the spirit of private enterprise is still vigorous. It appeared in the weekly *Tygodnik Demokratyczny* (Warsaw), March 4-11, 1959:

"Human ingenuity—especially where business is concerned—knows no bounds. Toward the end of [last] year two crafty people bought up all the pictures of Karl Marx in Czestochowa [Polish city, site of major Church shrines]. They painted golden halos over his head and sold them as framed pictures of Saint Joseph. They managed to sell almost their whole stock before they were nabbed. The courts of Czestochowa are now investigating the incident."



There have been recent complaints in Poland, among them one from Premier Cyrankiewicz, that the current drive against bureaucracy is merely displacing the bureaucratic morass from the highest levels of centralized administration to the lower local levels. In this cartoon the citizen on top stands at the entrance to a maze in which the obstacles are marked "Minister," "Section Chief," "Department Director," "Central Administration Director," etc. Below, the citizen stands at the new, low-level maze, with obstacles marked "President of the District National Council," "District National Council Secretary," "Deputy Department Director," "Subinspector," etc.

Cartoon from *Szipilki* (Warsaw), April 5, 1959

Greek-Albanian Border Incident

On March 31, the Albanian government sent a note of protest to Greece via the UN Secretary-General, alleging that a dozen Greek soldiers crossed the frontier on March 30, killing one Albanian soldier and wounding another. (Radio Tirana, April 1.) The incident provided the Albanian regime with yet another excuse to excoriate Yugoslavia. The Party journal, *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), April 1, in an article entitled, "A Premeditated Criminal Act," asserted:

"The shameful crimes committed . . . by the Greek armed forces against the Albanian soldiers undoubtedly please the Yugoslav revisionists, because the latter carry out the same criminal activities against the Albanian people; [however], the Greeks commit their provocations on the border, whereas the Yugoslav revisionists commit them in Belgrade. The facts prove that the hostile policy of chauvinist Greek circles is coordinated with the policy of the Yugoslav revisionist leadership against the Albanian People's Republic."

Recent and Related

Warsaw in Chains, by Stefan Korbonski (Macmillan, \$6.00). In his previous book, "Fighting Warsaw," Stefan Korbonski, the last acting leader of the Polish Underground, described life in Poland during the Nazi occupation and the Soviet "Liberation." Now he presents, in diary form, the events between July 1945 and November 1947: those were the years of the short-lived "coalition" government joined by the former Prime Minister of the London-government-in-exile, S. Mikolajczyk. The Polish Peasant Party, to which both Mikolajczyk and Korbonski belonged, was endeavoring unsuccessfully to oppose the Sovietization of Poland. In spite of common goals and organizational ties, Mr. Korbonski is outspoken in his criticism of Mikolajczyk, and their views differ on important issues. The book is lively and readable and succeeds in recreating the unique atmosphere of that period; it also contains much penetrating political commentary and vivid portraits of leading Communist and non-Communist personalities. An epilogue, written in exile, tells briefly the story of events following the author's escape from Poland, and dramatically describes the Poznan insurrection and the October 1956 upheaval. Index.

The Soviet Crucible, edited by Samuel Hendel (*D. Van Nostrand*, \$8.50). The editor attempts to make evident the overall patterns and developments in Russian history which have resulted in the Soviet system. In order to present the Soviet government in theory and practice he has collected significant selections from the works of men who shaped Soviet history and ideology—Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Khrushchev—along with commentaries by such scholars and authors as Isaac Deutscher, Sidney Hook, E. H. Carr, Milovan Djilas, Harrison Salisbury and Bertram Wolfe. Bibliography, index, illustrations.

Child of Communism, by Ede Pfeiffer (Crowell, \$3.50). Life behind the Iron Curtain is shown through the author's account of his childhood experiences. He puts particular emphasis on describing the educational system enforced in Hungary and the manner in which a Communist government molds and indoctrinates children, and tells of his struggle against poverty after the Russians took over in Budapest, his participation in the Hungarian Revolt, and his final escape to the West.

The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, by William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki. Two volumes. (*Dover Publications*, \$12.50). The long overdue new edition of a classic of modern sociology first published in five volumes between 1918 and 1921. It is a product of the collaboration between the eminent American sociologist William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, "the founding father of Polish sociology," who resided in the US from 1915 to 1919, and from 1939 until his death in 1958. This work is a study of cultural patterns of Polish peasant life in its original setting, and of the processes of acculturation in the US. Even today, after more than forty years, the book still remains a mine of illuminating information. It is equally important as a milestone in the development of modern sociological theory and general methodology. Particularly noteworthy are its introduction of the uses of personal documents, the classification of human wishes into four groups, the theory of attitudes and values, and the theory of social disorganization. In post-war Poland Znaniecki and his "school" became a subject of violent attack: however, after October 1956 the status of Polish sociology changed and, although officially Znaniecki's works are still labeled "bourgeois sociology," translations into Polish of some of his English books are reportedly being prepared.

Journey to Poland and Yugoslavia, by John Kenneth Galbraith (*Harvard University Press*, \$3.00). An entertaining, informal journal which Harvard Professor of Economics Galbraith kept while lecturing in Poland and Yugoslavia in Spring of 1958. He records his impressions of people, places and events, as well as conversations with government and labor officials, professors, teachers, students and journalists. Appendix, notes.

Russia and the Soviet Union, by Warren B. Walsh (*University of Michigan Press*, \$10.00). This work on Russian history embraces a span of more than one thousand years, from Russia's very beginning to the present. Of its twenty-nine chapters, nineteen deal with the pre-1917 period, and ten with the events of the Soviet era. Written, as the author says, "for the general reader," for people unfamiliar with the subject, the book is a popularized narrative of events, ideologies, leaders, and governments. Notes, index.

The Nineteen Days, by George Urban (*William Heinemann, London*, 30 shillings). A straightforward, factual account of the 1956 Hungarian Revolt by a BBC reporter. The book contains little in the way of new information, but is notable for its objective presentation and its emphasis on the role of broadcasting. Foreword by Salvador de Madariaga. Appendix A—three British eye-witness accounts of the Revolt; Appendix B—two BBC broadcast talks; Appendix C—the Declaration by the Soviet Government, "The Community of Socialist Nations", of 30 October, 1956. 17 black and white photos taken during the Revolt. Index.

Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, by Merle Fainsod (*Harvard University Press*, \$8.50). Based on the Smolensk Archive, a group of Soviet documents captured by the Nazi armies when they seized the city of Smolensk in 1941, and subsequently taken by American forces from the Germans. The 200,000 pages of the Archive covered all aspects of Soviet rule in the area from 1917 through 1938, and this selection and analysis gives an authentic behind-the-scenes view of a typical Russian city, the lives of its people and its rulers, as they were recorded in Party, governmental, and police reports. Index.

What's Wrong with US Foreign Policy, by C. L. Sulzberger (*Harcourt, Brace*, \$4.50). This book gives a detailed account of America's policy, war tactics, alliances, and economic interests. It also analyzes the US State Department's role overseas, discusses the similarities between the US and the USSR, and gives specific examples of how foreign governments and people think and feel about America. Index.

A Room in Moscow, by Sally Belfrage (Reynal & Company, \$3.50). A non-political account by a young American girl of her five months' visit to Russia, where she found many friends with whom she shared ideas and problems.

Bibliography of Books in Polish or relating to Poland, published outside Poland since September 1st, 1939, Volume 1: 1939-51. Compiled by Janina Zabielska (*The Polish Library, London*, 2 guineas). The second volume, covering the years 1952-1959, is scheduled to appear shortly.

East Europe
Free Europe Committee, Inc.
2 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK 16, N. Y.
Return Postage Guaranteed

Sec. 34.66, P.L. & R.

**U. S. POSTAGE
PAID**

New York, N. Y.
Permit No. 13933

*Form 3547 Requested
Forwarding postage guaranteed*



Printed in U.S.A.